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INT·RODU.CTION 
On September 21, 1931, the rep.tesen-
tative of the Chinese Government at 
Geneva wrote to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League of Nations asking 
him to bring to the attention of the 
Council the dispute between China and 
Japan which had arisen from the events 
which took place at Mukden on the 
night of September 18-19, and appealed 
.. o the Council under Article II of the 
~ovenant to "take immediate steps 
to prevent the further development of 
a situation endangering the peace of 
nations." 
On September 30th the Council · pass-
ed the following resolution: 
"The Council 
" l. Notes the replies of the Chinese 
and Japanese Governments to the ur-
gent appeal addressed to them by its 
President and the steps that have 
already been taken in response to that 
appeal; 
"2. Recognizes the importance of the 
Japanese Government's statement that 
it has no territorial designs in Man-
churia; 
"3. Notes the Japanese r epresenta-
tive's statement that his Government 
will continue as rapidly as possible, 
the withdrawal of its troops, which 
has already been begun, into the rail-
way zone in proportion as the safety 
of the lives and pToperty of Japanese 
nationals is effectively assured and that 
it hopes to carry out this intention ln 
full as speedily as may be; 
"4. Notes the Chinese representa-
tive's statement that his Government 
will assume responsibility for the safety 
of the lives and pTOperty of Japanese 
nationals outside that zone as the with-
drawal of the Japanese troops con-
tinues and the C&inese local authorities 
and poJiFe forces are re-established; 
"5. Being convinced that both Gov-
ernments are anxious to avoid taking 
any action which might disturb the 
peace and good understanding be-
tween the two nations, notes that the 
Chinese and Japanese representatives 
have given assurances that their re-
spective Governments will take all 
necessary steps to prevent any exten-
sion of the scope of the incident or 
any aggravation of the situation; 
"6. Requests both parties to do all 
in their power to hasten the restora-
tion of normal relations between them 
and for that purpose to continue and 
speedily complete the execution of the 
above-mentioned undertakings; 
"7. Requests both parties to furnish 
the Council at frequent intervals with 
full information as to the develop-
ment of the situation; 
"8. Decides, in the absence of an} 
unforeseen occurrence which might 
rende:.:- an immediate meeting essential. 
to meet again at Geneva on Wednes-
day, October 14, 1931, to consider the 
situation as it then stands; 
"9. Authorizes its President to can-
cel the meeting of the Council fixed 
for October 14th, should he decide, 
after consulting his colleagues, and 
more particularly the representatives 
of the two parties, that, in view of 
such information as he may have re-
ceived from the parties or from other 
members of the Council as to the 
development of the situation, the 
meeting is no longer necessary." 
China Suggests Inquiry 
In the course of the discussions that 
proceeded the adoption of this resolu-
tion, the Chinese representative ex-
pressed the view of his Government 
that "the best method that may b~ 
devised by the Council for securing 
the prompt and complete withdrawal 
of the Japanese troops and police and 
the full re-establishment of the sta-
tus quo ante, is the sending of a neu-
tral commission to Manchuria." 
The Council held a further session 
for the consideration of the dispute, 
1 
from October 13 to the 24. In con-
. sequence of the opposition of the 
Japanese representative, unanimity 
could not be obtained for the resolu-
tion proposed at this session. 
The Council met again on Novem-
ber 16th in Paris and devoted nearly 
four weeks to a study of · the situation-
On November 21st, the Japanese re-
pre_sentative, after stati,ng that his 
Government was anxious' _that the re-
solution of ., September. 30th should be 
observed in the spir~t , ·and letter, pro-
posed. that a corru;n\~ion of inquiry_ 
shoulp be sent to th~ spot. This pro-
posal was subsequently welcomed by 
all the other mem ~rs of- the Council 
and on December 10, 1931, the follow-
ing resolution was unanimously 
adopted: · · 
"The . Council 
"l. Reaffirms • the ' resolution -passed 
unanimously by . it,· on September . 30. 
1931, by which: th~ two parties declare 
that they are ·solemnly bound; itr,there-. 
fore calls upon the Chinese and ·Japa.-
nese Governments to take .. all steps 
necessary to assure its execution so 
th~t the ·withdrawal ·· of . the Japanese 
trqops within the .. railway zone· may 
be .. :eJfected a;a ;\ speedily I as possible 
under the cpnditic)n's set forth in the 
said resolutioh; 
"2. Considering that events have as-
sumed an . even more serious aspect 
since the Council meeting of Octo~r 
24th; 
"Notes that the two parties under-
fake to avoid any further aggravation 
of the situation and to refrain from 
any . initiative which may lead to fur-
ther fighting and loss of life; 
3. Invites the two parties to con-
tinue to keep the . Council infoqned as 
to the development of the situation; 
"4. Invites the other Members of 
the Council to furnish the Council 
with any information received from 
fueir representatives on the spot; 
"5. Without prejudice to the car-
rying out of the above-mentioned 
measures; 
"Desitung, in view of the special 
circumstahces of the case, to . contri-
bute toward a final and fundamental 
solutio,n by the 1 wo Governments of 
the. questions at · •issue between them: 
''.Decides to ;ippoin~ a commission of 
five· members to study o.n the spot and 
i 
to report to the Council on any cir-
cumstances which, affecting interna-
tional relations, threaten to disturb 
peace between China and Japan, or 
the good understanding between them, 
upon which peace depends; 
"The Governments of China and of 
Japan will each have the right to 
nominate one assessor to assist the 
commission. 
"The two Governments will afford . 
the commission all ' facilities to ob- · 
tain on· the · spot whatever information 
it may require; · : · 
''It ls Understood that. should the 
two parties initiate ·any negotiations, 
these · would not fall within the scope· 
of the terms of· reference of the com-
mission, nor would it be within the 
competence of the commission t<> in- · 
terfere · with the military arrange-
ments of' ~ither party. ' ~, 
"The appointment and deliberation 
of the commission shall not prejudice 
in any way the underta),c\pg given by 
the Japanese Government m. the , ,re- . 
solution of September 30th as regards 
the withdrawal, of the Japanese .~roop.5 
within the railway z~me. 
"6. Betw~en now and its next ordi-
nary 8~s~on, . which will be held on 
January .25th, 1932, the Council, which 
remains seized of the matter, invites 
its President to follow the question 
and to summon it afresh if necessary." 
Briand Makes Declamtion 
In introducing this resolution, the 
President, Mr. Briand, made the fol-
lowing declaration: 
"It will be observed that the reso-
lution which is before you ; provides 
!or action on two separate lines; (1) · 
to put an end to the immediate threat 
to peace; (2} to facilitate the final 
solution of existing causes of dispute 
between the two countries. . · 
"The Cou'1cil was glad to find dur .. 
ing its present sittings that an in-
quiry · into the circumstances whkh 
tend to disturb the relations between 
China and Japan, in itself. desirable, 
would ' . be acceptable to the parties. 
The Council therefor'€ welcomed the 
proposal to estabUsh a commission 
which 'Fas brought before i~ on 
November 21st. The final paragraph 
of the ·resolution provides for .the ~p-
poinfmeµt :;ind ., functioning of such a 






.. ' I . shal~ now make certaip _commeJ:?,ts 
?n t~ fes_olution, paragra_ph )?r ·:~f~a-
~ap : •I , ' ; I 
.. .. "Patagtaph 1.-::This paragraph re-
affinn.s . the resolution unanimously 
~dop"ted by the Council on September 
?~h, 1ayir,ig particular stress on the 
· withdrawal of the Japanese troops 
within the railway zone on the condi-
tions described therein as speedily as 
possible. 
'The Co:.mcil attaches the utmost 
importance to this resolution and is 
persuaded that the two Governments 
will set themselves to the · complete 
fulfillment of the engagements which 
tliey assumed on September 30th. 
''Paragraph 2.-It is an unfortunate 
fact that, since the last meeting of the 
Council, events have occurred which 
. have seriously aggravated the situa-
tion, and have given rise to legitimate 
apprehensionl It is indispensable and 
urgent to ubstain from any initiative 
·which may , lead to further fighting, 
- and from · all other action likely to 
aggravate the situation. , 
"Paragraph 4.-Under Paragraph 4, 
the Members of the Council other 
than the parties are requested to con-
tinue to furni~h the Council with in-
formation received from their repre-
zentatives on the spot. 
"Such information having proved of 
high value in the past, the. Powers 
who have the possibility of sending 
such representative3 to various local-
ities have :c-greed to do all that is 
possible to continue and improve thP 
·present system. 
· ''For thJs purpose, those Powers will 
keep in touch with the two pat;ties, so 
that the latter may, should they so 
desire, indicate to them the localities 
to which they would desire the dis-
patch of such ,;epresentatives. 
"Paragraph 5.-Provides for the in-
stitution of a commission of inquiry. 
Subject to its purely advisory charact-
er, the terms of reference of the com-
mission are wide. In principle, no 
question which it feels called upon to 
study will be excluded, provided the 
question rela1es to any circumstances 
which, affecting international rela-
tions, threaten to disturb peace be-
tween China ~nd Japan, or the ~ood 
understanding between them upon 
which peace depends. Each of the 
two Governments will have the ~ight 
.~P r~u-~~ Y~f
1
.fom~issipn }~ -~onsider 
any -~~esf10~--1 t~1. . ex~~inabon of 
whi_cIJ,_ ·. -~~ r1 ~~rv~u_larl;r . :?~ir~s. ,' ,'.J:'ne 
comnnJ:s,¥>p .~-~~!; , P.~Yi:? ~
1 
_fu1J d1stret~?n 
to detetj_hine tfie. _questf~ upon which 
it will report to the Council, and will 
have power to make interim rt!ports 
when IJ~sirable. 
"If', f~~ unde~a~tngs given · by the 
two parties according to the , resolu-
tion of :-September'. 30th have . not been 
·carried crut by'· the •tinie of the arrival 
of the commission~ the commissioh 
should as speedily ·as possible report 
to the Council .. on ' the situation. I 
'
1It is specially provided that, 'should 
thP. two parties initiate any negotia-
tions, tlrese would not fall within the 
scope of the terms of reference of the 
commission, nor would it be within the 
competence of the commission ;o in-
terfere with the lJlilitary arrangements 
of either party'. This latter provision 
does not limit in any way its faculty 
of investigation. It is also clear that 
the commission wi~l. enj9y full liberty 
of movement in order to obtain the 
information it may require for its re-
ports." 
Japan Makes Reservation 
The Japanese representative, in ac-
cepting the Resolution, made a reserva-
tion concerning paragraph 2 of the 
rernlution, st~ting that he accepted it 
on hehalf of his Government "on the 
understanding that this paragraph was 
not intended to preclude the Japanese 
fore es from taking such action as might 
be rendered necessary to provid~ di-
rectly for the protection of the lives 
and property of Japanese subject 
against the activities of bandits and 
lawless elements rampant in various 
parts of Manchuria." 
The Chinese representative, on his 
part, accepted the resolution, but asked 
that certain of his observations and 
reservations on points of principle 
should be placed on record as follows:-
"!. China mu~t and does fully re-
serve any and all rights, remedies and 
juridical positions to which she is or 
may be entitled under and by virtue 
of all the provisions of the Covenant, 
under all the existing treaties to which 
China is a party, and under the accept-
ed principles of international law and 
practice. 
"II. The present arrangement evi-
denced by the resolution and the state-
3 
ment made by the President of the 
Council is regarded by China as a 
. practical measure embodying four es-
sential and interdependent elements: 
(a) Immediate cessation of hostili-
ties; 
(b) Liquidation of the Japanese oc-
cupation of Manchuria within the 
shortest possible period of time; 
(c) Neutral observation and report-
ing upon all developments from now 
on; , 
(d) A comprehensive inquiry into 
the .entire Manchurian situation on 
the spot by a commission appointed by 
the Council. 
The said arrangement being in ef-
fect and in spirit predicated upon 
these fundamental factors, its in-
tegrity would be manifestly destroyed 
by the failure of any one of them to 
materialize and be effectively realized 
as contemplated. 
"III. China understands and expects 
that the commission provided for in 
the resolution will make it its first 
duty to inquire into and report, with 
its recommendations, on the with-
drawal of the Japanese forces, if such 
withdrawal has not been completed 
when the commission arrives on the 
spot. 
"IV. China assumes that the said ar-
rangement neither directly nor by im-
plication affects the question of re-
parations and damages to China and 
her nationals growing out" of the re-
cent events in Manchuria, and makes 
a specific reservation in that respect. 
"V. In accepting the resolution laid 
before us, China appreciates the ef-
forts · of the Council to prevent fur-
ther fighting and bloodshed by enjoin-
ing both China and Japan to avoid 
any initiatbe which may lead to fur-
ther fighting or any other action like-
ly to aggravate the situation. It must 
be clearly pointed out that this in-
junction should not be violated under 
the pretext of the existence of law-
lessness caused by a state of affairs 
which it is the very purpose of the 
resoiution to do away with. It is to 
be observed that much of the law-
lessness now prevalent in Manchuria 
is due to the interruption of normal 
life caused by the invasion of the 
Japanese forces. Th~ only sure way 
of restoring the normal peaceful life 
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is to hasten the withdrawal of the 
Japanese troops and allow the- Chi-
nese authorities to assume the respon-
sibility for the maintenance of peace 
and order. China cannot tolerate the 
invasion and occupation of her terri-
tory by the troops of any foreign 
country; fa::.· less can she permit these 
troops to usurp the police functions 
of the Chinese authorities. 
"VI. China notes with satisfaction 
the purpose to continue and improve 
the present system of neutral obs.erva-
tion and reporting through represen-
tatives of other Pcwers, and China will 
from time to time, as occasion re-
quires, indicate the localities to which 
it seems desirable to dispatch such 
representatives. 
"VII. It should be understood that, in 
agreeing to this resolution which pro-
vides for the withdrawal of the Japa-
nese forces to the railway zone, China 
in no way recedes from the position 
she has always taken with respect to 
the maintenance of military forces in 
the said railway zone. 
"VIII. China would regard any at-
tempt by Japan to bring about com-
plications of a political character af-
fecting China's territorial or admini-
strative integrity (such as promoting 
so-called independence movements 01· 
utilizing disorderly elements for such 
purposes) as an obvious violation of. 
the undertaking to avoid any further 
aggravation of the situation." 
Membership Approved 
The members of the commission 
were subsequently selected by the 
President of the Council, and, after 
the approval of the two parties had 
been obtained, the membership wa3 
finally approved by the Council on 
January 14, 1932, as follows: 
H. E. Count Aldrovandi (Italian), 
General de Division Henri Claude! 
(French). 
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Lytton, 
P.C. G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., <British). 
Major-General Frank Ross McCoy 
(American), 
H. E. Dr. Heinrich Schnee (Ger-
man). 
The Euro:,:,can members, with a r~ 
presentative of the American rilell,l-
ber, held two sittings in Geneva on 
January 21st, at which Lord Ly~ton 






















and a provisional program of work 
was approved. The Governments of 
hpan and China, each of which had, 
by virtue of the resolution of De-
cember 10th, "the right to nominat~ 
one assessor to assist the commission," 
subseq-:.iently appointed as their •as-
sessors H. E. Mr. Isaburo Yoshida, 
Ambassador of Japan in Turkey, and 
H. E. Dr. Wellington Koo, a former 
Prime Mimster and former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of China. 
The Secretary-General of the League 
d€signated Mr. Robert Haas, Director 
in the Secretariat of the League, to 
act as secretary-general of the com-
mission.(•) 
In the course of its work the com • 
mission was assisted by the technical 
advice of Professor G. H. Blakeslee, 
professor at Clark University, U.S.A., 
Ph. D., L.L.D., Mr. Donnery, Agrege 
de l'Universite de France, Mr. Ben 
Dorfman, B. A., M. A., William Har-
rison Mills Fellow, University of Cali-
fornia, U. S. A.; Dr. A. D. A. de Kat 
Angelino, Colonel T. A. Hiam, assistant 
to the chairman of the Canadian Na-
tional Railways, G. S. Moss, Esq , 
C.B.E., H.B.M. Consul in Weihaiwei, 
Dr. C. Walter Young, M. A., Ph. D., 
Far Eastern Representative of the In-
stitute of Current World Affairs, New 
York City. 
The European members of the com-
mission sailed from Le Havre and Ply-
(") The secretary-General had put at 
the disposal of the secretariat of the com-
mission: 
Mr. Pelt, member of the information 
section; Mr. von Kotze, assistant to the 
Under Secretary-General in charge of the 
International Bureau; Mr. Pastuhov, mem-
ber of the Political Section; the Hon. 
W. W. Astor, temporary member of the 
Secretariat a~ting as secretary of the 
Chairman of the commission; and Mr. 
Charrere, of the information section. 
Major P. Jouvelet, Army Medical Corps, 
French Army acted as personal assistant 
to General Claude!, and Lieutenant Biddle 
as personal assistant to General McCoy, 
and collaborated also in the general work 
of the secretariat. 
Mr. Depeyre, French Vice-Consul at 
Yokohama, acted as interpretor in the 
Japanese language. . 
Mr. Aoki and Mr. Wou Sao-fong, mem-
bers of the information section, collaborat-
ed with the secretariat of the commis-
sion. 
mouth on February 3rd, and were 
joined by the American member at 
New York on February 9th. 
Article 15 Invoked 
Meanwhile the development of the 
situation in the Far ·East . caused the 
Chinese Government, on January 29th, 
to submit a further appeal to the 
Le.ague of Nations under Articles 10, 
11 and 15 of the Covenant. On Feb-
:r uary 12, 1932, the Chinese represen.-
tative requested the Council to sub-
mit the dispute to the Assembly in 
accordance with paragraph 9 of Ar-
ticle 15 of the Covenant. Since no 
further instructions were received 
from the Council, the commission con-
tinued to interpret its mandate accord-
ing to the resolution of the Council of 
December 10th. This included: 
1. An examination of the issues be-
tween China and Japan, which were 
referred to the Council, ·including their 
causes, development and status at the 
time of the inquiry; 
2. A consideration of a possible 
solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute 
which would reconcile the fundamental 
interests of the two countries. 
This conception of its mission deter-
mined the program of its work. 
Before reaching Manchuria the main 
theater of the conflict, contact was 
established with the Governments of 
Japan and China and with representa-· 
tives of various shades of opinion, in 
order to ascertain the nature of the 
interests of the two countries. The 
commission arrived in Tokyo on Feb-
ruary 29th, where· it was joined by the 
Japanese assessor. It had the honor 
of being received by His Majesty the 
Emperor. Eight days were spent in 
Tokyo, and daily conferences were 
held with members of the Govern-
ment (and others) , including the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Inukai, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Inukai, the Min-
ister of Navy, Admiral Osumi. Int~-
views were also held W:~tih leading 
bankers, businessmen, representatives 
of various organizations and· oi.hers. 
From all of these we :received inforrna-
tion regarding the rights and intcresfs 
of Japan in Manchuria and her his-
torical associations with that country. 
The Shanghai situation was also dis-
cussed. After leaving Tokyo we learn-
5 
ed while in Kyoto of the establishment 
of a new "State" in Manchuria, under 
the name of "Manchukuo" {flle Man-
chu State). In Osaka conferences were 
arranged with represent~tives of the 
lusiness community. 
The commission reached Shanghai 
on March 14 and was joined there 
by the Chinese assessor. Here a fort-
night was 0 ccupied, in addition to our 
general inquiry, in learning as much 
as possible about the facts of the re-
cent fighting and the possibility of an 
&rl'l'Wtice, which we had previously 
discussed with Mr. Yoshizawa in To-
kyo. We paid a visit to the devastated 
ar eas, and heard statements from the 
Japanese naval and military author-
ities rega1·ding recent operations. We 
also interviewed some of the members 
of the Chinese Government and lead-
ers of busine~s, educational, and other 
circles, incl•.tding Canton. 
Nanldng Leaders Inte~wed 
On March 26th, the commission pro-
ceeded to Nanking, some of its mem-
bers visiting Hangchow on the way. 
Dur ing the following week it had the 
honor of bei'ng received by the ?.resi-
dent of the National Government. ln-
terviews were held with Mr. Wang 
Ching-wei, :President of the Execu-
tive Yuan, General Chiang Kai-shek, 
Chairman of the Military Council, Dr. 
Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of 
Finance, General Cheng Ming-chu, 
Minister of Communications, Mr. Chu 
Chia-hua, Minister of Education, and 
other members of the Government. 
In order to acquaint ourselves more 
fully with representative opinion and 
with conditions existing in various 
pa,rts of China, we proceeded on April 
1 to Hankow, stopping en route at 
Kiukiang. Some representatives of the 
c0mmission visited Ichang, Wanhsien 
and Chungking in the Provinces of 
Hupeh and Szechuan. 
On April 9 the commission arrived 
at Peiping (as Peking is now called) 
where several conferences were held 
with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and 
with officials who 'had been members 
of the adniinistration in Manchuria 
until September 18. Evidenc·e was 
also given by the Chinese generals who 
had been in command of the troops 
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at the ba•rracks a t Mukden on the 
night of ~tembet 18th. 
Our stay in Peiping was prolonged 
owing to difficulty which arose regard-
ing the entry into Manchuria of Dr. 
W dlington Koo, the Chinese assessor. 
In proceeding to Manchuria, the 
com.mission divided into two groups, 
some of the party traveling to Mukden 
by rail via Shanhaikwan, and the re-
mainder, including Dr. Koo, by sea via 
Dairen, thus remaining within the 
Japanese railway area. The objection 
to Dr. Koo's entry into "Manchukuo" 
territory was finally withdrawn after 
the arrival of the commission in 
Changchun, the northern terminus of 
the Japanese railway area. 
We remained in Manchuria for about 
six weeks, visiting Mukden, Chang-
chun, Kirin. Harbin, Dtliren, Port 
A~hur, Anshan, Fushun and Chln-
chow. We had intended to visit Tsi-
tsihar as well, but while we were in 
Harbin there was continuous fighting 
in the surrounding districts, and 
Japanese military authorities stateJ 
that they ·11ere unable at that moment 
to guarant-ee the safety of the com-
mission by rail on the western branch 
of the Chine5e Eastern Railway. Ac-
cordingly, some members of our staff 
visited Tsitsihar by air. From there 
they traveled by the Taonan-Angang-
cbi and Ssupingkai-Taonan railways 
and rejoined the main body in Muk-
den. 
Dur-ing our stay in Manchuria we 
wrote a preliminary report, which we 
dispatched to Geneva on April 29th. 
We had numerous conferences witc 
Lieutenant-General Honjo, Commander 
of the Kwantu.ng Army, other military 
officers, and .Ja:panese consular officials. 
At Changchun we visited the Chief 
Executive of "Manchukuo", the former 
Emperor, Hsuan Tung, now known by 
his personal name of Henry Pu-yi. We 
also had intervi-ews with members of 
the "Manchukuo" Government includ-
ing officiails and advisers of Japanese 
nationality, and governors of provinces. 
Delegations wete received from the 
local population, most of which were 
presented by the Japanese or "Man-
chukuo" authorities. In addition to 
our public meetings, we were able to 
arrange interviews with a great number 
of individuals, both Chinese and for-
eign. 
Analysis in Peiping 
The commission returned to Peiping 
on June 5th, where an analysis of the 
voluminous documentary materi~l , col-
lected was begun. Two more confer-
ences were also held with Mr. Wang 
Ching-wei, President of the Executive 
Yuan, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. T. V .. Soong, 
Minister of Finance. , : 
On June 28 the commission proceed-
ed to Tokyo via Chosen (Korea). Its 
departure for Japan was delayed . by 
the fact that no Foreign Minister had 
yet been appointed in the Cabinet of 
Admiral Viscount Saito. After thetr 
arrival in Tokyo on July 4, confer-
ences were held with leaders of the 
new Government, including the Prime 
Minister, Admiral Viscount Saito, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count 
Uchida, and the Minister of War, 
Lieutenant-General Araki. From these 
we learned the present views and policy 
of the Government regarding the de-
velopment of the situation in Man-
churia and Sino-Japanese relations. 
Having thus renewed contact with 
bo h the Chinese and the Japanese 
Governments, the commission returned 
to Peiping, where the drafting of thP. 
report was undertaken. · 
The two assessors, who throughout 
spared no effort to assist the work of 
the comnuss1on, presented a great 
amount of valuable documentary evid-
ence. The material received from each 
assessor was shown to the other, and 
an opportunity given for subsequent 
comment. These documents will be 
published. 
The large number of persons and 
organizations interviewed, as listed in 
the appendix, will illustrate the amount 
of evidence examined. Further, in the 
course of our travels we have been 
presented with a great quantity of 
printed pamphlets, petitions, appeals, 
and letters. In Manchuria alone we 
received approximately 1,550 letters in 
Chinese and 400 letters in Russia, with-
out mentioning those written in Eng-
lish, F-rench or Japanese. The arrange-
ment, translation and study of ~hese 
documents involved a considerable 
labor Which was carried out · in ~ite 
of our continual mov·ement from place 
to place. It was finally c6rhplet~a• on 
our return to Peiping in July :ahcf b~-
fore our last visit to Japan. '. 1 1. · 
The C011\IIliSSion's concept~on of its 
mission, which determined the program 
of its work and itinerary, has equally 
guided the plan of its report. . 
First we have tried to provide an 
historical background by describing the 
rights and interests of the two coun-
tries in Manchuria which prqvide the 
fundamental causes of the dispute; the 
more recent specific issues which im-
mediately preceded the actual outbreak 
were then examined and the . course? 
of events since September 18th, ,1931, 
described. Throughout this review . of 
the issues we have insisted less tm tlie 
responsibility for past actions than on 
the nece~sity of finding means to avoid 
their repetition in the future. 
Finally, the report concludes with 
some reflections and considerations 
which we have desired to submit to 
the Council upon the various issues 
with which it is confronted, and with 
some suggestions of the lines on whic:h 
it seemed to us possible to effect a 
durable solution of the conflict and the 
re-establishment of a good under~tand-
ing between China and Japan. 
CHAPTER I 
Outline of Recent Developments in China 
.. The events of September 18, 1931 , 
which first brought the presep.t con-
flict to the notice of the League of 
Nations were but the outcome of a 
long cha.in of minor occasions of fric-
tion, indicating ~ growing tension in 
the relations between China and 
J,pan. A knowledge of ·the essential 
factors in the recent relations of thea~ 
two: countries is necessary to a com-
plete understanding of the present 
conflict. It has been necessary, there-
fore, to extend our study of the is-
sues beyond the limits of Manchuria 
itself and to consider in their widest 
aspect all the factors which determine 
present Sino-Japanese relations. The 
m{tional aspirations of the Republic 
of China, the expansionist policy Jf 
the Japanese Empire and of the form-
er Russian Empire, the present dis-
semination of communism from the 
U. S. S. R., the economic and strategic 
needs of these three countries: such 
matters as these, for example, are fac-
tors of fundamental importance in any 
study of the Manchurian problem. 
Situated as this part of China is 
geographically betweeh the territories 
t>f Japan and Russia, Manchuria has 
become politically a center of conflict, 
and wars between all three countrier 
have been fought upon its soil. Man-
churia is in fact the meeting ground 
of conflicting needs and policies, which 
themselves require investigation before 
the concrete facts of the present con-
flict can be fully appreciated. We shall 
therefore begin by reviewing these es-
sential factors seriatim. 
1. Development of China 
The dominating factor in China is 
the modernization of the nation itself 
which is slowly taking place. China 
today is a nation in evolution, showing 
evidence of transition in all aspects of 
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its national life. Political upheavals, 
civil wars, social and economic unrest, 
with the resulting weakness of the 
central gove:rnment;, have been the 
characteristics of China since the Re-
volution of 1911. These conditions have 
adversely affected all the nations with 
which China has been brought into 
contact and until remedied will con-
tinue a menace to world peace and iA 
contributory cause of world economk 
depression. 
Of the stages of which the present 
conditions have been reached only a 
brief summary can here be given. 
which in no sense aims at bemg a 
comprehensive history, Throughout the 
first centuries of her intercourse with 
individua\ Occidentals, China remained, 
as far as W estem influence is concern-
ed, practically an isolated country. Thic, 
condition of isolation was bound to 
come to an end when, at the beginning 
cV. the nineteenth century, the im-
p rovement of modem communications 
diminished distance and brought the 
Far East within easy reach of other 
nations, but in fact the country was 
not ready for the new contact y.,hen 
it came. As a result of the Treaty of 
N~nki~g, which ended the war of 1842, 
some ports were opened to foreign 
trade and residence. Foreign influences 
were introduced into a country whose 
government had made no prepa1ations 
to assimilate them. Foreign trader,;; 
began to settle in her ports before 
she could provide for their admin-
istrative, legal, judicial, intellectual 
and sanitary requirements. The latter 
brought with them conditions and stan-
dards to which they were accustomed. 
Foreign cities sprang up in the Treaty 
Ports. Foreign methods of organiza-
tion, of administration and business, 
asserted themselves. Any efforts there 
may have been on either side to miti-
gate the contrast were not effective, 
and a long period of friction and mis-
un'derstanding followed. 
The efficacy of foreign arms ha'ving 
been: demonstrated in a series ·of armed 
conflicts, China hoped by building ar-
senals and 1 by military training ac-
cording to Western methods to meet 
force with force. Her efforts in this 
direction, restricted as they were in 
scope, were doomed to failure. Much 
• mor~ fundamental reforms were need-
ed to enable the country to hold its 
own 'against the foreigner, but China 
did riot desire such reforms. On the 
contrary, she wanted to protect her 
culture and clominion against them. 
Japan Solved Problems 
Japan had to face similar problems 
when that country was first opened to 
Western influences: new contacts with 
disturbing ideas, the conflict of differ-
ent standards, leading to the establish-
ment of foreign settlements, one-sided 
tariff conventions and extraterritorial 
claims. But Japan shelved these prob-
lems by internal reforms, by raising 
her standards of modern requirements 
to those of the West and by diplomatic 
negotiations. Her assimilation of Wes-
tern thoughts may not yet be complete, 
and friction may sometimes be seen be-
tween the old an'd the new ideas of dif-
ferent generations. But the ~apidity 
and the thoroughness with which 
Japan has assimilated Western science 
and technique and adopted W estem 
standards without diminishing the 
value of her old traditions, have arous-
ed general admiration. 
However difficult Japan's problems of 
assimilation and transformation may 
have been, those faced by China were 
much more difficult, owing to the vast-
ness of her territory, the lack of na-
tional unity of her people, and her 
traditional financial system, under 
which the whole of the revenue col-
lected did not reach the Central Trea-
sury. Although the complexity of the 
problem which China has to solve may 
be .so much greater than that which 
confronted Japan as to malce unjust 
any comparison between the two, yet 
the solution required for China must 
ultunately follow lines similar to those 
adopted by Japan. The reluctance fJf 
China to receive •foreigners, and her 
attih1de 'toward those who were in the 
country was bound to have serious 
consequences. It concentrated the at-
tention of · her foreign influence, and 
prevented her from profiting by the ex-
perience of more mode:rn conditions in 
the foreign settlements. As, a result 
the constructive reform necessary to 
enable the country to cope with the 
new conditions was almost completely 
neglected. 
The inevitable conflict of two irre·-
concilable conceptions of respective 
rights and international relations led 
to wars and disputes resulting in the 
progressive surrender of sovereign 
rights and the loss of territory either· 
temporary or permanent. China lost 
a huge area on the north bank of the 
Amur River, and the Maritime Pro-
vince; the Luchu Islands; Hongkong; 
Burma; Annam, Tongking, Laos, Co-
chin-China (provinces of Indo-China); 
Formosa; Korea; and - several other 
tributary states; she also granted long 
leases of other territories. · Foreign 
courts, administration, police and mili-
tary establishments were admitted on 
Chinese soil. The right to regulate 
at will her tariff on imports and ex-
ports was lost for the time being. 
China had to pay damages for inju-
ries to foreign lives and property and 
heavy war indemnities which have 
been a burden to her finances ever 
since. Her very existence was even 
threatened by the division of her ter-
ritory· into spheres of interests of for-
eign Powers. 
Her defeat in the Sino-Japanese war 
of 1894-95, and the disastrous conse-
quences of the Boxer uprising of 1900 
opened the eyes of soine thoughtful 
leaders to the necessity of fundamen-
tal reform. The reform movement was 
at first to accept the leadership of 
the Manchu house, but turned away 
from this dynasty after its cause and 
its leaders had been · betrayed to the 
Empress Dowager, and the Emperor 
Kwang Hsu was made to expiate his 
hundred days of reform in virtual im-
prisonment to the end of his life in 
1908 . . 
Manchu Dynasty Weakens 
The Manchu dynasty had ruled China 
for 250 years. In its later years it was 
weakened by a series of rebellions: 
the Taiping rebellion (1850-65); the 
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Mohammedan rising in Yunnan (1856-
µ), and the risings iq. Chinese Tu~k~s-
tan (1864-77). The Taiping rebeJlj9n 
especially shook the - Empire to , ,its 
found~tion, and dealt a blow to the 
. prestige of the dynasty from. which jt 
.never recovered. Finally, after the 
death of the then ~mpress -Dowager in 
1908, it collapsed through its own in-
herent weakness. 
After some minor attempts at in-
surrection, the revolutionaries were 
successful in South China. A brief 
period followed during which• a Re-
·publican Government was established 
at Nanking, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the 
leading figure of the Revolution, as 
provisional President. On February 12, 
1912, the then Empress Dowager in 
the name of the child Emperor signed 
a decree of abdication, and a . provi-
sional constitutional regime, with Yuan 
Shih-kai as President, was th.en in-
augurated. With the abdication of th~ 
Emperor his representatives in pro-
vinces, prefectures and districts lost 
the influence and moral prestige which 
they had derived from his authority. 
They became ordinary men, to be 
obeyed only in so far as they were 
able to enforce their decisions. The 
gradual substitution to military for 
civil governors in the provinces was an 
inevitable con~equence. The post of 
central executive could, likewise, be 
held only by the military leader who 
had the strongest army or was S\:lp-
ported by the strongest group of prp-
vincial or local military chiefs. 
This tendency toward military dic-
tatorship, which was more apparent 
in -the north, was facilitated by the 
fact that the army had gained some 
popularity by the support it had given 
in many instances to the Revolution. 
Military leaders did not hesitate to lay 
claim to the merit of having made the 
Revolution a success. Most of them 
were northern leaders, to a certain ex-
tent grouped together in the so-call-
ed Peiyang Party-men who had risen 
from a low status to higher command!: 
in the model army trained by Yuan 
Shih-kai after the Sino-Japanese war. 
They could more or less be trusted by 
him because of the tie of p&sonal al• 
legiance which, in China, has not yet 
given place to the corporate loyalty 
which characterizes ,organizations in 
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the West. These men were . appointed 
military governors by ~ _uap' Slµp~*'ai 
i~· .the provinces under his cQµ~ol. 
'.J'pere the power rested in their hSAd:~ 
and pr-0vincial revenues could, accord-
ingly, ,be taken at will by them .~ ,.}?e 
used for their personal armies ,1~nd 
adherents. 
In the southern provinces the situa-
•tion was ,d~fferent, partly as a resuit 
of intercourse with foreign countries 
;md J»trtly on account of the different 
sdeial ,customs of the population. The 
p_eople of South China have always 
been averse to military autocracy and 
official interference from outside. Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen and their other leaders 
remained faithful to the idea of con-
stitutionalism. They had, however. 
little military force behind them, ., pe-
cQuse the reorganization of the .Q~y 
had not yet progressed very far in .. ,lbe 
provinces south of the Yangtze, and 
they had no well-equipped arset;1a1s. 
KuomJntanr Revolts 
When, after much procrastination, the 
first Parliament was convened in Pek-
ing in 1913, Yuan Shih-kai had con-
solidated his military position, iatked 
only sufficient financial reso1.111ces to 
ensure the loyalty of the provincial 
armies. A huge foreign loan, the so-
called Reorganization Loan, provided 
1im with the necessary financial me~. 
13ut his action in concluding that loan 
without the consent of Parliament 
brought his political opponents of , the 
Kuomintang or Nationalist Party under 
Dr. Sun's leadership, into open - re-
volt. In a military sense the South 
was weaker than the North, and was 
still more weakened when the vic-
torious northern commanders, after 
conquering a number of southern pro-
vinces, placed the latter under northern 
generals. 
There ~ere several attempts to rein-
state the 1913 Parliament, which had 
been dissolved by Yuan Shih-kai, or 
to convene bogus Parliaments, two at-
tempts to establish monarchical rule. 
many changes of Presidents and Cabi-
nets, continuous shifting of allegiance 
among military leaders, and many de-
clarations of temporary independence 
of one or more provinces. In Canton. 
the Kuomintang Government, be~ded 
by Dr. Sun, succeeded in maintairung 
itself from 1917 onwards, with oc~-
sio~l:...intervals dUI.'ing which it ceao;-
ed . • 16 function. During these year,s:, 
Chima was · ravaged by warring fac-
tions •and the everpresent bandits grew 
into ·veritable armies by the enlist-
ment of ruined farmers, desperate .'·in-
habitants ·of famine-stricken districts, · 
or unpaid soldiers.' Even the constitu- · 
tionalists, who were fighting in the 
South, were repeatedly opposed to the 
danger of militarist feuds arising in 
their midst. · 
In 1923, convinced by Russian revolu-
tiorusts that a definite program, strict 
party discipline, and systematic pro-
paganda were necessary to , ensure · the 
victory of his cause, Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
reorganized the Kuomintang with a 
program which he outUnea in his 
"Manifesto" and "Three Principles of 
the People." (*) Systematic organiza-
tion ensured party disci'.pline and unity 
of action through the intermediary of 
a Central Executive Committee-. A 
political -training institute instructed 
propagandists and organizers of local 
branches, while a military training in-
stitute at Whampoo, with the help of 
Russian officers, was instrumental in 
providing the party with ·an effiicent 
army, the leaders of which . were per-
meated with the idea of . the party. 
Thus equipped, the Kuomintang was 
soon ready to establish contacts with 
the people at large. Sympathizers 
were organized in local branches or in 
peasant and labor unions affiliateJ with 
the party. This preliminary conquest 
of the . people's mind was, after the 
death of Dr. Sun in 1925, followed up 
by the successful Northern Expedition 
of the Kuomintang army, which by 
the end of 1928 succeeded. in produc-
ing. a nominal unity for the first time in 
many years, and a measure of actual 
uni(y which lasted for a ~ime. 
Military Phase Ended 
The first, or military, phase of Dr. 
Sun's program had thus been brought 
to a successful end. 
The second period of political tutel-
age under party dictatorship could 
begin. It was to be devoted to the 
education of the people in the art of 
self-government and to the reconstruc-
tion of the country. - ·-~; 
(* ) Nationai l· independence, democratic 
government and social. i;eorganization. · 
In , 1927 a Central Gove~mnent was 
established at .Nanking. It ;was -con-. 
trolled. by the party-it was, jn1 • fa<:t, 
me:tely one important . organ , ·o~ the • 
party. · It consisted of five Yuans or 
Boards (tht:! , Executive, the Legislative, 
the '•Judicial, the Control, and ·the Ex-
amination Boards). The Government 
had been modeled as closely as, pos- .. 
sible on· the lines of Dr. Sun's "Five 
Power Constitution" the Trias 'Politica 
of Montesquieu with the addition of ' 
two old Chinese institutions, the Cen-
sorate and · the Public Services Ex-
amination Board-in order to facilitate 
the transition to the final, dr con- . 
stitutional stage, when the . people, 
partly directly and partly through its 
elected representatives. would itself 
take charge of the direction of its gcw- · 
ernment. 
In the provinces, similarly," a con:i-
mittee system was adopted for the or-
ganization of · provincial governments. 
while in villages, towns and· districts 
the people were to be trained in the 
handling of local self-government. The 
party was now ready to put into 
operation its schemes of political and 
economic reconstruction, but was pre-
vented from doing so by internal dis-
sensions, the periodical revolt of vari-
ous generals with personal armies, and 
the menace of communism. In fact, 
the Central Government had repe:itedly 
to fight for its very existence. 
For a time unity was maintained on 
the surface. But not even the sem-
blance of unity could be preserved 
when powerful warlords concluded al-
liances among themselves and marched 
their armies against N anking. Though 
they never succeeded in their object, 
they remained, even after defeat, po-
tential forces to be reckoned with. More-
over, they never took the position that 
war against the Central Government 
was an act of rebellion. It was in 
their eyes simply a struggle for su-
premacy between their faction and an- · 
other one which happened to reside 
in the national capital and to be rec-
ognized as the Central Government by 
foreign Powers. This lack of hierar-
chical relations is all the more dah-
gerous because serious :i.. dissensions in 
the party itself have' weakened the 
title of the Central Gove:mment ·to be 
the unquestione(h.ucc-essorS'·of Dr. Sun. · 
The new schisnd1as·led to the' estrange-
1t 
ment of influential southern leaders, 
who retired •to €anton, where the local 
authorities and the local branch of ··the 
Kuomintang frequently acted inde-
pendently of the Central Government. 
From this summary description it 
appears that disruptive forces in China 
are still powerful. The cause of thic; 
lack of cohesion is the tendency of 
the mass of the people to think in 
terms of family and locality, rather 
than in terms of the nation, except in 
periods of acute tension between their 
country and foreign Powers. • Although 
there are, nowadays, a number of 
lNiders who have risen above parti-
cularist sentiments, it . is evident that 
a national outlook must be attained 
by a far greater number of citizens be-
fore real national unity can result. 
Considerable Progress Made 
Although the spectacle of China's 
transitional 'period, with its unavoidable 
political, social, intellectual and moral 
disorder, is disappointing · to her im-
patient friends and has created enmi • 
ties which have become a danger to 
peace. it is nevertheless true that, !O 
spite of difficulties, delays and failures, 
considerable progress has in fact been 
made. An argument which consfautl.y 
reappears in the polemics of the pre-
sent controversy is that China- is "not 
an organized State" or "is in a cond!-
tion of complete chaos and incredible 
anarchy,'' and that her present-day 
conditions should disqualify her from 
membership in the League of Nation<.:: 
and deprive her of the protective 
clauses of the Covenant. In this con-
nectiori it may be useful to remember 
that an altogether different attitude was 
taken at the time of the Washington 
conference by all the participating 
Powers. Yet, even at that time, China 
had two completely separate Govern-
ments, one at Peking and one at Can--
ton, and was rlisturbed by large bandit 
forces which frequently interfered with 
communications in the interior, while 
preparations were being made for a 
civil war involving all China. As a 
result of that war, which was pre-
ceded by an ultimatum sent to the 
Central Government on January 13, 
1922, when the Washington conference 
was still in session, the Central Gov-
ernment was overthroWn in May, and 
the independence of Manchuria from 
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the Government installed at Peking in 
its place was declared in July by Mar-
shal Chang Tso-lin. Thus, there exist-
ed no fewer than three governments 
professing to be independent, not - to 
mention the virtually autonomous 
status of a number of provinces . or 
parts of provinces. Although, at pres-
e11t, the Central Government's iau-
thority is still weak in a number . of 
provinces, the central authority is not, 
at least openly repudiated, and there 
is reason to hope that if the Central 
Government as such can be maintain-
~. provincial administration, military 
forces and finance will acquire an in-
creasingly national character. These, 
among others, were d()ubtless the rea-
sons which induced the Assembly of 
the League of Nations last September 
to elect China to the Council. 
The present Government has tried 
to balance its current receipts and ex-
pepditures and to adhere to sound fi-
nancial principles. Various taxes have 
been consolidated and simplified. In 
default of a proper budgetary system, 
an annual statement has been issued 
by the Ministry of Finance. A Cen-
tral Bank· has been established. A 
National Financial Committee has been 
appointed, which includes among its 
members influential representatives of 
banking and commercial interests. The 
Ministry of Finance is also trying to 
supervise the finances of the provinces, 
where the methods of raising taxes are 
often still highly un~tisfactory. For 
all these new measures the Govern-
ment is entitled to credit. It has, how-
e:ver, been forced by recurrent civil 
wars to increase its domestic indebted-
ness by about a billion dollars (sil-
ver ), since 1927. Lack of funds has 
prevented it from executing its ambi-
tious plans of reconstruction, or com-
pleting the improvement of communi-
cations which is so vitally necessary 
for the solution of most of the coun-
try's problems. In many things, no 
doubt, the Government has failed, but 
it has already accomplished much. 
Nationalism Is Normal 
The Nationalism of modern China i,c; 
a normal aspect of the period of 
political transition through which the 
country is passing. National senti-















would be fou.nd in any country placed 
in the same position. But, in addition 
to the natural desire to be free from 
any outside control in a people that 
has become conscious of national unity . 
~he influence of the Kuomintang .has 
mtroduced into the nationalism of 
China an additional and abnormal 
~inge of bitterness against all foreign 
mflnenc-es, and has expanded its aims 
so as to include the liberation of all 
Asiatic people still subject to "im-
perialistic oppression." This is partly 
due to the slogans of its early com-
:r.1unistic connection. Chinese national-
ism today is also permeated by memo-
ries of former greatness, which it so 
desires to revive. It demands the re-
turn of leased territories, of adminis-
trative and other. not purely commer-
~ial ri~hts exercised by a foreign agency 
m railway areas, , of administrative 
rights in concessions and settlements, 
and of extraterritorial rights which 
imply that foreigners are not amenable 
to Chinese laws, law courts and taxa-
tion. Public opinion is strongly opposetl 
to the continuance of these rights 
which are regarded as a nationai 
humiliation. 
Foreign Powers have in general taken 
a sympathetic attitude towards these 
desires. At the Washington conference, 
1921-22, they were admitted to be ac-
ceptable in principle, though there was 
divergence of opinion as to the best 
time and method of giving effect to 
them. It was felt that an immediate 
surrender of such rights would impose 
upon China the obligation to provide 
administration, police and justice of a 
standard which, owing to financial 
and other internal difficulties, she could 
not at present attain. The present 
single issue of extraterritoriality might 
lead to a number of separate issues 
with Foreign Powers if the former 
were abolished prematurely. It was 
also felt that international relations 
would not improve but would deterio-
rate if foreign nationals were to be ex-
posed to the same unjust treatment 
and extortionate taxation as Chinese 
citizens were subjected to in so many 
parts of the country. In spite of these 
reservations, much was actually ac-
complished, especially at Washington, 
or as a result of that conference. China 
has recovered two out of five leased 
territories, many concessions, admin-
istrative rights in the area of the Chi- . 
nese Eastern Railway, Customs auto-
nomy, and postal rights. Many trea-
ties on the basis of equality have als~ 
been negotiated. 
Hampered by Propaganda 
Having started upon the road of in-
ternational co-operation for the pur-
pose of solving her difficulties, as was 
done at Washington, China might have 
made more substantial progress in the 
ten years that have since elapsed had 
she continued to follow that road. She 
has only been hampered by the viru-
lence of the anti-foreign propaganda 
which has been pursued. In two par-
ticulars has this been carried so far 
as to contribute to the creation of the 
atmosphere in which the present con-
flict arose, namely, the use made of the 
economic boycott, to which reference is 
made in Chapter VII, and the intro-
duction of anti-foreign •J)ropaganda 
into the schools. 
It is provided in the Provisional Con:.. 
stitution of China promulgated on 
June 1, 1931 that "the Three Principles 
of the People shall be the basic princi-
ples of education in the Republic of 
China. "The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
are now taught in the scliools as if 
they had the same authority as that 
of the Classics in former centuries. The 
sayings of the Master receive the same 
veneration as the sayings of Confucius 
received in the days before the Revo-
lution. Unfortunately, however, mO'l"e 
attention has been gfven to the nega-
tive than to the constructive side of na-
tionalism in the education of the 
young. A perusal of the textbooks used 
ip the schools leaves the impression 
on the mind of a reader that their 
authors. have sought to kindle patrio-
tism with the flame of hatred, and to 
build up manliness upon a sense of in-
jury. The result of this virulent anti-
foreign pr~paganda, begun in the 
schools and carried through every 
phase of public life, has been to in-
duce the students to engage in politi -
cal activities which sometimes have 
culminated in attacks on the persons. 
homes or offices of Ministers and other 
authorities, and in attempts to over-
throw the Government. Unaccom-
panied b.y ~ffective internal reforms or 
improvements in national · standards, 
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this attitude tended to alarm the For-
eign;· Powers and to increase their re-
luctance to surrender the rights which 
are · at the moment their only protec-
tion. 
In connection with the problems of 
maintaining law and order, the pre-
sent , inad~quate means of communica-
tion. in China is a serious handicap. 
Unless c;?ommunioations are sufficient 
to -ensure p!'cmpt tnm~portation of na-
tional forces, the safeguarding of law 
and . order must largely, if not com-
pletely, be entrusteci. to provincial au-
thorities, who on account of the dis-
tance of the Central Government, must 
be allowed to use their own judgment 
in handling provincial affairs. Under 
such conditions independence of mind 
and action may easily cross the boun-
dary· of law, with the result that the 
province gradually takes on the aspect 
of a private estate. Its armed force ';. > 
are also identified with their command-
er, not with the nation. The transfer 
of a commander from one army to 
another by order of the Central Gov-
ernment is, , in many cases, impossible. 
The danger of civil war must continue 
to exist so long as the Central Gov-
ernment lacks the material means to 
make its authority swiftly and per-
manently . felt all over the country. 
Banditry Nationwide 
T1'e problem of banditry, which may 
be tx:ace~ throughout the history of 
China, and which exists today in all 
parts of the country, is subject to 
the same considerations. Banditry has 
always existed in China and the ad-
ministration has never been able to 
suppress it thoroughly. Lack of pro-
per communications was one of the 
reasons which prevented the admin-
istration from getting rid of this evil 
which increased or decreased according 
to changing circumstances. Another 
contributory cause is to be found in 
the · local.. uprisings and rebellions 
which have often occurred in China, 
especially as a result of maladministra-
tion. Even . after the successful sup-
pression of such rebellions, bandit 
gang~ recruited from the ranks of the 
rebe~ often remained active in parts 
of th«:! country. This was especially 
the case in the period following the 
suppfession of the Taiping Rebe.llion 
(1850--65). In more recent times ·'6an-
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dits' h'ave aTso originated from the ranks 
of ' unpkiid · soldiers who were not able . 
to find other means of' )living and nad· 
beeri accustomed to looting during the 
civil ' 'wars in which they had tliken · 
pert. : ' '.' 
Other causes which have given rise 
to an · increase of banditry in parts of • 
China were. floods and droughts. These : 
are more or less regular occurrences, , 
and they have always brought famine-
and banditry in their wake. The prob-
lem has been further aggravated by 
the pressure of a rapidly increasing · 
population. In congested areas normal · 
economic difficulties were still fu1:'~ :, 
ther increased, and among people liv-
ing on a bare subsistence level with no 
margin to ·' meet times of crises the 
slightest deterioration in the conditions 
of life • might bring large numbers to 
the · point of destitution. Banditry, 
theretore, has been largely influenced 
by the prevailing economic conditions. 
In .prosperous periods or districts it 
has .~ diminished, but where for any of 
the reasons . mentioned the struggle for • 
existence was intensified or the· poli-
tical conditions were disturbed, it was 
sure to increase. 
When once banditry had become well 
established in any area, its suppres-
sion ·by force was rendered difficult 
becaus.e of the defective communica-
tions ip. the interior of the country. 
It is· in regions which are difficult of 
access, where a few miles may in-
volve days of travel, that large armed 
ban<~s can move freely, appearing and 
disappearing suddenly, without their 
abodes and movements being known. 
When bandit suppression has been 
long neglected, and when the soldiers 
even co-operate with bandits secretly, 
as has happened often enough, traffic 
along highways and waterways is in-
terfered with. Such occurrences can 
only be stopped by adequate police 
forces. In the districts of the interior, 
bandit suppression is much more dif-
ficult, because guerilla warfare inevit-
ably develops. 
But though the personal armies of 
local generals and the prevalence of 
bandit hordes throughout the country 
may. disturb the internal peace of the 
country, they are no longer a menace 
to· -the authority of the Central Gov-· 





a menace of this kind from another 
source, namely, Communism. 
Communism Starts in 1921 
The communist movement in China, 
remained restricted within intellectual 
and labour circles, where the doctrine 
gained considerable influence in the 
period 1919-24. Rural China was, at 
that time, scarcely touched by this 
movement. The manifesto of the So-
viet Government of July 25, 1919, de-
claring its willingness to renounce all 
privileges "extorted" from China by 
the former Tsarist Government, creat-
ed a favorable impression throughout 
China, especially among the intelli-
gentsia. In May, 1921, the "Chinese 
Communist Party" was formally con-
stituted. Propaganda was especially 
conducted in labor circles at Shang-
hai where Red syndicates were or-
gar{ized. I.n June, 1922, at its second 
Congress, the Communist Party which 
did not then number more than three 
hundred members, decided to ally it-
self with the Kuomintang. . 1r. Sun 
Yat-sen, although opposed to the com-
munist doctrine, was prepared to ad-
mit individual Chinese Communists 
into the party. In the autumn of 1922 
the Soviet Government sent a mis-
sion to China, headed by Mr. Joffe. 
Important interviews, which took place 
between him and Dr. Sun resulted in 
the joint declaration of January 26, 
1923, by which assurance was given of 
Soviet sympathy and support to the 
cause of the national unification and 
independence of China. It was ex-
plicitly stated, on the other hand, that 
the communist organization and the 
Soviet system of government could not 
be introduced at that time under the 
conditions prevailing in China. Fol-
lowing this agreement, a number of 
military and civil advisers were sent 
from Moscow by the end of 1923, and 
"undertook, under the control of Dr. 
Sun, the modification of the internal 
organization of the Kuomintang and 
of the Cantonese Army." 
At the first National Congress of the 
Kuomintang, convened in March, 1924, 
the admission of Chinese Communists 
into the party was formally agreed to, 
on the condition that such members 
should not take any further part in the 
preparation of the proletarian revolu-
tion. · The period of tolerance with re-
~d to communism thus began. 
This period lasted from 1924 until 
1927. Early in 1924 the Communists 
counted about 2,000 adl}.erents, and· Red 
syndicates approximately 60,000 mem-
bers. But the Communists soon ac-
quired enough influence ,inside the 
Kuomintang to raise anxiety among the 
orthodox members of that party.· They 
presented to the Central Committee, at 
the end of 1926, a proposal going so far 
as to include the nationalization of all 
landed properties except those belong-
ing to workmen, peasants or soldiers ; 
the reorganization of the Kuomintang; 
the elimination of all military leaders 
hostile to communism; and the arming 
of 20,000 Communists and 50,000 work-
men and peasants. This proposal, how-
ever, was defeated and the Communists 
ceased to support the intended campaign 
of the Kuomintang against the Northern 
militarists although they had previously 
been most active in the organization of 
the Nationalist forces. Nevertheless, at 
a later stage they joined in it, and 
when the' N orthem Expedition reached 
Central China and established a Na-
tionalist Government at Wu-Han, in 
1927, the Communists succeeded in ob-
taining a controlling position in it, as 
the Nationalist leaders were not pre-
pared to join is.sue with them until 
their own forces had occupied Nanking 
and Shanghai. The Wu-Han Govern-
ment put into operation, in the pro-
vinces of Hunan and Hupeh, a series 
of purely communistic measures. The 
Nationalist Revolution was almost on 
the point of being transformed into 
a Communist Revolution. 
No Longer Tolerated 
The Nationalist leaders at last decid-
ed that communism had become too 
serious a menace to be tolerated an:-,• 
longer. As soon as they were firmly 
established at Nanking, where another 
National Government was constituted 
on April 10, 1927, a proclamation was 
jssued in which the Nanking Gqvern-
ment ordered the immediate purifica-
tion of the army and the civil service 
fro~ communism. On July 15 the 
majority of the Central Executive of 
the Kuomintang at Wu-Han, who had 
so far refused to join the Nationalist 
leaders at Nanking, adopted a resolu-
tion excluding Communists from the 
Kuomintang and ordering the Soviet 
advisers to leave China. As a ·result 
of this decision, the Kuomintang re-
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gained its unity, and the Government 
at Nanking became generally recogniz-
ed by the party. 
During the period of tolerance, sev-
eral military units had been gained 
to the- communist cause. These 
had been left in the rear, mostly in 
Kiangsi Province, when the Nationalist 
Army was marching to the North. 
Communist agents were sent to co-
ordinate these units and to persuade 
them to take action against the Na-
tional Government. On July 30, 1927, 
the garrison at Nanchang, the capital 
of Kiangsi Province, together wit.h 
some other military units, revolted and 
subjected the population to numerous 
excesses. However, on August 5 they 
were defeated by the Government 
forces and withdrew to the south. 
On December 11 a communist rising at 
Canton delivered control of the city 
for two days into their hands. The 
Nanking Government considered that 
official Soviet agents had actively 
participated in these uprisings. An 
order of December 14, 1927, withdrew 
the exequatur of all the consuls of 
the U.S.S.R. residing in China. 
The recrudescence of civil war fav-
ored the growth of communist influ -
ence in the neriod between 1928 and 
1931. A Red· Army was organized, and 
extensive areas in Kiangsi and Fukien 
were sovietized. Only in November, 
1930, shortly after the defeat of a pow-
erful coalition of northern militarists, 
was the Central Government able to 
take up the suppl,"ession of communism 
in earnest. The communist forces had 
operated in parts of Kiangsi and Hunan 
Provinces, and were then reported to 
have caused in two or three months 
the loss of 200,000 lives and of prop-
erty valued at about one billion dol-
lars (silver). They had now become 
so strong that they were able to de-
feat the first and frustrate the second 
expedition sent against them by the 
Government. The third expedition, di-
rected by the Commander-in-Chief, 
General Chiang Kai-shek, defeated the 
communist armies in several encount-
ers. By the middle of July, 1~31, the 
most important communist strongholds 
had been taken, and their forces were 
in full retreat toward Fukien. 
Whilst constituting a political com-
mission to reorganize the areas which 
had been devastated, General Chiang 
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Kai-shek pursued the Red armies, and' 
drove them into the mountainous re-
gion southeast of Kiangsi. 
The Nanking Government was thus 
on the point of putting the principal 
Red army out of action. when event~ 
occurred in different parts of China 
which obliged them to suspend this.· 
offensive, and to withdraw a large part 
of their troops. In the North had oc-. 
curred the rebellion of General Shih 
Yu-san, supported by a hostile inter-
vention on the part of the Cantonese 
troops in the province of Hunan; sim-
ultaneously with this intervention came 
the events of Seotember 18 at Mukden. 
Encouraged by these circumstances, the 
Red resumed the offensive, and before: 
long the fruits of the victorious cam- ' 
paign were almost completely lost. 
Some Areas Sovietized 
i..a.q;c parts of the 1irovinces of 
Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of 
Kwangtung, are reliably reported to 
be completely sovietized. Communist 
zones · of influence are far more ex-
tensive. They cover a large part of 
China south of the Yangtze, and parts ' 
of the provinces of Hupeh. Anhwei, 
and Kiangsu north of that river. 
Shanghai has been the center of com-
munist propaganda. Individual sym-
pathizers with communism may pro-
bably be found in every town in Chinn. 
So far two provincial communist gov-
ernments only have been organized 
in Kiangsi and Fukien, but the num-
ber of minor soviets runs into hun- · 
dreds. The communist government 
itself is formed by a committee elect-. 
ed by a congress of local workers and . 
peasants. It is, in reality, controlled 
by representatives of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, which sends out trained 
men for that purpose, a large number 
of whom have been previously trained 
in the U.S.S.R. Regional committees. 
under the control of the Central Com -
mittee of the Chinese Communist , 
Party, in their turn control provincial. 
committees and these, again, district 
committees, and so on, down to the-
communist cells organized in factories, 
schools, military barracks, etc. 
When a district has been occupied-
by a Red Army, efforts are made to 
sovietize it, if the occupation appears 
to be of a more or less permanent na-· 
ture. Any opposition from the popu-· 
lation is suppressed by terrorism. A 
communist government, as described, 
is then established. The complete or-
ganization of such governments com-
prises: Commissariats for. Internal A~-
fairs for the struggle agamst: the anti-
revolutionari es (G. P. U.) , for Fin-
ancial Affairs. for Rural Economy, for 
Education, for Hygiene, for Post and 
Telegraph, for Communications; and 
Committees for Military Affairs and 
for the control of workmen and peas-
ants. Such elaborate government or-
ganizations exist only in completely 
sovietized districts. Elsewhere the 
organization is more modest. 
The program of action consists in 
the cancellation of debts, the distribu-
tion among landless proletarians and 
small farmers of land forcibly seized, 
either from large private owners or 
from religious institutions, such as tem-
ples, monasteries and churches. Taxa-
tion is simplified; the peasants have to 
contribute a certain part of the pro-
duce of their lands. With a view to 
the improvement of agriculture, steps 
are taken to deve:op irrigation, rural 
credit systems, and co-operatives. Pub-
lic schools, hospitals and di~pensaries 
may also be established. 
Thus the poorest farmers derive con-
siderable benefit from communism, 
whereas the rich and middle-class land-
owners merchants and local gentry 
are co~pletely ruined, either by im-
mediate expropriation or by levies anc~ 
fines; and in applying its agrarian pro-
gram the Communist Party expects to 
gain the support of the masses. . In 
this respect, its propaganda and action 
nave met with considerable success, 
notwithstanding the fact that com-
munist theory conflicts with the Chi-
nese social system. Existing grievances 
resulting from oppressive taxation, ex-
tortion, usury and pillage by soidiery 
or bandits, were fully exploited. 
Special slogans were employed for 
farmers, workmen. soldiers and intel-
lectuals, with variations especially 
adapted to women. 
Communism in China not only 
means as in most countries other than 
the U :s.S.R., either a political doctrine 
held by certain members of existing 
parties, or the organization of a speci-
al party to compete for power with 
other political parties. It has become 
an actual rival of the National Gov-
ernment. It possesses its own ia#, 
army and government, and its own 
territorial sphere of action. For this 
state of affairs there is no parallel in 
any other country. Moreover, in 
China the disturbance created by the 
communist war is made more serious 
by the fact that the country is going 
~hrough a critical period of internal 
1 econstruction, still further complicated 
during the last eleven months by an 
external crisis of exceptional gravity. 
The National Government seems to be 
determined to regain the control of 
the districts under communist influ •· 
ence, and to pursue in these districts, 
once their reco_v<>ry is ac.hievcd, a po-
licy of economic rehabilitation; but in 
its military campaigns, apart from dif-
ficulties already mentioned, both in-
ternal and external, which weaken its 
position, it is hampered by lack of' 
funds and defective communications. 
The problem of communism in China 
is thus linked with the larger problem 
of national reconstruction. 
In the summer of 1932 important mili-
tary operations, having for their object 
a final suppression of the Red resist-
ance, were announced by the Govern-
ment of Nanking. They were com-
menced, and, as stated ·above, were to 
have been accompanied by a thorough 
Eocial and administrative reorganiza~ 
tion of the recaptured regions. But up 
to the present no important results 
have been announced. · 
So far as Japan is China's nearest 
neighbor and largest customer she has 
suffered more than any other Power 
from the lawle'ss conditions described 
in this chapter. Over two-thirds o~ 
the foreign residents in China are Japa-: 
nese, and the number of Koreans in 
Manchuria is estimated at about 800,000. 
She has more nationals, therefore, than 
any other Power who would suffer if 
they were made amenable to Chinese 
law, justice and taxation under present 
conditions. 
Japan felt it impossible to satisfy 
Chinese aspirations so long as satis-
factory rnfeguards to take the place of 
her treaty rights could not be hoped 
for. Her interests in China, and more 
especially in Manchuria, began to be 
more prominently asserted as those ~f 
the other major Powers receded into 
the background. Japan's anxiety to 
safeguard the life and property of her 
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subjects in China camed her to inter-
vene repeatedly in times of civil war 
or of local disturbances. Such action 
was bitterly resented by China, espe-
cially when it resulted in an armed 
clash such as occurr-ed in 1928 at Tsinan. 
In recent years the claims of Japan 
have come to be regarded in China as 
constituting a more serious challenge to 
national aspirations than the rights of 
all the other Powers taken together. 
Of International Interest 
This issue, however, though affecting 
Japan to a greater extent than other 
Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue 
alone. China demands immediately the 
surrender of certain exceptional pow-
ers and privileges because they are felt 
to be derogatory to her national dig-
nity and sovereignty. The foreign Pow-
ers have hesitated to meet these wishes 
as long as conditio.ns in China did not 
ensure adequate protect\on of their 
nationals, whose interests depend on 
the security afforded by the enjoyment 
of special treaty rights . The process 
of fermentation, inevitable in a pe-
riod of transition, which this chapter 
has attempted to describe, has devel-
oped forces of public opinion which will 
probably continue to embarrass the 
Central Government: in the conduct of 
their foreign policy, as long as they 
are weakened by failure to complete 
the unification and reconstruction of 
the country . The realization of China's 
national aspirations in the field of for-
eign relations depends on her ability 
to discharge the functions of a modern 
government in the sphere of domestic 
affairs, and until the discrepancy be-
tween these has been removed, the dan-
ger of internatio.nal friction and of in-
cidents, boycotts and armed interven-
tions will continue. 
The present extreme case of inter-
national friction having forced China 
once more to seek the intervention of 
the League of Nations, should, if a 
satisfactory settlement can be effected, 
convince her of the advantages of t);le 
policy of international co-operation 
which was inaugurated at Washington 
with such beneficial results in 1922. 
China has not at the moment the capi-
tal nor the trained specialists neces-
sary for the unaided accomplishment 
of her national reconstruction. Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen himself realized this, and 
actually drew up an ambitious plan of 
international participation in the eco-
nomic development of his country. 
The National GQvernment, too, has in 
recent years sought and accepted in-
ternational help in the solution of her 
problems-in financial matters since 
1930, in matters relating to economic 
planning and <;ievelopment in liaison 
with the technical organizations of the 
League of Nations since the constitu-
tion of the National Economic Council 
in 1931, and in relief of the distress 
caused by the great flood of the same 
year. Along this road of internationc! 
co-operation China would make the 
surest and most rapid progress toward 
the attainment of her national ideals. 
and such a policy would make it 
easier for foreign Powers to give what 
support the Central Government ma~, 
seek, and to help in the removal as 
rapidly and as effectively as possible 
of any c~uses of friction which may 
endanger her peaceful relation-; w:th 
the rest of the world. · 
CHAPTER II 
Manchuria 
Description, Relations With Rest of China and With RtJ.ssia 
I. Description 
Manchuria-which is known in China 
as the Three Eastern Provinces-a 
large fertile region only forty years 
' ago almost undeveloped and even now 
still under-populated, has assumed an 
increasingly important role in the 
solution of the surplus population prob-
lems of China and Japan. The pro-
vinces Qf Shantung and Hopei have 
poured millions of destitute farmers 
into Manchuria, while Japan has ex-
ported. to that country her manu-
factured ai:ticles and capital, in ex-
change for food supplies and raw 
materials. In providing for the respec-
tive ~eeds of China and Japan, Man-
churia has proved the usefulness of 
theil" partnership. Without Japan's 
activity, Manchuria could not have at-
tracted and absorbed such a large po-
pulation. Without the influx of Chi-
nese farmers and laborers Manchuria 
could ~ot have developed so rapidly, • 
I?roviding Japan thereby with a mar-
ket and with supplies of food, fer-
tjlizers, and raw moterials. 
Yet, Manchuria so largely dependent 
on co-operation. was destined, for 
reasons ~lrea<;ly indicated, to b~come e 
region of conflict: at first between Rus-
sia and Japan, later, between China and 
her two powerful neighbors. At first, 
Manchuria entered into this great con-
flict of policies only as an area, the 
occupation of which was thought to 
imply domination of Far Eastern poli-
tics. It became coveted for its own 
sake later, when its agricultural, mineral 
and forestry resources had been dis-
cove,red. Exceptional treaty right::;. were 
acquired in the first ill$tance by Russia 
at the expense of China. Those which 
concerned South Manchuria were sub-
sequently tr-ansferred to Japan. The 
use of the privileges so acquired be-
came more and more instrumental in 
furthering, the economic dexelopmeot 
of South Manchuria. Strategical con-
siderations have remained paramouµt, 
but the extensive economic interest$ 
resulting from the active part taken by 
Russia and Japan in the development 
of Manchuria found an ever-increasing 
insist-ence in the foreign poli~y of these 
two countries. 
China at first showed little activity 
in the field of development. She al-
most allowed Manchuria to pass from 
her control to that of Russia. Even 
after the Treaty of Portsmouth, which 
reaffirmed her sovereignty in Man-
churia, the economic activities of Rus-
sia and Japan in developing those Pro-
vinces figured more ]?rominently than 
her OWJ;l in the eyes of the world 
Meanwhile the immigration of mil-
lions of Chinese farmers settled the fu-
ture possession of the land. This im-
migration was in fact an occupation, 
peaceful, inconspicuous but none the 
less real. White Russia and Japan. were 
engaged in delimiting their r.espective 
spheres of intere~ in North and South 
Manchuria, Chinese farmers took pos-
session of the soil, an~ Manchuria is 
now unalterably Chinese. In such cir-
cumstances China could afford to wait 
for a favorable o!)portunity to reassert 
her sovereign rights. The Russian re-
volution of 1917 gave her that oppol'-
tunity in North Manchuria. She be--
gan to take a more active part in the 
government and developwent of the 
countrY, which had been so long neg- · 
lected. In recent years she has tried 
to diminish Japan's influence in South 
Manchuria. Growing friction resulted 
from that policy, the culminating point 
of which was reached on September 18, 
i931. 
Population About 30,000,000 
The total population is estimated at 
about 30,000,000, of whom 28.000,000 are, 
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said to be Chinese or assimilated Man-
chus. The number of Koreans is put 
at 800,000, of whom a large number arC" 
congregated in the so-called Chientao 
District on the Korean border, the re-
mainder being widely scattered in 
Manchuria. Mongol tribes live in the 
pasture lands bordering Inner Mon-
golia, their number being small. There 
may be about 150,000 Russians in Man-
churia, most of them being in the area 
along the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
especially at · Harbin. About 230,000 
Japanese are mainly concentrated in 
the settlements along the South Man-
churia Railway and in the Kwantung 
Leased Territory (Liaotung Peninsula). 
The total number of Japanese, Rus-
sians and other foreigners (excluding 
'Koreans) in Manchuria does not exceed 
400,000. 
Manchuria is a vast country with an 
area as large as that of France and 
Germany taken together, estimated at 
about 380,000 square miles. lq. China 
it is always referred to as the "Three 
Eastern Provinces" because of its ad-
ministrative division into the three pro-
vinces of Liaoning (or Fengtien) in the 
South, Kirin in the East, and Heilung-
kiang in the North. Liaoning is e·sti-
mated to have an area of 70,000 square 
miles, Kirin of 100,000, Heilungkiang 
of over 200,000. 
Manchuria is continental in its char-
acteristics. There are two mountain 
ranges, the Changpai range in the 
Soutfieast and the Great Khingan 
range in the Northwest. Between these 
two mountain ranges lies the great 
Manchurian plain, o! which the north-
€:rn part belongs to the basin of the 
Sungari river and the southern part to 
that of the Liao river. The watershed 
between them, which has some his-
torical importance, is a range of hills 
dividing the Manchurian plain into a 
northern and a souther npart. 
Manchuria is bounded on the west 
by the province of Hopeh and by 
Outer and Inner Mongolia. Inner Mon-
golia was formerly divided into three 
special administrative areas: Jehol, 
Chahar and Suiyuan, which were given 
the full status of provinces by the Na-
tional Gov<:?rnment in 1928. Inner 
Mongolia, and more especially J ehoL 
has always had relations ·:.rith Man-
churia, and exercises some influence in 
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Manchurian affairs. On the northwest, 
northeast and east, Manchuria is 
bounded b.Y che Siberian provinces of 
the U.S.S.R., on the southeast by 
Korea, and on the south by the Yel-
low Sea. The southern end of the 
Liaotung Peninsula has been held by 
Japan since 1905. Its area is over 1,300 
square miles, and it is administered as a 
Japanese leased territory. In addition, 
Japan exercises certain rights over a 
narrow strip of land, which extends 
beyond the Lease Territory, and which 
contains the lines of the South Man-
churia Railway. The total area is only 
108 square miles, whereas the length Qf 
the lines is 690 miles. 
Transportation Essential 
The soil of Manchuria is generally 
fertile, but its development is depen-
dent on transportation facilities. Many 
important towns flourish along its 
rivers and railways. Formerly, devel-
opment was practically dependent on 
the river system, which is still of 
much importance, though the railways 
have now taken the first place as a 
means of transport. The production of 
important crops, such as soya beans, 
kaoliang, wheat, millet, barley, rice, oats 
has doubled in fifteen year~. In 1929 
these crops were estimated at over 
876.000,000 bushels. According to esti-
mates given in the Manchurian Year 
Book 1931 only 12.6 per cent of the 
tota] area has been brought under cul-
tivation in 1929, whereas 28.4 per cent 
was cultivable. A Jarge in.crease of 
production may therefore be expected 
in the future if economic condition~ 
improve. The total value of the agri-
cultural products of Manchuria· for 
the year 1928 was estimated at ovet 
£130,000,000 sterling. A large part of 
the agricultural produce is exported. 
Pongee or tussah silk is another im-
portant article of export from Man-
churia. 
The mountainous regions are rich in 
timber and minerals, especially coal. 
Important deposits of iron and gold 
are also known to exist, while large 
quantities of oil shale, dolomite, mag-
nesite, limestone, fireclay, stoatite and 
silica of excellent quality have been 
found. The mining industry may there-
fore be expected to become of gr.eat 
importance. 
11. Relations with the rest of Chh1a 
, Manchuria has, since the dawn of 
,history, been inhabited by various Tun-
gus tribes, who mixed freely with 
Mongol Tartars. Under the influence 
of Chinese immigrants of superior civil-
ization they learned to organize them-
se!ves, and established several king-
. doms which sometimes dominated the 
northern districts in China and Korea. 
great.er part of Manchuria and some 
northern districts in China and Korea. 
The Liao, Chin and Manchu dynasties 
even conquered large parts or the whole 
of China over which they ruled for 
· centuries. China, on the other hand, 
under strong emperors, was able to 
stem the tide from the north, and in 
her turn to establish sovereignty over 
large parts of Manchuria. Colonization 
by Chinese settlers was practised at a 
very early date. Various Chinese towns 
which radiated the influence of Chi-
nese culture through the surrounding 
districts, date from the same early time. 
For two thousand years a permanent 
foothold has been maintained, and Chi-
nese culture has always been active in 
the southern-most part of Manchuria 
The influence of this culture had be-
come very strong during the rule of 
the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) , whose 
authority extended over practically the 
whole of Manchuria. The Manchus 
were permeated by Chinese culture and 
had amalgamated to a great extent 
with the Chinese before they overthrew 
·the Ming administration in Manchuria 
in 1616, and in 1628 passed the Great 
Wall to conquer China. In the Man-
chu army were large numbers of Chi-
nese who were organized in separate 
military units known as Chinese Ban-
ners. 
After the conquest, the Manchus 
quartered their garrisons in the more 
important cities of China, forbade Man-
chus to engage in certain professions, 
prohibited intermarriage between Man-
chus and Chinese, and restricted the 
immigration of Chinese into Manchuria 
and Mongolia. These measures were 
inspired more by political than by racial 
discrimination, and aimed at safeguard-
. ing the permanent dominance of the 
dynasty. They did not affect the numer-
ous Chinese Bannermen, who enjoyed 
practically the same privileged status 
as the Manchus themselves. 
The exodus for the Manchus and their 
Chinese allies greatly reduced the 
population of Manchuria. However, in 
the south, Chinese communities con-
tinued to exist. From this foothold a 
few settlers spread across the central 
part of Fengtien Province. Their num~ 
her was increased by a continuous in 
filtration of immigrants from China, 
who succeeded in evading the exclu-
sion laws, or who had profited by their 
modifications from time to time. Man-
chus and Chinese became still more 
amalgamated, and even the Manchu 
language was virtually replaced by 
Chinese. The Mongols, however, were 
not assimilated but pushal back . by the 
advancing immigrants. Finally, to stem 
the Russian advance from the north, 
the Manchu Government decided ·to en-
courage Chinese immigration. In 1878 
various parts of Manchuria were ac-
cordingly opened and various forms of 
encouragement given to immigrants, 
with the result that at the time of the 
Chinese Revolution in 1911, the popula-
tion of Manchuria was estimated at 
18,000,000. 
Manchus Reform Administration 
In 1907, a few years only before its 
abdication, the Manchu Dynasty had 
decided to reform the administration in 
Manchuria. These provinces had hither-
to been administered as a separate, 
extra-mural dominion, with its own 
form of government. The Chinese prac-
tice of entrusting the civil administra-
tion in the provinces to scholars who 
had passed the competitive examina-
tions had not been followed in Man-
churia, which had been placed under 
a purely military regime in which 
Manchu officials and traditions were 
maintained. In China officials we~e 
not allowed to hold office in their na-
tive province. Each Manchurian pro-
vince had a military governor, who 
exercised complete power in civil as 
well as in military matters. Later, at-
'tempts had been made to separate mili-
tary and civil administration. The re-
sults were not satisfactory. The de-
marcation of the respective spheres - of 
authority was not adequate; misunder-
standings and intrigues were frequent 
and inefficiency resulted. In 1907, th€re-
fore, this attempt was given up. The 
three military governor:; were replaced 
by a Viceroy for all Manchuria, with 
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the object of centralizing authority, 
especially in the domain of foreign 
policy. Provincial civil governors under 
the control of the Viceroy were in 
charge of provincial administration. 
This reorganization prepared the way 
for the later administrative reforms 
which introduced the Chinese system 
of provincial government. These last 
measures of the Manchus were very 
effective, thanks to the able admin-
istrators in charge of Manchurian af-
fairs after 1907. 
When the Revolution broke out in 
1911, tne Manchurian authorities. who 
were not in favor of the Republic suc-
ceeded in saving these provinces front 
the turmoil of civil war, by oroe.ting 
Chang Tso-lin, who was later to be-
come the dictator of both Manchuria 
and North China, to resist the ad-
vance of the revolutionary troops. 
When the Republic had been estab-
lished, the Manchurian authorities ac-
cepted the fait accompli and volun-
tarily followed the leadership of Yuan 
Shih-kai, who was chosen the first 
President of the Republic. To each 
province both civil and military gov-
ernors were appointed. In Manchuria 
as in the rest of China the military 
governors soon succeeded in putting 
their civil colleagues. into the back-
ground. 
In 1916, Chang Tso-lin was appoint-
ed military governor of Fengtien Pro-
vince, concurrently acting as civil 
governor. His personal influence ex-
tended much further. When the ques-
tion arose of declaring war against 
Germany, he joined the military lead-
ers in China in their request to dis-
solve the Parliament which had op-
posed that measure. When the re-
quest was rejected by the President 
he declared his province independent 
from the Central Government at Pe-
king. Later, he withdrew that de-
claration and in 1918, in recognition t)f 
his service to the Central Govffn-
ment. he was apponited Inspector-
General of all Manchuria. In this, way 
Manchuria again became an admin-
istrative unit with its own special re-
gime. 
Chang Tso-lin accepted the honors 
accorded by the Central Government, 
but this attitude from time to time de-
pended on th-e nature of his peJ'Sonal 
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relations with the military leaders 
who controlled the changing central 
authorities. He seems to -have looked 
upon his relations with the Govern-
ment in the sense of a personal 
aliiance. In July, 1928, when he failed 
to establish his authority south of the 
Great Wall and saw his rivals taking 
c:ontrol of tht;> Peking Government, he 
renounced allegiance to the Centrai 
Government and maintained complete 
independence of action in Manchuria 
until he extended his authority south 
of the Wall and became master of 
Peking as well. He expressed his 
willingness to respect foreign rights, 
and accepted the obligations of China, 
but he rE'Quested foreign Powers to 
negotiate henceforth directly with his 
administration in all matters cocem-
L-r1g Manchuria. 
Soviet Agreement Changed 
Accordingly, he repudiated the Sino-
Soviet agreement of May 31, 1924, 
though very advantageous to China, 
~nd persuaded the U.S.S.R. to con-
clude a separate agreement with him 
in September, 1924. It was virtually 
identical with that of May 31, 1924, 
with the Central Government. This 
fact emphasized Chang Tso-tin's in-
sistence on the recognition of his com-
plete independence of action, botlil in 
ciomestic and foreign policy. 
In 1924 he invaded China again and 
was successful, because General (no.w 
Marshal) Feng Yu-hsiang abandoned 
his superior, General (now Marshal) 
Wu Pei-fu, at a critical moment in the 
campaign. The immediate result wa 
the overthrow of the Central Gov6D-
ment and the expansion of Marshal 
Chang's influence as far south as 
Shanghai. 
In 1925 Marshal Chang had again to 
resort to arms, this time against his 
late ally, General Feng. In this cam-
paign one of his commanders, Kuo 
Sung-lin, abandoned him at most cri-
tical moment in favor ,of General Feng. 
The mutinY, of Kuo Sung-lin, i.n Nov-
ember, 1925, was of more than pa.ss-
ing interest, because it involved both 
the U.S.S.R~ and Japan, the action ol 
the former having been indirectly, of 
advantage to General Feng, and that 
of the latter to Marshal Chang. Kuo--
Sung-lin, though a subordinate of the 




about social reform, and turned against 
bis superior in the belief that his down-
fall was necessary to put an end to 
civil war. This defection put the Mar-
shal in a most critical position. Kuo 
Sung-lin was in possession of the terri-
tory west of the railway and the Mar-
shal was at Mukden with greatly re-
duced forces. At this moment Japan, 
in her own interests in South Man-
churia, declared a neutral zone of 20 
11 (7 miles) on each side of the South 
Manchuria Railway, across which she 
would allow no troops to pass. This 
prevented Kuo Sung-lin from advanc-
ing against the Marshal and allowed 
tune for the re-enforcements from 
Heilungkiang to reach him. They were 
delayed by the action of Soviet rail-
way authorities who refused to allow 
th.mi to travel over the Railway with-
out ~t paying their fares in cash, 
but they managed to travel by an-
other :r:oute. The arrival of these re-
enforcements and the more or less 
open help given by the Japanese set-
tled the campaign in the Marshal's 
favor. Kuo Sung-lin was defeated and 
Genel'al Feng was forced to with-
draw and abandon Peking to Marshal 
Chang. Marshal Chang resented the 
action of the authorities of the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway on this occasion 
nd left no stone 'Ullturned to retali-
ate by continuous encroachments on the 
rights of this railway. The experi-
ence provided by this incident appE:arS 
to have been an impoi:tant fl:lctor in 
causing hlm to build an indepep.dent 
railway system co,nnecting the three 
l)rovincial capitals of Manchuria. 
The independence declared by Marshal 
Chang Tso-lin at different times never 
meant that he or the people of Man-
churia wished to be separated from 
China, His armies did not invade 
China as if it were a foreign country, 
but merely as participants in the civil 
war. Like the warlords of any other 
province, the Marshal alternately sup-
ported, attacked or declared his terri-
tory independent of the Central Gov-
ernment, but never in such a way as 
o involve the partition of China into 
_eparate states. On the contrary, mo.st 
Chinese civil wars were directly or in-
directly connected with some ambitious 
scheme to unify the country under a 
really strong Government. Through all 
its wars and periods o_f "independence," 
therefore, Manchuria remained an in-
tegral part of China. 
Did Not Favor Con!ftitution 
Although Marshal ChQng Tso-Un and 
the· Kuomintang had been allies in 1:1,e 
wars against Wu Pei-fu, the former did 
not himself accept the doctrines of t~ 
Kuomintang. He did not approve. of 
the constitution as desired by Dr. SlUl, 
as it did not seem to him to hapnoni~ 
with the spirit of the Chinese people; 
but he desi,red the unification of Chine, 
and his policy with rega.rd to the 
spheres of interest of the U.S.S.R. and 
Japan in Manchuria shows that be 
would have liquidated both if he could 
have done so. Indeed, he almost suc-
ceeded in accomplishing this in the case 
of the sphere of the U.S.S.R., and ini-
tiated the policy of railway con~uction 
already referred to, a result of which 
was to cu.t off the South Manchuria 
Railway from some of its feeder dis-
tricts. This attitude toward, U.S.$.R. 
and Japanese interests in Manchuria 
may be attributed partly to impatience 
at the limitations of his authority in 
dealing with these countries, and part;Jy 
to the resentment which he Ehared with 
all shades of Chinese opinion regard-
ing the privileged position of foreigners 
in China. In fact, in November, 1924, 
he invited Dr. Sun to a Reorganization 
Conference in the program of which the 
latter wanted to include the impro.ve-
ment of the standard of living, the 
convening of a National Convention and 
the abolition of unequal tre-aties. Dr. 
Sun's fatal illness prevented this con-
ference from taking place; but his pro-
pornls suggest a certain understanding 
with the Ma.rshal and a possible ba.si.5 
of agreement between them with regard 
to the £oreign. policy of their co1:1ntty•. 
In the last yeai,s of his life, Marshal 
Chang Tso-lin showed inc)ieal!ing \m-
willingness to allow Japan to profit by 
the privileges she derived {rom various 
trE:aties and agreements. Their rela-
tions at times became somewhat strai.nr-
ed. Japanese advice that he should 
keep out of the factional strife in China 
and concentrate his energy on the de-
velopment of Manchuria he resented 
and disregarded, as did his son aftj:!r 
him. After the defeat of General Feng-, 
Chang Tso-lin became the chief of the 
alliance of the Northern militarists, 
with the title of Great Marshal: 
In 1928 he suffered defeat at the 
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hands of the Kuomintang army, in their 
Northern Expedition referred to in 
Chapter 1. and was advised by Japan 
to withdraw his armies into Manchuria 
· before it was too late. The declared 
: object · of Japan was to save Man-
. churia from the evils of civil war which 
. would have resulted from the entry 
of a defeated army pursued by its 
· victors. 
The Marshal resented the advice, but 
was obliged to follow it. He left Pei-
ping (formerly Peking) on June 3, 1928 
for Mukden, but was killed the next 
day by an explosion which wrecked 
' his train just outside the city at the 
spot where the Peiping-Mukden Rail-
way passes underneath the bridge over 
which run the lines of the South Man-
churia Railway. 
Shrouded in Mystery 
The responsibility for this murder 
'has never been established. The tra-
gedy remains shrouded in mystery, but 
the suspicion of Japanese complicity tc 
· which it gave rise became an addition-
al factor in the state of tension which 
Sino-Japanese relations had already 
reached by that time. 
After the death of Marshal Chang 
Tso-lin his son, Chang Hsueh-liang 
became the ruler of Manchuria. He 
shared many of the national aspira-
tions of the younger generation, and 
desired to stop civil warfare and as-
sist the Kuomintang in its policy of 
unification. As Japan had already 
some experience of the policy ann 
tendencies of the Kuomintang, she did 
not welcome the prospect of such in-
fluence penetrating into Manchuria. 
The Young Marshal was advised ac-
cordingly. Like his &ther, he re-
sented that advice and decided to fol-
low his own counsel. His relations 
with the Kuomintang and with Nan-
king became closer, and in December, 
1928, he accepted the national flag and 
·declared his allegiance to the Central 
.Government. He was made Command-
er-in-Chief of the Northeastern Fron-
tier Army and was also con.firmed as 
chief of the administration of Man-
churia, with the addition of Jehol, a 
part' of Inner Mongolia with an area of 
.about 60,000 square miles. 
The union of Manchuria with Na-
tionalist China necessitated some 
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changes in the administrative or-
ganizatioin, which was made to ap-
proximate that of the Central Govern-
ment. The committee system was in-
troduced nnd Kuomintang headquarters 
were established. In reaiity, the old 
system and its personnel continued to 
function as before. The interference 
of party branches with the local cld-
ministrations, such as continually oc-
curred in China. was not tolerated in 
Manchuria. The provision which re-
quired all irr;portant military officers 
and civil officials to be members of the 
Kuomintang was trrnted as a mere 
formality. The relationship with the 
Central Governmt'nt de:pended in all 
affairs military, civil, financial and 
foreign, on voluntary co-operation. 
Orders or instructions requiring un-
questioning obedience would not have 
been tolerated. Appointments or dis-
missals against the wishes of the Man-
churian authorities were unthinkable. 
In various other parts of China a 
similar independence of action in GoY -
ernment and party affairs existed. All 
important appointments are, such cases, 
reaily made by the local authorities 
and only confirmed by the Centr..al 
Government. 
Foreign Policy Effected 
In the domain of foreign policy, the 
union of Manchuria with the Nation-
alist Government was to have more 
important consequences, although, in 
this respect, the local authorities were 
also left much liberty of a_ction. The 
persistent assaults of Marshal Chang 
Tso-lin on the position of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and his 
disregard of certain rights claimed by 
Japan, show that in Manchuria a "for-
ward policy" had already been adopted 
before the union with the Nationalists. 
However, after the union, Manchuria 
was opened to well-organized and sys-
tematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its 
official party publication and numerous 
affiliated organs it never ceased to in-
sist on the primary importance of the 
recovery of lost sovereign rights, and 
abolition of unequal treaties, and the 
wickedness of imperialism. Such pro-
paganda was bound to make a profound 
impression in Manchuria, where .the 
reality of foreign interests, courts, 
police, guards or soldiers on Chinese 
soil was apparent. Through the. Na-
tionalist schoolbooks Party propaganda 
entered the schools. Associations such 
as the Liaoning Peoples' Foreign Policy 
,Association made their apearance. They 
stimulated and intensified the nation-
alist sentiment and carried on an anti-
Japanese agitation. Pressure was 
brought to I bear on Chinese house-
owners and landlords to raise the rents 
of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to 
refuse renewal of rent contracts. The 
Japanese reported to the comlnission 
many cases of this nature. Korean 
settlers were subjected to systematic 
persecution. Various orders and in-
structions of an anti-Japanese nature 
were issued. Cases of friction accumu-
Jated, and dangerous tension develop-
ed. The Kuomintang Party Headquar-
ters in the provincial capitals were 
established in March, 1931, and sub-
sequently branch organizations were 
set up in the other towns and districts. 
Party propagandists from China came 
North in increasing numbers. The 
Japanese complained that the anti-
Japanese agitation was intensified every 
day. In April, 1931, a five days' confer-
ence under the auspices of the People's 
Foreign Policy Association was held 
at Mukden, with over three hundred 
delegates from various parts of Man-
churia in attendance. The possibility 
of liquidating the Japanese position in 
Manchuria was discussed, the recovery 
of the South Manchuria Railway being 
included in the resolutions adopted. 
At the same time, the U. S. S. R. and 
her citizens suffered from similar ten-
dencies, while the White Russians, al-
though they had no sovereign rights or 
exceptional privileges to surrender, 
were subjected to humiliation and ill-
treatment. 
As regards domestic affairs, the Man-
churian authorities had retained all the 
power they wanted, and they had no 
objection to following administrative 
rules and methods adopted by the Cen-
tral Government so long as the es-
sentials of power were not affected. 
Political Committee Formed 
Soon after the union, the Political 
Committee of the Northeastern Pro-
vinces was established at Mukden. It 
was, under the nominal supervision 
of the Central Government, the high-
est administrative authority in the 
northeastern Provinces. It consisted 
of 13 members, who elected one of 
their ·number as President:. The com-
mittee was responsible for the direc-
tic.-1 and supervision of the work of 
the governments of the four provinces 
of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and 
J ehol, and of the so-called Special Dis-
trict which, since 1922, had replaced 
the administrative sphere of the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway. The committee 
had authority to deal with all matters 
not specifically reserved to the Central 
Government, and to take any action 
which did not conflict wtih their laws 
and orders. It was the duty of the 
the Special District to carry out the 
governments of the provinces and of 
decisions reached by the committee. 
The administrative system of the pro-
vinces did not differ essentially from 
the organization adopted in the rest 
of China. The concession made with 
regard to the preservation of Man-
churia as an administrative unit - was 
the most important difference. With-
out this concession, voluntary union 
would probably not have taken place. 
In fact, notwithstanding external 
·changes, the old conditions continued 
to exist. The Manchurian authorities 
realized that as before their power de-
rived much more from their armies 
than from Nanking. 
This fact explains the maintenance 
of large standing armies numbering 
about 250,000 men, and of the huge 
arsenal on which more than $200,-
000,000 (silver) are reported to have 
estimated to have amounted to 80 per-
cent of the total expenditure. The re-
mainder was not sufficient to provide 
for the costs of administration, police, 
justice and education. The treasury 
was not capable of paying adequate 
salaries to the officials. As all power 
rested in the hands of a few military 
men, office could be obtained only 
through them. Nepotism, corruption 
and maladministration continued to be 
the unavoidable consequences of this 
state of affairs. The Commission found 
grave complaints concerning this mal-
administration to be widely current. 
This state of affairs, however, was not 
peculiar to Manchuria, as similar ·or 
even worse conditions existed in other 
parts of China. 
Heavy taxation was needed for the 
upkeep of the army. As ordinary re-
venues were still insufficient, the au-
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thorities . further taxed the people by 
steadily depreciating the irredeemable 
provincial currencies. This was Qften 
done, particularly of late, in connec-
tion with "official bean-buying'' opera-
tions, which by 1930 had already as-
su,med monopolistic proportions. By 
gaining control over Manchuria's 
staple products. the authorities had 
hoped to enhance their gains by <:om-
peJling the foreign bean-buyers, parti-
cularly the Japanese, to pay J;i.igher 
prices. Such transactions show the ex-
tent to which the authorities con-
trollecj baJ:)ks and commerce. O.fficials 
likewj,se e1,1ga,ged freely in aU sorts of 
private enterprise, and used their 
power to gather wealth for themselves 
and their favorites. 
Achievements N-0ted 
Whatever the shortcomings of the ad-
ministration in Manchuria may, have 
been in the period preceding the events 
of Septem.ber, 1931, efforts were ma.de 
in some parts of the country to im-
prove the administration, and certail} 
achievements must be noted, particUr 
lal'ly in the field of educational pro-
gres·s, of municiJ?al administratio.n, and 
public utility work. It is necessary in 
particular to emphasize that during this 
period, under the administration of 
Marsha.I Chang Tso-lin and Ma,i;shal 
Cha.ng Hsueh-liang, the Chinese popu-
lation a1;1d Chinese interests played a 
-much greater part thau :(ormerly in 
the development and organization of 
t~e, economic resources of Manchuria. 
· The extensive settlement of Chinese 
im.migrants, already mentioned, helped 
to develop the economic and social re-
lations between Manchuria and the rest 
of China. But apart from this coloniza-
tion, it was dwing this period, that 
Chinese railways, independent of Japa-
nese capital, notably the Mukden-
Hailun.g, the Tahushan-Tungliao (a 
brapch of the Peiping-Mukden system) , 
th.e Tsitsihar-Koshan, and the Hulun-
Hailun ~ailways, were buUt, and that 
the Hulutao Harbor project, the Liao 
River Co~ervancy work, and some 
navigation enterprises on various rivers, 
were started. Official and private Chi-
nese interests participated in many 
enterpdses. In mining, they had an 
interest in the Penhsihu, MuUng,_ Chal-
ainoerh and Laot.oukou coal mines, .and 
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sole responsibility for the development 
of other mines, many of them under 
the direction of the official North-East-
ern Mining Adminisb::ation: they were 
also interested in gold mining in Hei:.. 
lungkiang prov,ince. In forestry they 
had a joint interest with Japanese in 
the "¥alu Timber Company, and were 
eng:;iged in the timber industry in Hei-
1:ungkiang and Kirin provinces. Agri-
cultuz:al experimental stations were 
started in various places in Manchuria, 
and agricultural associations and irri-
gation projects were encouraged. Final-
ly, Chinese interests were engaged in 
milling and te~tile industries, bean, 
oil and flour mills in Harbin, spinning 
and weaving mills for Pon.gee or Tussah 
silk, cotton and wool. 
Commerce between Manchuria and 
the rest of China also i:J;1,creased. Tbis 
trade was partly financed by ChinPSe 
banks, notably the Bank of China, 
which had established bran,ches in the 
leading towns in Manchuria. Chinese 
steamships and nati,ve ju~s pliecj be-
tween China Prop.er and Dairen, Ying~ 
kow (N ewchwang) and An tung. They 
carried increasing amounts of cargv 
and occupied second place in Mai~chu• 
ria's shipping, beu:g exceeded only by 
Japanese tonnage. Chinese insu"6nce 
bt.Jswess was also on the it'c:r;-ease1 and 
the Chinese Maritune Ct:sto,Jll$ d,eri\'~d 
aa e\'er-increas~e; revenue from the 
trade of Manchuria. 
'fhus, during the pe:riod p,recec;liJ,>.S 
the- c<,nflict b.etween China and Jap~n, 
both the political and econormc, ~ 
be~een Manchuria and the rest. of 
China w-ere gFQdually strengthened. 
This growing interd,e~nclence ~Qn-
trihuted. to in<;luce Chin-ese leaden;, 
both in Manchuria and in Nanking, tp 
pursue an increasingly nationalist 
policy directed against the inte.-ests 
and rights acquired by Russia. or 
Japan. 
UI. Relations With R~s,sia 
The Sjno-Japanese war of 1894-95 had 
given RW>$ia an opportunity to inter-
vene, QStensibly on behalf of Cl:w;la, 
but in fact in her own interest, as sl,lb,-
sequen.t events proved. Japan was forc-
ed by diplomatic pressure to return to 
China the Lia otung Peni.Il.$\lla in South 
,Ma,nchuria, which had been ceded to 



















in 1895, and Rm:sia assisted China to 
pay off the w,ar indemnities which 
had been imposed by Japan. In 1896 
a secret defensive alliance was conclud-
ed between the two countries, and in 
the same year, in consideration of the 
services above referred to, Russia was 
authorized by China to carry a branch 
of the Trans-Siberian Railway across 
Manchuria in a direct line from Chita 
to Vladivostok. This line was said to 
be needed for the transportation of 
Russian forces to be sent to the East 
in case Japan should again attack 
China. The Russo-Chinese Bank Oater 
Russo-Asiatic Bank) was established to 
mask somewhat the official character 
of the enterprise. The Bank formed in 
its turn the Chinese Eastern Railway 
Company for the construction and 
operation of the railway. J3y the terms 
of the contract of September 8, 1896, 
between the Bank and the Chinese 
Government, the Company was to build 
the railway and operate it for eighty 
years, at the end of which it was to 
become the property of China free of 
charge, but China had the right of 
purchasing h at a price to be agreed 
upon at the end of thirty years. During 
the period of the contract the company 
was to have the absolute and exclusive 
right of administr~tion of its lands. 
This clause was interpreted by Russia 
in a much broader way than various 
other stipulations in the contract seem 
to warrant. China prote-sted against 
the continuous Russian attempts to en-
large the scope of the contract, but was 
not able to prevent it. Russia gradu~lly 
succeeded in exercising in the Chinese 
Eastern Railway area, with its rapidly 
developing railway towns, rights 
equivalent: to rights of sovereignty. 
China had also consented to hand over 
free· of charge all government lands 
needed by the railway, while private 
lands might be expropriated at current 
prices. The Company had furthermore 
been permitted to construct and operate 
the telegraph lines necessary for its own 
use. 
In 1898, Russia secured a lease fo~· 
twenty-five years lof the southern part 
of the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan 
had been force~ to give up in 1895, 
and also secured the right to conn~ct 
the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin. 
with Port Arthur and Dalny, (now 
Dsiren) , in the leased territory. Au-
thority was given for the construction 
of a naval port at Port Arthur. In the 
area traversed by this branch line the . 
Company was granted the right to cut 
timber and to mine coal for the use 
of the railway. Ali the stipulations of 
the contract of September 8, 1896, wer-:> 
e,xtended to the supplementary bran-
ches. Russia was authorized to make 
r.er own tariff arrangements inside the 
leased territory. In 1899 Dalny (new 
Dairen) was declared a free port and 
opened to foreigp shipping and com-
merce. No r&ilway privileges were to 
be given to the subjects of other 
Powers in the area traversed by the 
branch line. In the neutral grol,llld 
north of the leased · territory no ports 
were to be opened to foreign trade and 
no· concessio!1s or privileges were to 
be granted without the consent of 
Russia. 
In 1900 Russia occupied Manch1,1ria 
on the ground that the Boxer rising 
had endangered her nationals. Other 
Powers protested and demanded thP. 
withdrawal of her forces, but Russia 
delayed taking action in this sense. 
In February, 1901, the draft of a 
seoret Sino-Russian treaty was dis-
cussed in St. Petersburg, by the terms 
of which China, in return for the 
restoration of her civil authority in 
M;mchuria, was to sanction the main-
tenance of the railway guards which 
Russia had established under Ciause 6 
of the fundamental contract of 1896, 
and to engage not to trans£ er to other 
natiQns or their subjects without the 
consent of Russia, mines or other in-
terests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and 
Sinkiang. These and some other 
clauses in the draft treaty, when they 
became known, aroused opposition 
:frCJm public opinion in China and other 
countries, and on April 3, 1901, the 
Russian Govermnent issued a circular 
note to the effect that the project had 
been withdrawn. 
Japan followed these maneuvers 
with particular attention. On January 
30, 1902, she had concluded the Anglo-
Japanese treaty of alliance and accord-
ingly felt 'herself more secure. How-
ever, she was still concerned at the 
prospect of Russian encroachments in-
to Korea and Manchuria. She there 4 
fore pressed with the other Powers for 
the evacuation of the Russian forces in 
Manchuria. Russia declared her · wm~ 
ingness to withdraw on conditions 
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which would have virtually closed 
Manchuria and Mongolia to other than 
Russian enterprise. In Korea, Rus-
sian pressure increased also. In July, 
1902, Russian troops appeared at' the 
mouth of the Yalu River. Several 
other acts convinced Japan that Rus-
sia had decided upon a policy which 
was a menace to her interests if not 
to her very existence. In July, 1903, 
she began negotiations with Russia con-
cerning the maintenance of the policy 
of the Open Door and the territorial 
integrity of China, but having met with 
no success whatever she resorted to 
war on February 10, 1904. China re-
mained neutral. 
Russia was defeated. On September 
3, 1905, she concluded the Treaty of 
Portsmouth, whereby she relinquished 
her exceptional rights in South Man-
churia in favor of Japan. The leasi!d. 
territory and all rights connected with 
the lease were transferred to Japan. 
ar.d also the railway betw~en Port Ar-
thur and Changchun, with ii• branches, 
as well as all coal mines in that region 
belonging to or worked for. lhe bene-
fit of the railway. Both parties agreed 
to restor.e to the exclusive adminh,t-
ration of China all portions of Man-
churia occupied or under the control 
of their respective troops, with the 
exception of the leased territory. Both 
reserved the right to maintain (under 
certain specified conditions) guards to 
protect their respective railway 1h.€s 
in Manchuria, the number of su:'h 
guards not to exceed fifteen per kilo-
meter. 
Russia had lost half of her sphere 
of influence, which was henceforth to 
be restricted to North Manchuria. She 
retained her position there and in-
creased her influence in the following 
years, but, when· the Russian revolu-
tion broke out in 1917, qiina decided 
to reassert her sovereignty in this area. 
At first her action was restricted 
to participation in the Allied interven-
tion (1918-20) which, in connection 
with the chaotic conditions rapidly 
developing, after the Russian Revolu-
tion, in Siberia and North Manchuria, 
bad been proposed by the United 
States of America for the double pur-
pose of protecting the vast stores of 
mar material and supplies accumulated 
at Vladivostok and of assj.sting the 
evacuation of some 50,000 Czech.o-
Slovak troops, who were retreating 
from the eastern front across Siberia. 
This proposal was accepted and it was 
arranged that ~ach country should send 
an expeditionary force of 7,000 meri 
to be assigned to its own special sec.:. 
tion of the Trans-Siberian line, the 
C. E. R. being confided to the sole 
charge of the Chinese. To ensure the 
working of the railways in co-opera-
tion with the Allied forces, a special 
Inter-Al.lied Railway Committee wa 
formed in 1919 with the technical and 
transportation Boards under it. In 1920, 
the intervention came to an end and 
the Allied forces were withdrawn from 
Siberia, except the Japanese, who had 
become involved in open hostilities with 
the Bolsheviks. The fighting dragged 
on for nearly two years. In 1922, after 
the Washington Conference, the Japa-
nese troops were also withdrawn and, 
simultaneously, the Inter-Allied Com7 
mittee with its technical board ceased 
to exist. 
Meanwhi}e China, after an abortive 
attempt of General Horvath, the head 
of the C.E.R., to set up an indepen-
dent: regime in the railway area, as-
sumed responsibility for the preserva-
tion of order in that area (1920). In 
the same year she concluded an agree-
ment with the reorganized Russo-
Asiatic Bank, and announced her in-
tention of assuming temporarily su-
preme control of the railway, pend-
ing the conclusion of an agreement 
with a new Russian Government. China 
also announced her intention of re-
suming the advantages conferred on 
her by the contract of 1896 and the ori-, 
ginal statutes of the Company. Thence-
forth the President and four members 
of the Board of directors of the Com-
pany, and two members of the Audit 
Committee, were , to be nominated by 
the Chinese Government. Russian 
predominance was also weakened by 
other measures which followed. The 
Russian armed forces in the railway 
area were dfsarmed and replaced by 
Chinese soldiers. The extraterritorial 
status of Russians was abolished. Their 
courts were forcibly entere i and clos-
ed. Russians were made amendable. 
to Chinese law, justice and taxation. 
They could be arrested by the Chi-
nese police and· held by them inde-
finitely, as the poli'ce had large pow·-
ers and were insufficiently controlled. 
In 1922, the railway area which so 
far had been under the administration 
of the Company was transformed into 
a Special District of the Three Eastern 
Provinces under a Chi('f Administrator 
directly responsible to Mukden. The 
administration of the lands belonging to 
the railways was also interferred with. 
Marshal Chang Tso-lin had practically 
Jjquidated the Russian sphere before 
Rm-sia's new government had been re-
cognized, and private inteTests had suf-
fered heavily in the process. When the 
Soviet Government succeeded to the 
Manchurian inheritance of its predeces-
sor the railway had been shorn of most 
of its privileges. 
The declarations of policy made in 
1919 and 1920 by the Soviet Government 
with regard to China implied a complete 
relinquishment of the special rights 
which the Imperial GoveTnment had 
acquired in China, notably those ac-
quired in North Manchuria. 
In accordance with this policy, the 
Soviet Government agreed to the reg-
ularisation of the fait accompli by a 
new agreement. By the Sino-Russian 
agreement of May 31, 1924, the Chinese 
Eastern Railway became a purely com-
mercial concern under joint manage-
ment, in which China also acquired a 
financial interest. The Government of 
the U.S.S.R. had however, the right 
of appointing the General Manager, 
who exercises extensive and ill-define'.l 
powers, and. under the Agreement, the 
Government of the U.S.S.R. exercised 
a preponderant influence in the af-
fairs of the railway and was able to 
retain the essential !?arts of its eco-
nomic interests in North Manchuria. 
As mentioned above, the Agreement of 
May, 1924, concluded with the Chi-
nese Government at Peking, was not 
accepted by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, 
who insisted on a separate Agreement 
being concluded with himself. This 
Agreement, signed in September, 1924. 
was almost identical in its terms, but 
by it the lease of the railway was 
shortene-d from eighty to sixty years. 
This Agreement did not inaugurate 
a period of friendly relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and the administration of 
Marshal Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. 
The convening of the Conference 
which was to deal with the many ques-
tions left unsettled in the two Agree-
ments of 1924 was postponed on various· 
pretexts. On two occasions in 1925 and 
1926 the General Manager of the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway refused to trans-
port troops of the Marshal on the rail-
way. The second incident led to the 
arrest of the General Manager and to 
an ultimatum from the U. S. S. R. 
(January 23, 1926). Nor were these 
isolated incidents. Nevertheless the 
Chinese authorities persisted in a policy 
which was directed against Russian 
intere!)ts and which was resented both 
by the Government of the U. S. S. R. 
and by the White Russians. 
After the adherence of Manchuria to 
the Nanking Government, nationalist 
spirit increased in strength, and the 
efforts of the U. S. S. R. to maintain 
predominating control over the railway 
were, more than ever before, resented. 
In May, 1929, an attempt was made to. 
liquidate the last remnants of the Rus-· 
sian sphere of interest. The attack 
started with a raid on the Soviet con-
sulates at various places by the Chinese 
police, who made many arrests and 
claimed to have found evidence proving : 
that a communist revolution was being 
plotted by employees of the Soviet Gov-
ernment and of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. In July, the telegraph and 
telephone systems of the railway were 
seized, and many important Soviet or-
ganizations and enterprises were for- • 
cibly closed down. Finally, the Soviet 
Manager of the railway was requested 
to hand over the management to a 
Chinese appointee. He refused to do 
so, and was thereupon forbidden to 
carry on his duties. The Chinese au•-
thorities replaced freely members of the 
Soviet staff by their own nominees, , 
many Soviet citize-ns w·ere arrested, and 
some were deported. The Chinese , 
justified the violent action taken on the 
ground that the Soviet Government had, 
broken its pledge not to engage in pro-
paganda directed against the political 
and social systems of China. The, 
Soviet Government, in its note of May 
30, denied the charge. 
In consequence of the forcible liqui- . 
dation of the remaining Russian rights 
and interests the Soviet Government 
decided to take action. After the ex-
change of several notes, it rc:?called 
from China its diplomatic and com~ 
mercial representatives, and all its 
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nominees to posts in the Chinese East-
e,;n Railway, a.nd severed all railway 
communications between its territory 
and China. China, likewise, broke off 
relations with the U. S. S. R. and with-
drew all Chinese diplomatic officers 
from Soviet territory. Raids by So-
viet troops across the Manchurian 
border began, and developed into a 
military invasion in November, 1929. 
After having suffered defeat and sev-
ere loss of prestige, the Manchurian 
authorities to whom the Nanking Gov-
ernment entrusted the settlement: of 
the dispute were forced to accept the 
demands of the U.S.S.R. On Decem-
ber 22, 1929, a protocol was signed at 
Habarovsk whereby the status quo was 
re-established. During the dispute the 
Soviet Government had always taken 
the position, in answer to various Me-
moranda from third Power signatories 
to the Pact of Paris, that her action 
had been taken in legitimate self de-
fence and could in no way be inter-
preted as a breach of that agreement. 
Before describing the interests of 
Japan in Manchuria, which are dealt 
with at length in the next chapter, a 
brief reference must be made in this 
account of the nosition of Russia in 
Manchuria, to the relations between 
that country and Japan since 1905. 
It is an interesting fact that the war 
between Russia and Japan was fol-
lowed almost immediately by a policy 
of close co-operation, and when peace 
was concluded they were able to 
strike a satisfactory balance between 
their respective spheres of interest in 
North and South Manchuria. Such 
traces of the conflict as might have 
remained behind were rapidly effaced 
by controversies with other Powers 
who wanted to engage actively in the 
development of Manchuria. The fear 
of other rivals hastened the process 
which was reconciling the two coun-
tries. The Treaties of 1907. 1910. 1912. 
1916, brought the• two countries pro-
gressively closer together. 
The Russian revolution of 1917, fol-
lowed by the declarations of the So-
viet Government of July 25, 1919 and 
30 
of October 27, 1920, regarding its poli-
cy towards the Chinese people and, 
later, by the Sino-Soviet agreements 
of M.ay 31, 1924 and September 20, 
1924. shattered the basis of Russo-
Japanese understanding and co-opera-
tion in Manchuria. This fundamental 
reversal of policy radically changed 
the !'elations of the three Powers in 
the Far East. Moreover, the Allied 
intervention (1918-20) with its after-
math of friction between the Japanese 
and Sov1et forces in Siberia (1920-22) 
had accentuated the change in the r~-
lations between Japan and Russia. 
The attitude of the Soviet Govern-
ment gave a strong impetus to China'<; 
nationalistic aspirations. As the So-
viet Government and the Third In-
ternational had adopted a policy op-
posed to all imperialist Powers which 
maintained relations with China or. 
the basis of the existing treaties, it 
seemed that probable they would sup-
port China in the struggle for the 
recovery of sovereign rights. This de-
velopment revived all the old amcie-
ties and suspicions of Japan towards 
her Russian neighbcr. This country, 
with which she had once been at war, 
had, during the years which followed 
that war, become a friend and ally. 
Now this relationship was changed, 
and the possibility of a danger from 
across the North Manchurian border 
again became a matter of concern to 
Japan. The likelihood of an alliance 
between the Communist doctrines in 
the north and the anti-Japanese pro- · 
paganda of the Kuomintang in the 
south made the desire to impose be-
tween the two a Manchuria which 
should be free from both increasingly 
felt in Japan. Japanese misgivings 
have been still further increased in 
the last few years by the predon,inant 
influence acquired by the U.S.S.R. in 
Outer Mongolia and the growth of 
communism in China. 
The Convention concluded between 
~npan and the U.S.S R. in January. 
1925, served to establish regular rela-
tions, but did not revive the close co-
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CHAPTER III 
Manchurian Issu·es Between China and Japan 
I. Japan's Interest in China 
(Before September 18, 1931) 
· D\uling the quarter of a century before 
September, 1931, the ties which bound 
Manchuria to the rest of China were 
growing stronger and at the same time 
the interests of Japan in Manchuria 
were increasing. Manchuria was ad-
mittedly a part of China, but it was 
a part i.n which Japan had acquired 
or claimed such exceptional rights, so 
restricting the exercise of China's sov-
ereign rights, that a conflict between 
the two countries was a natural re-
sult. 
By the Treaty of Peking of Decem-
ber, 1905, China gave her consent to 
the transfer to Japan of the K wantung 
Leased Territory which was former-
ly leased to Russia, and of the south-
ern branch of the Russian-controlled 
Chinese Eastern Railway as far north 
as Changchun. In an additional agree-
ment China granted to Japan a con-
cession to improve the military rail-
way line between Antung and Muk-
den, and to operate it for fifteen years. 
fn August, 1906, the South Mam:huria 
Railway Company was organized by Im-
perial Decree to take over and admin-
ister the former Russian railway, as 
well as the Antung-Mukden Railway. 
The Japanese Government acquired 
control of the company by taking half 
of the shares in exchange for the rail-
way, its properties, and the valilable 
coal mines at Fushun and Yentai. The 
company was entrusted, in the railway 
area, with the functions of administra-
tiOllj and was allowed to levy taxes: it 
was also authorized to engaged in min-
im:g; electrical enterprises, warehousing, 
and many other branches of business. 
m 1910 Japan annexed Korea. This 
annexation indirectly increased Japa-
nese rights in Manchuria, since Korean 
sett~n,; · became Japanese subjects over 
whom Japanese officials exercised juris-
diction. 
Leases Extended 
In 1915, as a result of the group of 
exceptional demands made by the Japa-
nese and generally known as the 
".Twenty-one Demands," Japan and 
Ghina. signed a treaty and exchanged 
notes on May 25th, regarding South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia. By these agreements the lease 
of the Kwantung Territory, including 
Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen), 
which was originally for a period of 
25 years and the concessions for the 
South Manchuria and the Antung-
Mukden railways, were all extended to 
99 years. Furthermore, Japanese sub-
jects in South Manchuria acquired the 
right to travel and reside, to engage 
in, business of any kind, and to lease 
land· necessary for trade, industry and 
agriculture. Japan also obtained rights 
of priority for railway and certain 
other loans in South Manchuria and 
Eastern· Inner Mongolia, and pref er-
ential rights regarding the appointment 
of advisers in South Manchuria. At the 
Washington conference, 1921-1922, how-
ever, Japan relinquished her rights re-
garding the loans and the advisers. 
These treaties and other agreements 
gave to Japan an important and un-
usual position in Manchuria. She 
governed the leased territory with 
practically full rights of sovereignty. 
Through the South Manchuria Rail-
way she administered the railway 
areas, including several town and 
large sections of such populous cities 
as Mukden and Changchun; and in 
these areas she controlled the police, 
taxation, education and public utilities. 
She maintained armed forces in 
many parts of the country; the Kwan-
tung army in the Leased Territory, 
railway Guards in the railway- areas, 
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and consular police throughout the 
various districts. 
This summary of the long list of 
Japan's rights in Manchuria shows 
clearly the exceptional character of the 
political, economic and legal relations 
created between that country and 
China in Manchuria. There is prob-
ably nowhere in the world an exact 
parallel to this situation. no example 
of a country enjoying in the territory 
of a neighboring state such extensive 
economic and administrative privileges. 
A situation of this kind could possibly 
be maintained without leading to in-
cessant complications and disputes if 
it were freely desired or accepted on 
both sides, and if it were the sign and 
embodiment of a weil-considered policy 
of close collaboration in the economic 
and in the political sphere. But in the 
absence of those conditions it could 
only lead to friction and conflict. 
II. Conflict Between the Fundamental 
interests of Japan and China 
in Manchuria 
The Chinese people regard Manchuria 
as an integral part of China, and deeply 
resent any attempt to separate it from 
the rest of their country. Hitherto these 
Three Eastern Provinces have always 
been considered both by China and by 
foreign Powers as a part of China, and 
the de jure authority of the Chinese 
Government there has been unqu~stion-
ed. This is evidenced in many Sino-
Japanese treaties and agreements, as 
well as in other international conven-
tions, and has been reiterated in nwner-
ous statements issued officially by for-
eign offices, including that of Japan. 
. The Chinese regard Manchuria as 
their "first line of defence." As Chi-
nese territory, it is looked upon as a 
sort of buffer against the adjoining ter-
ritories of Japan, and Russia, a region 
which constitutes an outpost against the 
penetration of Japanese and Russian 
influences from these regions into the 
other parts of China. The facility with 
which China, south of the Great Wall, 
including the city of Peiping, can be 
invaded from Manchuria has been de-
monstrated to the Chinese from his-
torical experience. This fear of foreign 
invasion from the northeast has been 
increased in recent years by the de-
velopment of railway communication, 
and has been intensified during the 
events of the past year. 
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Manchuria is also regarded by the 
Chinese as important to them for eco-
nomic reasons. For decades they have 
called it the "granary of China,'' and 
more recently have regarded it as a 
region which furnishes seasonal em-
ployment to Chinese farmers and lab-
orers from neighboring Chinese pro-
vinces. 
Whether China as a whole can be 
said to be over-populated may be open 
to question, but that certain regions 
and provinces, as, for example, Shan-
tung, are now peopled in such num-
bers as to require emigration is gen-
erally accepted by the most compe-
tent authorities on this subject. The 
Chinese, therefore, regard Manchuria 
as a frontier region, capable of afford-
ing ' relief for the present and future 
population problems of other parts of 
China. They deny the statement that 
the Japanese are principally respon-
sible for the economic development of 
Manchuria, and point to their own 
colonization enterprises, especially since 
1925, to their railway development and 
other enterprises in refutation of these 
claims. 
Japanese interests in Manchuria dif-
fer both in character and degree from 
those of any other foreign country. 
Deep in the mind of every Japanese 
is the memory of their country's great 
struggle with Russia in 1904-5, fought 
on the plains of Manchuria, at Muk-
den and Liaoyang, along the line of 
the South Manchuria Railway, at the 
Yalu River, and in the Liaot'ung Pen-
insula. To the Japanese the war with 
Russia will ever be remembered as a 
life and death struggle fought in self-
defense against the menace of Rus-
sian encroachments. The fact that a 
hundred thousand Japanese soldiers 
died in this war, and that two billion 
gold Yen were expended, has created 
in Japanese minds a determination that 
these sacrifices shall not have been 
made in vain. 
Interest Date Earlier 
Japanese interest in Manchuria, how-
ever, began ten years before that war. 
The war with China, in 1894-5, prin-
cipally over Korea, was largely fought 
at Port Arthur and on the plains of 
Manchuria; and the treaty of peace 
signed at Shimonoseki, ceded to Japan 
in full sovereignty the Liaotung Pen-
insula. To· the Japanese, the fact that 
Russia, France and Germany forced 
them to renounce this cession does not 
affect their conviction that Japan ob-
tained this part of Manchuria as the 
result of a successful war, and thereby 
acquired a moral right to it which still 
exists. 
Manchuria has been frequently re-
ferred to as the "life line" of Japan. 
Manchuria adjoins Korea, now Japa-
nese territory. The vision of a China, 
unified, strong and hostile, a nation of 
four hundred millions, dominant in 
Manchuria and in Eastern Asia, is dis-
turbing to many Japanese. But to the 
greater number, when they speak of 
menace to their national existence and 
of the necessity of self-defense, they 
have in mind Russia rather than China. 
Fundamental, therefore, among the in-
terests of Japan in Manchuria is the 
strategic importance of this territory. 
There are those in Japan who think 
that she should entrench herself firm-
ly •in Manchuria against the possibil-
ity of attack from the U.S.S.R. They 
have an ever-present anxiety lest Ko-
rean malcontents in league with Rus-
sian Communists in the nearby Mari-
time Province might in future invite, 
or co-operate with, some new military 
advance from the north. They regard 
Manchuria as a buffer region against 
both the U.S.S.R. and the rest of 
China. Especially in the minds :>f 
Japanese military men, the right 
claimed, under agreements with Rus-
sia and China, to station a few thou•• 
sand railway guards along the South 
Manchuria Railway is small recompense 
for the enormous sacrifices of their 
country in the Russo-Japanese War, 
and a meagre security against the 
possibility of attack from that direc • 
tion. 
Patriotic sentiment, the paramount 
need of military defence, and the ex-
ceptional treaty rights, all combine to 
create the claim to a "special position" 
in Manchuria. The Japanese concep-
tion of this special position is not 
limited to what is legally defined in 
treaties and agreements either with 
China or with other States. Feelings 
and historical association, which are 
the heritage of the Russo-Japanese 
War, and pride in the achievements of 
Japanese enterprise in Manchuria for 
the last quarter century, are an in-
definable but real part of the Japanese 
claim to a "special position." It is 
only natural. therefore, that the Japa-
nese use of this expression in dip-
1omatic language should be obscure. 
and that other States should have 
found it difficult, if not impossible to 
recognize it by international instru-
ments. 
The Japanese Government, since the 
Russo-Japanese War, has at various 
times sought to obtain from Russia, 
France, Great Britain and the United 
States recognition of their country's 
"special position," "special influence 
and interest,''' or "paramount interests" 
in Manchuria. These efforts have only 
met with partial success, and where 
recognition of such claims has been 
accorded, in more or less definite terms 
the inte-rnational agreements or under~ 
standings containing them have largely 
disappeared with the passage of time, 
either by formal abrogation or other-
w~e, as, for example, the Russo-
Japanese secret conventions of 1907, 
1910, 1912 and 1916, made with the 
ormer Tsarist Government of Russia: 
the Anglo-Japanese conventions of 
alliance, guarantee and declaration of 
policies; and the Lansing-Ishii exchange 
of notes of 1917. 
Spedal Position Challenged 
The Signatories of the Nine-Power 
Treaty of the Washington conference 
of February 6, 1922, by agreeing "to 
respect the sovereignty, the inde-
pendence, and the territorial and ad-
ministrative integrity" of China, to 
maintain "equality of opportunity in 
China for the trade and industry of all 
nations," by refraining from taking 
advantage of conditions in China" in 
order to seek special rights or privi-
leges" there, and by providing "the 
fullest and most unembarrassed oppor-
tunity to China to develop and main-
tain for herself an effective and stable 
government, challenged to a large 
extent the claims of any signatory 
State to a "special position," or to 
"special rights and interests" in any 
part of China, including Manchuria. 
But the provisions of the Nine-Power 
Treaty and the abandonment, by abro-
gation or otherwise, of such agreem~ts 
as those mentioned above, have led to 
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no change in the attitude Qf the Japa-
nese. Viscount Ishii doubtless well ex-
pressed the general view of his country-
men in his recent Memoirs (Gaiko Yo-
ruku), when he said: 
"Even if the Lansing-Ishii agreement 
is abolished, Japan's special interests 
unshakenly exist there. The special in-
terests which Japan possesses in China 
neither were created by an interna.-
tional agreement, nor can they become 
the objects of abolition." 
T4is Japanese claim with respect to 
Manchuria conflicts with the sovereign 
rights of China, and is irreconcilable 
with the aspirations of the National 
Government, which seeks to curtaH ex-
ist.ing exceptional rights and privileges 
of foreign States throughout China, and 
to prevent, their further extension in 
the future. The development of this 
<;onflict will be clear from a considera-
tion of the respective policies pursued 
by Japan and China iµ Manchuria. 
' Until the events of September, 1931, 
the various Japanese Cabinets, since 
1905, appeared to have the same gen-
eral aims in Manchuria, but they dif-
fered as to the policies best suited to 
achieve those aims. They also dif-
fered somewhat as to the extent of the 
respo.nsibility which Japan should as-
sume for the maintenance of peace 
and order. 
The general aims for which they 
worked in Manchuria were to main-
tain and develop Japan's vested in-
~erests, to foster the expansion of 
.Japanese enterprise, and to obtain ade-
quate protection for Japanese lives and 
prop.erty. In the policies adopted for 
realizing these aims there was one 
<;ardinal feature which may be said 
to have been common to them all. 
This feature has been the tendency 
~o regard Manchuria and Eastern In-
ner Mongolia as distinct from the rest of China. It resulted naturally from 
the Japanese conception of their coun-
try's "special position" in Manchuria. 
Whatever differences may have been 
obs~able between the specific ~ol-
ici~ advocated by the various cabi-
nets in Japan, as, for example, between 
the so-called "friepdship policy" of 
Baron Shidehara and the so-called 
1'p'ositi~e policy" of' the late General 
Bar,on · Tanaka, tq.ey,· have always· had 
his feature in common. 
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Two Policies Alternate 
The "friel)dship policy" developed 
from about the time of the WashingtQn 
conference and was maintained until 
April, 1927; it was then supplanted by 
the "positive policy," which was fol-
lowed until July, 1929; finally, the 
"friendship policy" was again adopted 
and continued the official policy of the 
Foreign Office until September, 1931. 
In the spirit which actuated the two 
policies there was a marked difference: 
the "friendship policy" rested, in Baron 
Shidehara's words, "on the basis• of 
good will and neighborliness": the 
"positive policy" rested upon military 
force. But in regard to the concrete 
measures which should be adopted in 
Manchuria, these two policies differed 
largely on the question as to the lengths 
to which Japan should go to maintain 
peace and order in Manchuria and to 
protect Japanese interests. 
The "positive policy" of the Tanaka 
Ministry placed greater emphasis UJ?On 
the necessity of regarding Manchuria as 
distinct from the rest of China: its 
positive character was made clear by 
the frank declaration that "if distur-
bances spread to Manchuria and Mon-
golia, and, as a result, peace and order 
are disrupted, thereby menacing our 
special position and rights and interests 
in those regions," Japan would "de-
fend them, no matter whence the 
menace comes." The Tanaka policy defi-
nitely asserted that Japan would take 
upon herself the task · of preserving 
''peace and order" in Manchuria-in 
contrast to previous policies which 
limited their objectives to protecting 
Japanese interests there. 
The Japanese Government has gen-
erally pursued a firmer policy in Man-
churia than elsewhere in China, in, 
order to preserve and develop these 
vested interests which are peculiar to 
that region. Certain of the Cabinets 
have tended to place great reliance on 
the use of interventionist methods, ac-
companied by a threat of force. This 
was true especially at the time of the 
presentation of the "Twenty-one De-
mands" on China in 1915, but as . to 
the wisdom of the "Twenty-one De-
mands," as well as to other methods 
Qf intervention and force. there has 
always been. a marked difference of 
opinion in Japan. 
f 
The Washington conference, although 
it had a marked effect upon the sit-
uation i~ the rest of Chin~, 'made lit-
tle actual change in Manchuria. The 
Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, 
in spite of its provisions with respect 
to the integrity of China and the 
policy of the Open Door, has had but 
qualified application to Manchuria in 
view of the character and extent of 
Japan's vested interests there; al-
though textually the treaty is applic-
aiA~ to that region. The Nine-Power 
Treaty did not materially d~inish 
the claims based on these vested in-
terests~ although, as alreadiy stlated, 
Japan formally relinquished her spe-
cial rights regarding loans and advis-
ers which had been granted in the 
Treaty of 1915. 
During the period from the Washing-
ton conference until the death of 
Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1928, the 
policy of Japan in Manchuria was 
chiefly concerned with the relations 
with the de facto ruler of the Three 
Eastern Provinces. Japan gave him 
a measure of support, notably during 
the Kuo Sung-lin mutiny mentioned in 
the last chap ter. Marshal Chang Tso-
lin, in return, although opposed to 
man of the Japanese demands, felt it 
necessary to give due recognition to 
Japan's desires, since these might at 
any time be enforced byl superior mili-
tary power. He also wished to be 
able, upon occasion to obtain Japa-
nese support against Russian opposi-
tion in the north. Upon the, whole, 
Japanese relations with Marshal 
Chang Tso-lin were reasonably satis-
factory from her point of view, al-
though they became increasingly dis-
turbed toward the end of his life in 
consequence of his failure to fulfill 
some of his alleged promises and agree-
ments. Some evidence even of a re-
vulsion ofi Japanese feeling against him 
became apparent in the months preced-
ing his defeat and final retreat to 
Mukden in June, 1928. 
Right to Keep Peaee Claimed 
ln the spring of 1928, when the Na-
tionalist armies of China were march•• 
fug on Peking in an effort to drive 
out the forces of Chang Tso-lin, the 
J apanese 'Government, under the pre-
miership of Baron Tanaka, issued a 
declaration that, on account of her 
"special position" 'in Manchuria, Japan 
would maintain peace and order in 'that 
region. When it seemed possible that 
the Nationalist arm~es might ·carry the 
civil war north of- the Great Wall, 
the Japanese Government, on May .28, 
sent to the leading :Chinese generals 
a communication 'which said: 
"The Japanese Government attache-; 
1he utmost importance to the main-
tenance of peace and order in Man-
churia, and is prepared to do all lt 
can to prevent the occurrence of any 
such state of affairs as may disturb 
that peace and order, or constitute the 
probable cause of such a disturbance 
"In these circumstances, should dis-
turbances develop further in the di-
rection of Peking and Tientsin, and 
the situation become so menacing as 
to threaten the peace and order of 
Manchuria, Japan may possibly be con-
strained to take appropriate effective 
steps for the maintenance of peace and 
order in Manchuria." 
At the same time, Baron Tanaka is-
sued a more definite statement, tha't 
the Japanese Government would pre-
vent "defeated troops of those in pur-
suit of them" from entering Manchuria. 
The announcement of this far-
reaching policy brought protests from 
both the Peking and the N anking 
Governments, the Nanking note stat-
ing that such meas~res as Japan pro-
posed would be not only "an inter-
ference with Chinese domestic a.ffa:rs, 
but also a flagrant violation of the 
principle of mutual respect for ter-
ritorial sovereignty." 
In Japan itself this "positive policy'' 
of the Tanaka Government, while it 
received strong support from one 
party, was vigorously criticized by 
another, especially by the Shidehara 
group, on the ground that the preser-
vation of peace and order over all 
Manchuria was not the responsibilit} 
of Japan. 
Japan's relations with Marshal C'nang-
Hsueh-liang, who succeeded his father 
in 1928, were increasingly strained from 
the outset. Japan wished Mahchuria 
to remain separate from the newly-
established National Government at 
Nanking, while Marshal Chang Hsueli-
liang was in favor of recognizing the 
35 
· authority of that Government. Refer-
ence has already been made to the 
. urgent advice given by Japanese offi-
ci~ that allegimce should not be 
· pledged t.o the Central Government. 
When, however, the Mukden Govern-
ment raised the Nationalist flag over 
government buildings in Mukden in 
December, 1928, the Japanese Govern-
ment made no attempt to interfere. 
Japanese relations with Marshal 
Chang Hsueh-liang continued to be 
strained, and acute friction developed 
in the months immediately preceding 
September, 1931. 
Ill. Sino-Japanese Railway Issues 
in Manchuria 
The international politics of Manchu-
ria for a quarter of a century have 
been largely railway politics. Con-
siderations of a purely economic and 
railway-operating character have been 
overshadowed by the dictates of state 
policies, with the result that Manchu-
rian railways cannot be said to have 
contributed their maximum to the eco-
nomic development of the region. Our 
_study of Manchurian railway questions, 
has revealed that in Manchuria there 
has been little or no co-operation be-
tween the Chin~se and Japanese rail-
way builders and authorities directed 
to achieving a comprehensive and mu-
tually beneficial railway plan. In con-
trast with railway development in such 
regions as Western Canada and Argen-
tina, where economic considerations 
have in large measure determined rail-
way. expansion, railway development in 
Manchuria has been largely a matter 
of rivalry between China and Japan. 
No railway of any importance has ever 
been constructed in Manchuria without 
causing an interchange of notes be-
tween China and Japan or other in-
terested foreign States. 
Manchurian railway construction be-
gan with the Russian-financed and 
directed Chinese Eastern Railway under 
circumstances which, after the Rus&Q-
J apanese War was replaced in the south 
. by a Japanese-controlled system, the 
,S~uth Manchuria Ra,ilway, thus mak-
ing inevitable future rivalry between 
· China and Japan. The South Man-
churia Railway, although nominally a 
private corporation, is, in fact, a Japa-
nese Government enterprise. Its func-
tions include not only the management 
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of it$ railw,.y lines, but also excep-
tional rights of political administra-
tion. From the time of its incorpora-
tion the Japanese have never regarded 
it as a purely economic enterprise. The 
late Viscount Goto, first President of 
the company, laid down a fundamental 
principle that the South Manchuria 
Railway should serve Japan's "special 
mission" in Manchuria. 
The South Manchuria Railway system 
has developed into an efficient and 
well-managed railway enterprise, and 
· has contributed much to the economic 
development of Manchuria, serving at 
the same time as an example for the 
Chinese in its numerous services of a 
non.:.railway character, such as its 
schools, laboratories, libraries and agri-
cultural experiment stations. But this 
has been accompanied by limitations 
and positive hindrances arising out of 
the political character of the company, 
its connection with party politics in 
Japan, and certain large expenditures 
from which no commensurate financial 
returns can have been expected. Since 
its formation, the policy of the railway 
company has been to finance the con-
struction of only such Chinese lines as 
would be connected with its own sys-
tem, thus, by means of through-traffic 
agreements, to divert the major part o.f 
the freight to the South Manchuria 
Railway for seaboard export at l)airen 
in the Japanese leased territory. Very 
large sums have been expended in fin-
ancing these lines and it is doubtful 
if their construction, in certain cases, 
was justified on purely economic 
grounds, especially in view of the large 
capital advances made and the loan 
considerations involved. 
Rights Often Questioned 
The very existence of such a foreign-
controlled institutio,n as the South 
Manchuria Railway on Chinese soil 
was naturally looked upon with dis-
favor by the Chinese authorities, and 
questions concerning its rights and pri-
vileges under treaties and agreements 
have constantly arisen since the Russo-
Japanese War. More particularly, after 
1924, when the Chinese authorities ih 
Manchuria, having come to recognize 
the importance of railway develop-
ment, sought to develop their own rail-
ways independent of Japanese capi-
tal, did these pr.oblems become more 
critical. Both economic and stragetic 
considerations were involved. The Ta-
hushan-Tungliao line, for example, 
was projected to develop new terri-
tory and to increase the revenues of 
the Peking-Mukden Railway, while, on 
the other hand, the Kuo Sung-lin 
mutiny in December, 1925, demonstrat-
ed the possible strategic and political 
value of independently owned and 
operated Chinese lines. The Chinese 
attempt to overcome the Japanese mo-
nopoly, and to place obstacles in the 
way of its future development, anteced-
ed the period of political influence of 
the Tahushan-Tungliao, Mukden-Hail-
ungcheng and Hulan-Hailun railways, 
for example, having been constructed 
while Marshal Chang Tso-lin was in 
power. The policy of Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang after his assumption of 
authority in 1928, re-enforced by the 
widespread movement for "rights re-
covery" sponsored by the Central Gov-
ernment and the Kuomintang, came 
into collision with Japan's monopolis-
tic and expansionist policies, centered, 
as they were, around the South Man-
churia Railway Company. 
In the Japanese justification of their 
resort to forceful means in Manchuria, 
on and after September 18, 1931, they 
have alleged violation of Japan's 
"treaty rights," and have emphasized 
China's failure to carry out an engage-
ment made by the Chinese Government 
during the Sino-Japanese conference 
held at Peking in November-December, 
1905, which was to the following 
effect: 
"The Chinese Government engage, 
for the purpose of protecting the in-
terests of the South Manchuria Rail-
way, not to construct, prior to the re-
covery by them of the said railway, 
any main line in the neighborhood of 
and parallel to that railway, or any 
branch line which might be pre-
judicial to the interests of the above-
mentioned railway." 
This dispute over the question of so-
called "parallel railways" in Man-
churia is of long standing importance. 
The issue first arose in 1907-1908, when 
the Japanese Government, asserting 
this claim of right, prevented the 
Chinese from constructing, under con-
tract with a British firm, the Hsin-
mintung-Fakumen Railway. Since 
1924, when the Chinese in Manchuria 
undertook with 11enewed vigor to 
develop their own railways, indepen-
dent of Japanese financial interest, the 
Japanese Government has protested 
against the construction by the Chi-
nese of the Tahushan-Tungliao and the 
Kirin-Hailungcheng lines, although 
both these lines were completed and 
opened to traffic in spite of Japanese 
protests. 
Prior to the arrival of the commis-
sion in the Far East, there had been 
much doubt as to the actual existence 
of any such engagement as was claim-
ed by Japan. In view of the long-
standing importance of this disputP. 
the commission took special pains to 
obtain information on the essentfal 
facts. In Tokyo, mmking and Peiping, 
all the relevant documents were ex-
amined, and we are now able to state 
that the alleged engagement of the 
Chinese plenipotentiaries of the Pe-
king conference of November-Decem-
ber, 1905, regarding so-called "parallel 
railways" is not contained in any 
formal treaty; that the alleged engage-
ment in question is to be found in the 
minutes of the eleventh day of the 
Peking Conference, December 4, 1905. 
We have obtained agreement from the 
Japanese and Chinese assessors that 
no other document containing such 
alleged engagement exists beyond this 
entry in the minutes of the Peking 
conference. 
Real Question at Issue 
The real question at issue, therefore, 
is not whether there exists a "treaty 
right" whereby Japan is entitled to 
claim that certain railways in Man •• 
churia have been constructed by the 
Chinese in violation of such an en-
gagement, but whether this entry in 
the minutes of the Peking conference 
of 1905, whether called a "protocol" or 
not, is a binding commitment on the 
part of China, having the force of a . 
formal agreement and without limi-
tation as to the period or circum-
stances of its application. 
The determination of the question 
whether this entry into the minutes of 
the Peking conference constituted, from 
an international legal point of view, a 
binding agreement, and whether, if so, 
there is but one interpretation which 
may reasonably be placed upon it,· was 
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properly a matter for judgment by an 
impartial judicial tribunal. 
The Chinese and Japanese official 
translations of this entry inlo the 
minutes of the conference leave no 
doubt that the disputed passage cort-
cerning "parallel railways" is u de-
claration or statement of intention on 
the part of the Chinese plenipoten-
tiaries. 
That there was a statement c,f in-
tention has not been disput-ed ,by the 
Chinese, but there has throughout •the 
controversy been a difference of op-inion 
between the two parties as to the ,nature 
of the intention expressed. Japan has 
claimed that the words employed pre-
clude China from building •or allowing 
to be built any railway which, in the 
opinion of the South Manchuria Rail-
way Company, was in competition with 
its system. The Chinese, on the other 
hand, contend that the only commit-
ment involved in the disputed passage 
was a statement of intention no! to 
build lines with the deliberate object 
of unduly impairing the commercial 
usefulness and value of the South Man-
churia Railway. During the exchange 
of notes of 1907 concerning the Hsin-
mintun - Fakumen Railway project, 
Prince Ching, representing the Chinese 
Government, stated to Baron Hayashi, 
the Japanese Minister, in a communi-
cation dated April 7, 1907, that the Japa-
nese plenipotentiaries in the Peking 
conference, while refusing to agree to 
a definition of the term "parallel line" 
in terms of specific mileage from the 
South Manchuria Railway, declared 
that Japan "would do nothing to pre-
vent China from any steps she might 
take in the future for the development 
of Manchuria." It would seem, there-
fore, that the Chinese Government 
during this period admitted in practice 
that there was, on their part, an ob-
ligation not to construct railways 
patently and unreasonably prejudidal 
to the interests of the South Manchuria 
Railway, though they have always 
denied that Japan had any valid claim 
to a right to monopolize railway con-
struction in southern Manchuria. 
There has never been a definition as 
to what would constitute a parallel 
railway, although the Chinese desired 
one. When the Japane~ Government 
opposed . the ~onstruction of the Hsin-
mintun-Fakumen Railway in 1906-1908, 
the impression was created that Japan 
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considered a "parallel" railway one 
within approximately thirty-five ,miles 
of the South Manchuria Railway, ,but 
in 1926 the Japanese Government ,pre-
tested against the construction of ,the 
Tahushan-Tungliao Railway as a "com-
petitive parallel line," noting that the 
distance between the proposed railway 
and ihe South Manchuria Railway 
would be "no more than seventy miles 
on the average." It would be difficult 
to make a thoroughly satisfactory defi-
nition. 
Interpretation Difficult 
From a railway-operating point of 
view, a "parallel" line ~an be consider-
ed a "competing line"; one which ·de-
prives another railway of some part of 
the traffic which naturally would have 
gravitated to it. Competitive traffic ,in-
cludes both local and through-traffic, 
and, especially when the latter is con-
sidered, it is not difficult to see how 
a stipulation against the construction of 
"parallel" lines is capable of very broad 
interpretation. Nor is there any agree-
ment between China and Japan as to 
what constitutes a "main line" ·or a 
"branch line." These terms, from a 
railway operating point of view, are 
subject to change. The Peldng-M•1kden 
Railway line from Tahushan extending 
north was originally considered by that 
administration as a "branch line," but 
after the line had been complet~ from 
Tahushan to Tungliao it was possible 
to regard this as a "main line." 
It was only natural that the inter-
pretation of the undertaking in 11e-
gard to parallel railways should lead 
to bitter co,ntroversy between China 
and Japan. The Chinese attempted 
to build their own railways in South 
Manchuria, but in almost every case 
met with a protest from Japan. 
A second group of railway issues 
which increased the tension between 
China and Japan before the events of 
September last, were those which arose 
from the agreements under which the 
Japanese advanced money for the con-
struction of various; Chinese Govern-
ment railways in Man<!huria. Japanese 
capital to the present value, including 
arrears and interest, of Yen 150,000,000 
had been expended in the building of 
the following Chinese lines: the Kirin-
Changchun, the Kirin-Tunhua, the 




Angangchi railways and certain nar-
row gauge lines. 
The Japanese complained that the 
Chinese would not pay these loans, 
nor make adequate provision for them, 
nor carry out various stipulations in 
the agreements, such as those respect-
ing the appointment of Japanese rail-
way advisers. They made repeated 
demands that the Chinese should ful-
fill the alleged promises made by their 
Government that Japanese interests 
should be permitted to participate in 
the construction of the Kirin-Kwainei 
Railway. This projected line would 
extend the Kirin-Tunhua Railway to 
the Korean border, and would make 
available for Japan a new short sea 
and rail route from her seaports 
to the center of Manchuria, and, in 
conjunction with the other railways, 
~horten the communications with the 
interior. 
In defence of the failure to repay 
their loans, the Chinese pointed out 
that these were not normal financi~l 
transactions. They claimed that the 
loans were made largely by the South 
Manchuria RaiJway in order to mono -
polize railway construction in South 
Mahchuria; that t!,e 0bject was pci-
ntarily strategic and political: and 
that in any case, the new lines had 
oeeb. so heav1iy over-capitalized That 
they were, at. least for the time lbein~. 
financially unable to earn the ·neces- , 
sary money to repay the construction 
expenses and loans. They contended 
that in each instance of alleged failure 
to fulfil obligations. an impartial e:,r-
amination would show adequate justi-
fication for their conduct. As for 
the Kirin-K wainei Railway, they de-
nied the moral, and even the legal, 
validity o! the alleged agreements. 
Branch Lines Desired 
There were certain conditions which 
existed in connection with these rail-
way agreements which make it m .. · 
tural for the loan controversy to arise. 
The South Manchuria Railway had 
practically no branches, and wished to 
develop a system of feeder lines ir. 
order to increase its freight and pas-
~enger traffic. The companv wor1s 
thetefore willing to advance money 
for the building of such new lines, 
even though there was little likeli 
hood that the loans would be repaid 
in the near future; it was, also, will-
ing to continue to make further ad-
vances, when earlier loans were still 
outstanding. 
In these ::ircumstances, and so long 
as the newly-constructed Chinese lines 
functioned as feeders to the South 
Manchuria system, and were operated 
in some measure under its influence, 
the South Manchuria Railway appea'red 
to make no special effort to force pay-
ment of the loans, and the Chinese 
lines operated with ever-increasing 
debt obligations. But when certain of 
these lines were connected with a new 
Chinese Railway System, and in 1930-
:u started a serious competition with 
the South Manchuria Railway, the 
nonpayment .of the loans at once be-
came a :-ubjed of complaint. 
Another complicating factor, in the 
case of certain of these loan agree-
ments, was their political character. It 
was as a result of the "Twenty-one 
Demands" that the Kirin-Changchun 
Railway was placed under the direc-
tion · of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company, and the outstanding in-
dehtedness of the line converted into 
a long-term loan, maturing in 1947. 
The advance of Yen 20 000,000 made in 
1918 in consequence of the so-called 
"Four Manchuria-Mongolia Railway 
Agreement," was one of the so-call~ 
"Nishihara Loans," made to the mili-
tary government of the "Anfu clique,'' 
without any restrictioin as to the pur-
pose for which it might be used. 
Similarly, it was from a Nishihara 
loan that an advance was made of 
Yen 10,000,000 to this clique in connec-
tion with the preliminary loan .contract 
a~reement of 1918 for the construction 
of the Kirin-Kwainei Railway. Chinese 
r.ational sentiment has been greatly 
aroused over the subject of the "Nishi-
hara Loans" ever since their negotia-
tion· but in spite of this the Chinese 
Gov~rnment has never repudiated 
them. In the~e .£.!rcutnstances, the Chi-
nese felt little moral obligation to 
fulfill the conditions of the loan con-
tracts. 
Especially important in Sino-Japanese 
relations were the issues over the 
Kirin-Kwainei Railway project. '11le 
first set of issues related to the section 
of the line from Kirin to Tunhua, the 
construction of which was completed 
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in 1928. From that time on, the Japa-
n.ese complained because the Chinese 
. would not convert the Japanese ad-
~ances for construction purposes into 
a formal loan secured by the earnings 
'of the railway and maintained that the 
Chinese were violating the contract by 
their refusal to appoint a Japanese ac-
. countant for the line. 
The Chinese in turn claimed that the 
construction costs submitted were not 
·only much higher than the estimates 
of the Japanese engineers, but were 
greatly in excess of the amount for 
which vouchers were presented. They 
refused to take over the line formally 
until the construction costs should bt:: 
settled; and contended that until they 
should do so, they wer~ under no obli-
gation to appoint a Japanese accoun4 
tant. 
These issues, definite and technical, 
involving no problems, of principle or 
policy, were obviously suited for arbit-
ration or judicial discrimination, but 
they remained unsettled and served to 
intensify the mutual resentment of Chi-
nese and Japanese. 
Line to Korea Important 
Of much greater importance, and far 
more complicated, was the issue over 
the construction of the railway from 
· Tunhua to K wainei. This section would 
complete the railway from Changchun 
to the Korean border, where it would 
connect with a Japanese railway run-
ning to a nearby Korean port. Such 
a line, giving direct entrance to cen-
. tral Manchuria and opening a region 
rich in timber and mineral resources, 
would be of economic value as well 
as of great strategic importance to 
Japan. 
The Japanese were insistent that this 
line should be built and that -they 
should participate in ·its financing. They 
claimed that China had given treaty 
assurances to tr.is effect. The Chi-
ese Government promised, they point-
ed out, in the Chientao Agreement of 
September 4, 1909, to build the line 
"upon consultation with the Govern-
ment of Japan," the promise being 
given in part as a consideration fu 
Japan's relinquishing the old claims 
of Korea to the Chientao region in 
Manchuria. Later, in 1918, the Chi-
nese Government and the Japanese 
0
banks signed a preliminary agreement 
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for a loan for the construction of this 
line, and in accordance with the agree-
ment, the banks advanced to the Chi-
nese Government the sum of Yen 10,-
000,000. This, however, was one of the 
Nishihara loans, a fact which in the 
view of the Chinese, affected the val-
idity of the engagement. 
Neither of them, however, was a de• 
finitive loan contract agreement, ob-
ligating China, without condition and 
before a specific date, to permit Japa-
nese financiers to participate in the 
construction of such a line. 
It was alleged that formal, definitive 
contracts for the construction of this 
Urie were signed in Peking in May, 
1928, but there was much uncertainty 
regarding their validity. Such contracts 
were doubtless signed, under very ir-
regular circumstances, on May· 13-15 by 
a representative of the Ministry of 
Communications of the Government at 
Peking, then under Marshal Chang 
Tso-lin. But the Chinese contend that 
the Marshal who was then hard pres-
sed by the Nationalist Armies and was 
about to evacuate Peking, gave his 
consent that this official should sign, 
under "a duress of compulsion,·• due to 
lthteats of the Jaipanese that if he 
should not sanction the contracts his 
retreat to Mukden would be endanger-
ed. Whether Marshal Cli:mg Tso-Jin 
himself also signed the contracts has 
been a matter of dispute. After the 
death of the Marshal, the1 Northeastern 
Political Council at Mukden and Mar-
shal Chang Hsueh-liang both refused 
to approve the contracts on the ground 
that they were faulty in form and nego-
tiated unde: duress and had never been 
ratified by the Peking Cabinet er the 
North-eastern Political Council. 
The underlying reason for the op-
position of the Chinese to the construc-
tion of the Tunhua-Kwainei line was 
their fear of Japan's military and strate-
gic purposes, and their belief that their 
sovereign rights and interest would be 
threatened by this new Japanese ap-
proach to Manchuria from the Japan 
Sea. 
This particular railway issue was not 
primarily a financial or commercial 
problem, but involved a conflict be-
tween the state policies of Japan and 
China. 
I~ues Over Traffic 
There were -additional issues over 
through-traffic arrangements between 
the Chinese and Japanese lines, rate 
' questions and rivalries between the 
seaport of Dairen and such Chinese 
ports as Yingkow (N ewchwang). 
By September, 1931, the Chinese had 
built unaided and were owning and 
operating railways with a total length 
of nearly a thousand kilometers, of 
which the most important were: the 
Mukden-Hailung, the Hailung-Kirin, 
the 'rsitsihar-Koshan, the Hulan-Hai-
lun and the Tahushan-Tungliao (a 
branch of the Peiping-Mukden system) 
lines; and they owned the Peiping-
Mukden Railway and the following 
Japanese-financed lines: the Kirin-
Changchur'. , the Kirin-Tunhua, Ssuping-
kai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi 
lines. During the two years preceding 
the outbreak of the present conflict 
the Chinese attempted to operate 
these various lines as a great Chines<? 
railway system, and made efforts to 
route all freight, if possible, e;xcln-
sively over the Chinese-operated lines, 
with a seaboard at the Chinese port 
of Yingkow (Newchwang)-potentially 
at Hulutao. As a result the Chinese 
made through-traffic arrangements for 
all ports of their railway system, and 
refused in important sections to make 
similar traffic agreements between 
their lines and the South Manchur1a 
system. The Japanese claimer\ that 
this discrimination deprived the South 
Manchuria Railway of much freight 
from North Manchuria which would 
normally pass over at least a part of 
its line and would find an outlet at 
Dairen. 
Associated with these through-traffic 
controversies a bitter rate war sprang 
up between the Japanese and Chinese 
lines, which began in 1929-30, when 
the Chinese reduced their rates after 
the opening of the Tahushan-Tungliao 
and the K.irin-Hailung lines. The Chi-
nese lines appeared to have a natural 
advantage at that time due to the fall in 
the value of the Chinese silver cur-
rency, which made tlie silver rates on 
these lines cheaper than the gold-yen 
rates on the South Manchuria Rail-
way. The Japanese claimed that the 
Chinese rates were so low that they 
constituted unfair competition, but the 
Chinese replied that their aim was not 
primarily to make profits, as was the 
case with the South Manchuria, but to 
develop the country and to enable the 
rural population to reach the markets 
as cheaply as possible. 
Incidental to this rivalry in rate cut-
ting, allegations were made by each 
side that the other indulged in rate 
discrimination or secret rebates in favor 
of its own nationals. The Japanese 
complained that the Chinese made rail-
way classifications which enabled Chi-
nese products to be carried over Chi-
nese lines more cheaply than foreign 
goods, and that they gave lower rates 
than normal for native goods and for 
freight shipped over Chinese lines to 
a Chinese controlled seaport. The Chi-
nese on their side charged the South 
Manchuria Railway with granting ·sec-
ret rebates, pointing out particularly 
that a Japanese forwarding agency was 
quoting rntes for freight consigned 
through them which were lower than 
the regular scheduled rates of the 
South Manchuria line. 
These issues were highly technical 
and involved, and it was difficult to 
determine the justice of the charges 
which each side was making against 
the other. It is obvious that such ques-
. tions as these should normally be set-
tled by a Railroad Commission or by 
regular judicial determination. 
Hulutao Being Developed 
The railway policies of the Chinese 
authorities in Manchuria were f-opus-
ed upon the new port development at 
Hulutao; Yingkow was to be the sec-
ondary port, and pending the comple-
tion of Hulutao, the principal one. 
Many new railways were projected 
which would ~rve practically all parts 
of Manchuria. The Japanese claimed 
that the through-traffic arrangements 
and the low rates put into effect by 
the Chinese deprived the port of Dai-
ren of much cargo that would normal-
ly have moved to it, and that this sit-
uation was particularly evident in 1930. 
They stated that the export freight 
carried to Dairen by the South .Man-
_churia Railway fell off over a mil-
lion metric tons in 1930, while the port 
of Yingkow actually showed an in-
~rease over the previous year. The 
Chinese, however, pointed out that the 
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falling off in freight at Dairen wa.s 
due principally to the general deptes-
sion and to the especially severe slump 
in soya beans, which constituted a 
large part of the freight normally car-
ried over the South Manchuria line. 
They claimed also that the increase at 
Yingkow was the result of traffic from 
regions recently opened by the •new 
Chinese railway lines. 
The Japanese appeared to be espe-
cially concerned over the potential com-
petition of the Chinese lines and the 
port of Hulutao, and complail'led that 
the purpose of the Chinese in planning 
to construct many new railways and 
in developing Hulutao harbor was to 
make "the port of Dairen as well as 
the South Manchuria Railway itself as 
good as valueless." 
Viewing these many railroad issues 
as a whole, it is evident that a i.umber 
of them were technical in character and 
were quite capable of settlement by 
ordinary arbitral or judicial process, 
but that others of them were due to 
intense rivalry between China and 
Japan which resulted from a deep-
seated conflict in national policies. 
Practically all these railway questions 
were still outstanding at the opening 
of the year 1931. Beginning in Janu-
ary, and continuing sporadica1ly into 
the summer, a final but futile effort was 
made by both Japan and China to hold 
a conference i'n order to reco'ncile their 
policies with respect to these outstand-
ing railway questions. These Kirrn.u-a-
Kao negotiations, as they were called, 
achieved no result. There was evi-
dence of sincerity on both sides when 
the negotiations began in January, but 
various delays occurred for which both 
Chinese and Japanese were responsible, 
with the result that the formal con-
ference, for which extended prepara-
tions had been made, had not yet met 
when the present conflict started. 
IV. The Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes 
of 1915 and related issues 
With the exception of the railway 
controversies the Sino-Japanese issues 
of greatest importance which were out-
~tanding in September, 1931, were those 
which arose from the Sino-Japanese 
treaties and notes of 1915, which in 
tum were a result of the so-called 
"Twenty-one Demands." These issues 
mainly concerned South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, since with the 
exception of the question of the Han-
yohping Mine (near Hankow) the other 
agreements negotiated in 1915 had either 
been Teplaced by hew ones, 'or had been 
voluntarily given up by Japan. The 
controversies in Manchuria were over 
the following provisions: 
(1) the extension of the term of Japa-
nese possession of the Kwan tung Leas-
ed Territory to ninety-nine years (1997); 
(2) the prolongation of the period of 
Japanese possession of the South Man-
churia Railway and the Mukden-An-
tung Railway to ninety-nine years (2002 
and 2007 respectively); 
(3) the grant to Japanese subjects of 
the right to lease land in the interior 
of "South Manchuria, i.e., outside those 
areas opened by treaty or otherwise to 
foreign residence and trade; 
(4) the grant to Japanese subjects of 
the right to travel, reside and ~onduct 
business in the interior of South Man-
churia and to participate in joint Sino-
Japanese agricultural enterprises in 
Eastern Inner Mongolia. 
The legal right of the Japanese to 
enjoy these grants and concessions de-
pended entirely upon the validity of 
the treaty and notes of 1915, and the 
Chinese continuously denied that 
these were binding upon them. No 
amount of technical explanation or 
argument could divest the minds of 
the Chinese people, officials or lay-
men of their conviction that the term 
"Twenty-one Demands" was practical-
ly synonymous with the "Treaties and 
Notes of 1916" •and that China's aim 
should be to free herself from them. 
At the Paris conference, 1919, China de-
manded their abrogation on the ground 
that they had been concluded "under 
coercion of a Japanese ultimetum 
threatening war." At the Washington 
conference, 1921-22, the Chinese dele-
gation raised the questiou "as to the 
equity and justice of these agree-
ments and therefore as to their fun.da-
m<.>ntal validity," and i.n March, 1~~3, 
shortly before the expiration of the 
origi:!al twenty-fivP. year lease of the 
Liaotung (Kwantung) territory which 
China granted in 1898 to Russia, the 
Chinese Government comnnmicated to 
Japan a further request for the 'abro-
gation of the provisions of 1915, anJ 
stated \hat "The Treaties and Notes of 
1915 have been consistently condemn-
ed b~ public opinion in China.'' Sir.cl'? 
the Chinese maintained that the a$ree-
ments of 1915 lacked "fundamental 
valiclity," they declined to carry out 
the provisions relating to Manchuria 
except in so far as circumstances made 
it expedient to do so. 
The Japanese complained bitterly of 
the consequent violations of their 
treaty rights by the Chinese. They 
contended that the treaties and notes 
of, 1915 were duly signed and ratified 
and were in full force. To be sure, 
there was a considerable body of pub-
lic opinion in Japan which from the 
first did not agree with the "Twenty-
one. Demands''; and more recently it 
has, been common for Japanese spe'ak~ 
ers and publicists to criticize this pol-
icy. But the Japanese Government and 
people appeared unanimous in insisting 
upon the validity of these provisions 
which related to Manchuria. 
Lease Extensions bnportant 
Two important prov1s1on in the 
treaty and notes of 1915 were those for 
the extension of the lease of the 
Kwantung Territory from 25 to 99 years, 
and of the concessions of the South 
Manchuria and the Mukden-Antung 
railways to a similar period of 99 
years. For the dual reasons that these 
extensions were a result of the 1915 
agreements and that recovery of the 
territories originally leased by form-
er Governments was included in the 
Nationalist "Rights Recovery" move-
ment, directed against foreign inter-
ests in China, the Kwan tung Leased 
Territory and the South Manchuria 
Railway were made objects, at various 
times, of agitation and even diplomatic 
representation on the part of the Chi-
nese. The policy of Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-Hang of declaring Manchuria's 
clllegiance to the Central Government 
and of permitting the spread of Kuo-
mintang influence in Manchuria made 
these issues acute after 1928, although 
they remained in the background of 
practical politics. 
Associated also with the treaty and 
notes of 1915 was the agitation for the 
recovery of the South Manchuria 
Railway, or for stripping that• institu-
tion of its political, character in ordex: to 
:reduce it to a purely economic enter,-
p:dse. As the e rliest date fixed for 
th«t recovecy Qf, this r,ailway Qn r;e~y-
ment of the capital and interest outlay 
was 1939, the mere abrogation of the 
1915 treaties would not in itself have 
r~overed the South Manchuria Rail-
way for China. It was extremely 
doul;>tful whether China, in any. case, 
would have been able to obtain the 
capital for this purpose. The occ~sion-, 
al utterances of Chinese Nationalist 
spokesmen, urging recovery of the 
South Manchuria Railway, served as 
an irritant to the Japanese, whose 
legitimate rights and interests were 
thereby threatened. 
The disagreement between the Japa-
nese and Chinese as to the proper 
functions of the South Manchuria Rail-
ways continued from the time of the 
railway company's organization in 1906. 
Technically, of course the railway com-
pany is organized under Japanese law 
as a private joint stock enterprise, and 
~ quite beyond the pale of Chinese 
jurisdiction in practice. Particularly 
since 1927, there had been an agitation 
among Chinese groups in Manchuria 
for divesting the South Manchuria Rail-
way of its political and administrative 
functions and converting it into a "pu.re-
ly commercial enterprise.'' No concrete 
plan for achieving this end seems to 
have been proposed by the Chinese. 
The railway company was in fact a 
political enterprise. It was a Japanese 
Goyernment agency, the Government 
controlling a majority ·of its shares: 
its administrative policy was so closely 
controlled by the Government that the 
company's higher officials were almost 
invariably changed when a new Cabi-
net came into power in Japan. More-
over, the company had always been 
charged, under Japanese law, with 
broad political administrative functions, 
including police, taxation and educa-
tion. To have divested the company 
of these functions would have been to 
abandon the entire "special mission" of 
the South Manchuria Railway, as ori-
ginally conceived and subsequently 
developed. 
Numerous issues arose in regard to 
the administrative rights of the Japa-
nese within the South Manchuria Rail-
way area, especially as to the ac-
quisition of land, the levying of taxes 
and, the maintenance of railway 
guards. 
15 Municipalities Included 
The railway area includes, in addi-
tion to a few yards on each side of 
the railway tracks, fifteen municipali-
ties, termed Japanese "railway towns," 
situated along the entire system of th~ 
South Manchuria Railway from Dairen 
to Changchun and from Antung ti:; 
Mukden. Some of these railway 
towns, such as those at Mukden, 
Changchun and Antung, comprise large 
sections of populous Chinese cities. 
The right of the South Manchuria 
Railway to maintain practically com-
plete municipal governments in the 
railway area rested legally upon a 
clause in the original Russo-Chinese 
Railway Agreement of 1896, which 
gave the railway company "absolute 
and exclusive administration of its 
lands." The Russian Government, 
until the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 
1924, and later the Japanese Govern-
ment, which acquired the original 
rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
so far as concerned the South Man-
churia Railway, interpreted this pro-
vision as granting political control of 
the railway area. The Chinese always 
denied this interpretation, insisting 
that other provisions in the treaty of 
1896 made it clear that this clause was 
not intended to grant such broad ad-
ministrative rights as control of po-
lice, taxation, education and public 
utilities. 
Disputes regarding the acquisition of 
land by the railway company were 
common. By virtue of one of the 
clauses of the original agreement of 
1896, the railway company had the right 
to acquire by purchase or lease private 
lands "actually necessary for the con-
struction, operation and protection of 
the line." But the Chinese contended 
that the Japanese attempted to make 
improper use of this right, in order to 
obtain additional territory. The 
result was almost continuous contro-
versy between the South Manchuria 
Railway Company and the Chinese local 
authorities. 
Conflicting claims as to the right to 
levy taxes within the railway area led 
to frequent controversy. The Japa-
nese based their claim upon the original 
grant to the railw~y company of the 
"absolute and exclusive administration 
of its lands"; the Chinese, upon the 
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rights of the sovereign state. Speak-
ing generally, the de facto situation 
was that the railway company levied 
and collected taxes from Japanese, Chi-
nese and foreigners residing in the 
railway areas, and that the Chinese au-
thorities did not exercise such authori-
ty, although they claimed the legal 
right to do so. 
A type of controversy which was 
frequently arising was where the Chi-
nese attempted to tax produce (such as 
soya bean shipments), which was being 
carted to the South Manchuria Railway 
towns for transport by rail to Dairen 
over the Japanese line. This was de-
scribed by the Chinese as a uniform 
tax, necessarily to be coilected at the 
boundaries of the J apa.nese "railway 
towns," since to refrain from doing 
so would have been to discriminate in 
favor of produce carried by the South 
Manchuria Railway. 
The issues as to Japanese railway 
guards led to almost continuous dif-
ficulty. Th~y v. ere aiso indicative of 
a fundamental conflict of state policies 
in Manchuria already referred to and 
were the cause of a series of incidents, 
resulting in considerable loss of life. 
The legal basis of Japan's alleged right 
to maintain these guards was the oft-
quoted clause in the original Agree-
ment of 1896 which granted to the 
Chinese Eastern Railway "the absolut.? 
and exclusive right of administration 
of its lands." Russia maintained, and 
China denied, that this gave the right 
to guard the railway line by Russian 
troops. In the Portsmouth Treaty, 
1905, Russia and Japan, as between 
themselves, reserved the right to main-
tained railway guards "not to exceed 
15 men per kilometer." But in the 
subsequent Treaty of Peking, signed 
by China and Japan later in the same 
year, the Chinese Government did not 
give its assent to this particular pro-
vision of the agreement between Japan 
and Russia. China and Japan, how-
ever, did include the following pro-
vision in Article II of the Additional 
Agreement ')f December 22. 1905, which 
is an annP.x to the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Peking of that date: 
"In view of the earnest desire express-
ed by the Imperial Chinese Govern-
ment to have the Japanese and Russian 
troops and railway guards in Manchuria 
withdrawn as soon as possible, and ~n 
order to meet this desire, the Imperial 
Japanese Government, in the event of 
Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of 
her railway guards, or in case other 
proper measures are agreed to between 
China and Russia, consent to take simi-
lar steps accordingly. When tranquillity 
shall have been re-established in Man-
churia and China shall have become 
herself capable of affording full pro-
tection to the lives and property of 
foreigners, Japan will withdraw her 
railway guards simultaneously with 
Russia." 
Tranquillity Denied 
It is this article upon which Japan 
based her treaty rights. Russia, how-
ever, long since withdrew her guards 
and she relinquished her rights to keep 
them by the Sino-Soviet Agreements 
of 1924. But Japan contended that 
tranquillity had not been established 
in Manchuria, and that China was not 
herself capable of affording full protec-
tion to foreigners; therefore, she claim-
ed that she still retained a valid treaty 
right to maintain railway guards. 
Japan has appeared increasingly in-
clined to defend her use of these guards 
less upon treaty right than upon the 
ground of "absolute necessity under 
the existing state of affairs in Man-
churia." 
The Chinese Government consistently 
controverted .the contention of Japan. 
It insisted that the stationing of Japa-
nese railway guards in Manchuria was 
not justified either in law or in fact, 
and that it impaired the territorial and 
administrative integrity of China. As 
to the stipulation in the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Peking, already quoted, the 
Chinese Government contended that 
this was merely declaratory of a de 
facto situation of a provisional charac-
ter, and that it could not be said to 
confer a right, especially of a perma-
nent character. Moreover, it claimed 
that Japan was legally obliged to with-
draw her guards, since Russia had 
withdrawn hers, tranquillity had been 
re-established in Manchuria, and the 
Chinese authorities were able to give 
adequate protection to the South Man-
churia Railway, as they were doing 
for other railway lines in Manchuria, 
provided the Japanese guards would 
permit them to do so. 
The controversies which arose regard-
ing the Japanese railway guards were · 
not limited to their presence and ac-
tivities within the railway area. These 
guards were regular Japanese soldiers, 
and they frequently carried their police 
function into adjoining districts or con-
ducted maneuvers outside the railway 
areas, with or without the permission 
of, and with or without notification to, 
the Chinese authorities. · These acts 
were particularly obnoxious to the Chi-
nese, officials and public alike, and were 
regarded as unjustifiable in law and 
provocative of unfortunate incidents. 
Frequent misunderstandings and con-
siderable damage to Chinese farm crops 
resulted from the maneuvers, and 
material remuneration failed to alle-
viate the hostile feelings thus aroused. 
Closely associated with the question 
of the Japanese railway guards was 
that of the Japanese Consular Police. 
Such police were attached to the 
Japanese Consulates and branch Con-
suiates in all the Japanese consular 
districts in Manchuria, not only along 
the South Manchµria Railway, but .in 
such cities as Harbin, Tsitsihar an<l 
Manchuli, as well as in the so-called 
"Chientao District,'' the area in which 
liv~d a large number of the Koreans 
resident in Manchuria. 
The Japanese claimed that the right 
to maintain consular police was a 
corollary to the right of extraterri-
toriality; that it was merely an exten-
sion of the judicial functions of the 
consui.ar courts, these police being 
necessary to protect and discipline 
Japanese sub2ects. In fact, Japanese 
consular police, in smaller numbers, 
have also be-en attached to Japanese 
consulates iu other parts of China, con-
trary to the general practice of coun-
tries having extraterritorial treaties. 
Japan Considers Necessity 
As a practical matter, the Japanese 
Government apparently believed that 
the stationing of consular police in 
Manchuria was a ne·cessity under the 
conditions which prevailed there, espe-
cially in view of the importance of the 
Japanese interests involved, and the 
large number of resident Japanese sub-
jects, including Koreans. 
· The Chinese Government, however, 
always contested this position advanced 
by Japan as justification for stationing 
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Japanese c~nsular police in Manchuria, 
and· sent frequent protests to Japan oo 
the subject. She claimed that there 
was no necessity to station Japanese 
police officers anywhere in Manchuria, 
that the- question of police could not be 
associated- with extraterritoriality, and 
that their presence was without treaty 
basis and a vioiation of China's sover-
eignty. 
Whether justified or not, the pre-
sence of consular police led in a number 
of cases to serious conflicts between 
members of their force and those of 
the local Chinese authorities. 
The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, 
provided that "Japanese subjects shall 
be free to. reside and travel in South 
Manchuria and to engage in business 
and manufacture of any kind whatso-
ever." This was an important right, 
but one which was objectionable to the 
Chinese since in no other part of China 
were foreigners as a class permitted to 
reside and to engage in business out-
side the treaty ports. It was the policy 
Qf the Chinese Government to with-
hold this privilege until extra-terri-
toriality should be abolished and for-
eigners should be subject to Chinese 
laws and jurisdiction. 
In South Manchuria, however, this 
right had certain limitations: the Japa-
nese were required to carry passports 
and· observe Chinese laws and· regula-
tions while in the interior of South 
Manchuria; but the Chinese regulations 
applicable to Japanese were not to be 
enforced until the Chinese authorities 
had first "come to an understanding 
with, the Japanese Consul." 
On many occasions the action of the 
Chinese authorities was inconsistent 
with the terms of this agreement, the 
validity of which they always con-
tested. The fact that restrictions were 
placed upon the residence, travel and 
businei:;s activities of Japanese subjects 
in the interior of South Manchuria, 
nnd that .>rdtrs and regulations were 
issued by various Chinese officials 
prohibiting J;ipanese or other foreigners 
from residing outside the treaty porti:; 
from renewing leases of buildings 
is• ~ot: cqntested in the documents 
officiaily pre~ented to the commissio!l 
by the- Chinf:?Se assessor. Official pres-
sure,. sometimes supported bY, severe 
police mea5ures, was exert~• upon 
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the Japanese to force them to with· 
draw. from many cities and towns in 
South Manchuria and eastern Jnner-
M()ngolia, :lnd upon Chinese property 
owners to pre-vent them from renting 
Houses to Japanese. It was stated by 
the Japanese that the Chinese authori-
ties also refused to issue passports to 
:c>panese-, harassed them by illegal 
taxes, and for some years before 
September, rn31, failed to carry out 
the stipulation in the agreement by 
which they had undertaken to submit 
to the Japanese Consul the regulations 
which were to be binding upon the 
Japanese. 
Chinese Intended Restriction 
That object of the Chine.se was the 
execution of their national policy of 
restricting the exceptional privileges of 
Japanese in Manchuria and thus 
strengthening the control of China over 
these Three Eastern Provinces. They 
justified their actions on the ground 
that they regarded the Treaty of 1915 
as without "fundamental validity 
They pointed out, moreover, that the 
Japanese attempted to reside and con-
duct business in all parts of Manchuria, 
although the treaty provision was limit-
ed to South Manchuria. 
In view of the conflicting national 
policies and aims of China and Japan it 
was almost inevitable that continuous 
and bitter controversies should arise 
over this treaty provision. Both coun-
tries admit that the situation was a 
growing irritant in their mutual rela--
tions up to the events of September, 
1931. 
Closely associated with the right to 
reside and to do business in the in-
terior of South Manchuria was the 
right to lease land, which was granted 
to Japanese by the Treaty of 1915 in 
the following terms: "Japanese sub-
jects in South Manchuria may, bi 
negotiation. lease land necessary for 
erecting suitable buildings for trade 
and manufacture Or for prosecuting 
agricultural enterprises." An exchange 
of notes betw.een the two Governments 
at the time of t:p.e treaty defined the 
expression "lease by negotiation" tQ 
imply, according to the Chinese ver-
sion, "a long-term lease of. not more 
than, thirty y;ears and also the possi .. 
bili.ty, of. its; unconditional renewal"; 
the Japanese version simply provided 
for "leases for a long term up to 
thirty years and unconditionally re-
newable." Disputes naturally arose 
over the question whether the Japa-
nese land leases were, at the sole op-
tion of the Japanese, "unconditionally 
renewable." 
The Chinese interpreted the desire 
of the Japanese to obtain lands in 
Manchuria, whether by lease, purchase 
or mortgage as evidence of a Japa-
nese national policy to "buy Man-
churia." Their authorities therefore 
very generai.ly attempted to obstruct 
efforts of the Japanese to this end, and 
became increasingly active in the three 
or four years preceding September, 
1931, a period during which the Chi-
nese "Rights Recovery Movement" was 
at its height. 
In making strict regulations against 
the purchase of land by the Japanese, 
their ownership of it in freehold, or 
their acquisition of a lien through 
mortgage, the Chinese authorities ap-
peared to be within their legal rights 
since the treaty granted only the privi-
lege of leasing land. The Japanese, 
however, complained that it was not 
in conformity with the spirit of the 
treaty to forbid mortgages upon land. 
Every Obstacle Offered 
Chinese officials, however, did not 
accept the validity of the treaty and 
consequently put every obstacle in the 
way of Japanese leasing land, by orders, 
provincial and local, calculated to make 
the leasing of lands to Japanese pun-
ishable under the criminal laws; by 
imposition of special fees and taxes 
payable in advance on such leases; 
and by instructions to local officials 
prohibiting them under threat of pun-
ishment, from approving such transfers 
to Japanese. 
In spite of these obstacles, great tracts 
of land have, as a matter of fact, not 
only been leased by the Japanese, but 
actually obtained in freehold-although 
the titles might not be recognized in a 
Chinese court-through outright pur-
chase, or by the more usual means of 
foreclosing a mortgage. These mort-
gages on land have been obtained by 
Japanese loan operators, especially 
la~ge loan associations, certain of which 
have been o.rganized especially for the 
purpose of acquiring land tracts. The 
total area of lands leased to Japanese 
in the whole of Manchuria, and in 
Jehol, according to Japanese official 
sources, increased from about 80,000 
acres in 1922-1923 to over 500,000 acres 
in 1931. A small proportion of this 
total was in North Manchuria where 
the Japanese had no legal right under 
Chinese law and international treaty 
to acquire land leases. 
Due to the importance of this land 
lease issue there were at least three 
attempts during the decade preceding 
1931, to reach some agreement by direct 
Sino-Japanese negotiation. A possible 
solution which there is reason to be-
lieve was under consideration would 
have treated together the two subjects 
of land leasing and the abolition of ex-
traterritoriality: in Manchuria the Japa-
nese were to surrender extraterritorial-
ity and the Chinese were to permit the 
Japanese to lease land freely. But the 
negotiations were unsuccessful. 
This long-standing Sino-Japanese con-
troversy over the right of Japanese to 
lease land arose like the other issues 
already mentioned out of the funda-
mental conflict between rival state 
policies, the allegations and counter 
statements concerning violation of in-
ternational agreements being less con-
sequential in themselves than the un-
derlying objectives of each policy. 
V. The Korean Problem in Manchuria 
The presence of about 800,000 Koreans 
in Manchuria, who possess Japanese 
nationaltiy under Japanese law, served 
to accentuate the conflict of policies 
of China and of Japan. Out of this 
situation theTe arose various contro-
versies, in consequence of which the 
Korean themselves were victimized, 
being subjected to suffering and brutali-
ties. 
Chinese opposition to Korean acquisi-
tion, by purchase or lease, of land in 
Mc!nchuria, was resented by the Japa-
nese, who claimed that the Koreans 
werie entitled, as Japanese subjec;.s, 
to the privii.eges of land leasing ac-
quired by Japan in the Treaty and 
Notes of 1915. The problem of dual 
nationality also arose, as the Japa-
r.ese refused to recognize the natural-
ization of Koreans as Chinese subjects. 
The use of Japanese consular police to 
invigilate and protect the Koreans was 
resented by the Chinese and resui.ted 
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in innumerable clashes . between 1Chi-
nese and Japanese police. ~pecfal 
problems arose in . the Chientao Dis-
trict. just north of the Korean border, 
where the 400,000 Korean residents 
outnumber the Chinese by three to 
one. By 1927 these questions led the 
Chinese to J1ursue a policy of restrict-
ing the free residence of Koreans in 
Manchuria, n policy which the Japa-
nese characterized as one of unjusti-
fiable oppression. 
The status and rights of Koreans in 
Manchuria are determined largely, i.r: 
three Sino-Japanese agreements, viz., 
the Agreem~r.t relating to the Chientao 
Region, September 4, 1909, the Treaty 
and Notes of May 25, 1915, concerning 
South Manchuria and Eastern lnn~r 
Mongolia, and the so-called "Mitsuya 
Agreement" of July 8, 1925. The de-
licate question of dual nationality in 
the case of the Koreans has never 
been regularized by Sino-Japanese 
agreement. 
By 1927 the Chinese authorities in 
Manchuria generally came to believe 
that the Koreans had become, in fact, 
"a vanguard of Japanese penetration 
and absorption" of Manchuria. In 
this view, so long as the Japanese re-
fused to recognize the naturalization of 
Koreans as Chinese subjects, and 
especially since the Japanese consular 
police constantly exercised surveillance. 
over Koreans, whether by purchase or 
lease, was an economic and political 
danger "which threatened the very 
existence of Chinese people in Man-
churia." • 
The view was prevalent among the 
Chinese that the Koreans were being 
compelled to migrate from their 
homeland in consequence of the studi~ 
ed policy of the Japanese Government 
to displace Koreans with Japanese im-
migrants from Japan, or to make life 
so miserable for them, politically and 
.economically, especially by forcing 
them to dispose of their land holdings, 
that emigration to Manchuria wou.}d 
naturally follow. According to the 
Chinese view, the Koreans, being an 
"oppressed race" ruled by an alien 
Government in their own land, where 
the Japanese monopolized all the im-
portant official posts, were forced 1:o 
migrate to Manchuria to ·seek political 
freedom , ~n~ ilI1 · economic liy_elihood,. 
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The.,. Korean immigrants, ninety ~ 
cent ,of whom are farmers, and aJ,mpst 
all of whom cultivators of rice-fields, 
were thus at first welcomed by t}.i t1 
Chinese as an economic asset and 
favored out of a natural sympathy for 
their supposed oppression. They con-. 
tended that, but for the Japanese re-
fusal to permit Koreans to becom~ 
naturalized Chinese subjects and .the 
Japanese policy of pursuing them into 
Manchuria on the pretext of offering 
them necessary police protection, this 
Korean colonization in Manchuria 
would have created no major poli-
tical and economic problems. The 
Chinese deny that the efforts admit-
tedly made by their officials in Man-
churia, especially after 1927, to re-
strict the free settlement of Koreans 
on the land in Manchuria except ".iS 
mere tenants or la borers, can be re-
garded as instances of "oppression." 
Japan Denies Accusations 
The Japanese admit that the Chinese 
suspicion was the principal cause of 
Chinese "oppression" of the Koreans. 
but vigorously deny the allegation ~t 
they pursued any definite policy of 
encouraging Korean migration to Man-
churia, stating that "Japan having 
neither encouraged nor restricted it, 
the Korean emigration to Manchuria 
must be regarded as the outcome of , a 
natural tendency," a phenomenon un-
influenced by any poiitical or diplo-
matic motives. They therefore declare 
that "the fear on the par,t of China 
that Japan is plotting the absorption of 
the two regions by making · use of 
Korean immigrants is entirely ground-
less." 
These irreconcilable views intensified, 
such problems a's those related to the 
leasing of land, questions. of jurisdic-
tion and the Japanese consular police, 
these having created, a ·mo~t unfortunate 
situ~tion for the Koreans and embitter-
ed Sino-Japanese relations. · 
There exist no Sino-Japanese agree-
ments which specifically grant or deuy 
the right of Koreans to settle, reside and 
conduct occupations outside the Treaty 
Ports, or to lease ·or otherwise acquire 
land in Manchuria, exc~t in the so-
.called Chientao District. Probably, how-
ever, over 400,000 Koreans do : live :in 
·Manchuria outside Chieyi.taoi · They·,~,e 
wi'dely distributed. especiaHy in the 
eastern half of Manchuria, and are 
numerrous in the regions lying 'north 
of Korea, in Kirin Province, and have 
penetrated in large numbers into the 
region of the eastern section of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway the lower 
Sungari valley and along the Sino-
Russian border from northeastern 
Korea to the Ussuri and the Amur 
river valleys, their migration and 
settlement having overflown into the 
adjoining territories of the U.S.S.R. 
Moreover, partly because a very con-
siderable group -0f the Koreans are na-
tives of Manchuria, their ancestors hav-
ing immigrated· generations ago, and 
partly because others have renounced 
their allegiance to Japan and have be-
come naturalized Chinese subjects a 
great many Koreans today actually 
possess agricultural lands in Manchuria, 
outside of Chientao, both by virtue of 
freehold title and leasehold. The vast 
majority, however, cultivate paddy 
fields simply as tenant farmers under 
rental contracts, on a crop division 
basis, with the Chinese landlords, these 
contracts usually being limited to 
periods fr-om one to three years, re-
newable at the discretion of the land-
lord. · 
The Chinese deny that the Koreans 
have the right to purchase or lease 
agricultural lands in Manchuria out-
side the Chientao District, since the 
only Sino-Japanese agreement . ·on the 
point is the Chientao Agreement of 
1909, which is restricted in its applica-
tion to that area. Oniy Koreans who 
· are Chinese subjects, therefore, are 
. entitled to purchase land, or, for th::it 
matter, to reside and lease land in the 
interior of Manchuria. In denying the 
claim of right of the Koreans to 
lease land freely in Manchuria, the 
Chines Government has contended 
that the Chientao Agreement of 1909, 
which granted Koreans the right of 
residence with special landholding 
privileges in the ·Chientao District 
alone, and specified that the Koreans 
were to be subject to Chinese jurisdic-
tion is, in itself, a self-contained in-
strument "purporting to settle, by 
mutual concessions, local issues then 
pending between China "and· Japan -in 
that area." The · Chienta6 -Agreement 
contained a quid · quo, Japan waiving 
the · olaim of jurisdiction• over: •. the 
Koreans, China -granting them ', the 
special ·privilege· of · possessing' agri-
cultural lands; ·: 1 
China Denie Alteration 
Both countries continued to observe 
the agreement after the annexation of 
Korea by Japan in 1910, China con-
tending that the Treaty and Notes of 
1915 could not alter the stipulations of 
the Chientao Agreement, especially as 
the new treaty contained a clause 
specifying that "all existing treaties be--
tween China and Japan, relating to 
Manchuria, shall, except as otherwise 
provided for, by this treaty1 remain in 
force." No exception was made for 
the Chientao Agreement. The Chinese 
Government further cohtends that the 
Treaty and Notes of 1915 do not apply 
to the Chientao District, since the latter 
is not geographically a part of· "South 
Manchuria," a term which is ill-defined 
both geographically and politically. 
This Chinese contentibn has ' been 
contested by the Japanese since 1915, 
their position being that, inasmuch as 
the Koreans became Japanese subjects 
by virtue of the annexation of Korea 
in 1910, the provisions of the Sino-Japa-
nese Treaty and Notes of 1915 concern-
ing South Manchuria and Eastern Inne,r 
Mongolia, which grant Japanese · sub-
jects the right to reside' and lease lands 
in South Manchuria and to participate 
in joint agricultural enterprises in East-
ern Inner Mongolia, apply equally to 
the Koreans. The Japanese Govern-
ment has contended that the Chientao 
Agreement was superseded by these 
provisions of the 1915 agreements in 
conflict therewith, that the Chinese con-
tention that the Chientao Agreement 
is a self-contained instrument is un-
tenable, since the right secured by the 
Koreans in Chientao was actually in 
consequence of Japan's agreement to 
recognize that region as a part of Chi-
nese territory. They assert that it 
would be discriminatory on their part 
to refrain from seeking for the Koieans 
in Manchuria rights and privileges 
granted to other' Japanese subjects. 
The Japanese reason for favoring the 
acquisition .of land by Koreans in Man-
churia is partly due to their desire to 
obtain rice ~xports for Japan, a deslre 
. which, so far: has' . been I but partly 
satisfied, since :pro'Mbly htilf of the ri~e 
production of over seven million 
bushels in 1930 is consumed locally, 
and the export of the balance has 
been restricted. The Japanese assert 
that the Koreans tenants, after hav-
ing reclaimed waste lands and mak-
ing them profitable for the Chine,;e 
owners, have been unjustly ejected. 
The Chinese, on the other hand, while 
equally desirous of having the cul-
tivable lowlands producing rice, have 
generally employed the Koreans as 
tenants or laborers to prevent the land 
itself from falling into Japanese hands. 
Many Koreans have therefore become 
naturalized Chinese subjects in order 
to possess land, some of them, how-
ever, having acquired such titles, 
transferring them to Japanese land 
mortgage associations. This suggests 
one reason why there has been a dif-
ference of opinion among the Japa-
nese themselves as to whether natur-
alization of Koreans as Chinese sub-
jects should be recognized by the 
Japanese Government. 
Under a Chinese Nationality Law of 
1914 only aiiens who, under the law of 
their own country, were permitted to 
become naturalized in another were 
capable of being naturalized Chinese 
subjects. The Chinese revised Nation-
ality Law of February 5, 1929, how-
ever, contained no provision by which 
an alien was required to lose his 
original nationai.ity in order to acquire 
Chinese nationality. Koreans were, 
therefore, naturalized as Chinese re-
gardless of the Japanese insistence 
that such naturaliz9tion could not be 
recognized under Japanese law. The 
Japanese nationality laws have never 
permitted Koreans to lose their Japa-
nese · nationality, and although a re-
vised Nationality Law of 1924 con•· 
tained an article to the effect that ''a 
person who Hcquires foreign na-
tionality voiuntarily loses Japanese 
nationality," this general law has never 
been made applicable to the Koreans 
by special Imperial Ordinance. Never-
theiess, many Koreans in Manchuria, 
varying from five to tw~nty per cent 
of the total Korean population in cer-
tain districts, especially where they 
. &re relatively inaccessible by . the Japa-
n~e ~onsufar officiais, have becoll\e 
• naturalized as Chinese. Others, inci-
rlen\ally, when migrating beyond the 
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Manchur4m borders into Soviet terri-
tory, have become citizens of the 
U.S.S.R. 
Dual Nationality Opposed 
This problem of dual nationality of 
the Koreans influenced the National 
Government of China and the provin-
cial authorities in Manchuria generally 
to iook with disfavor upon indiscrimr-
nate naturalization of Koreans, fearing 
that they might, by temporarily ac-
quiring Chinese nationality, become 
potential instruments of a Japanese 
policy of acquiring agricultural lands. 
In regulations issued by the Kirin Pro-
vincial Government, September 1930 
governing the purchase and sale of 
land throughout the province, it was 
provided that "when a naturalized 
Korean purchasses land, investigation 
must be made in order to discover 
whether he wants to purchase it. as a 
means of residing as a permanently 
naturalized citizen, or on behalf of 
some Japanese." The local district of-
ficials, however, seem to have wavered 
in their attitude, at times enforcing 
the orders of the higher authorities but 
frequently issuing temporary natural-
ization certificates in lieu of formal 
certificates requiring the approval of 
the provincial government and the Min-
istry of Interior at N anking. These 
local officials, especially in areas far 
removed from Japanese consulates, 
often readily consented to th~ issuing 
of such certificates to the Koreans who 
applied for them, and on occasion, no · 
doubt actually compelled the Koreans 
to become naturalized or leave the 
country, their actions being influenced 
both by the policy of the Japanese and 
by the revenue derivable from the 
naturalization fees. The Chine~e have 
asserted, moreiover, that some Japanese 
themselves actually connived at this 
business of naturalizing Koreans in 
order to use them as dummy land-
owners or to acquire lands by transfer 
from such naturalized Koreans. Gen-
erally speaking, however, the Japanese 
authoritiPS discountenanced naturali7a-
tion of Koreans and assumed jurh:dic-
tion over them wherever poss:ble. 
The Japanese claim of right to main-
tain consular police in Manchuria as 
a corollary of extraterritoriality became 
a source of constant conflict where the 
Koreans were involved. Whether the 
Koreans desired such Japanese in tel'-
ference, ostensibly in their behalf, c,r 
not, the Japanese consular police, espe-
cially in the Chientao District, under-
took not only protective functions but 
freely assumed the right to conduct 
searches and seizures of Korean pre-
mises, especially where the Koreans 
were suspected of being involved in 
the Independence Movement, or in com-
munist or anti-Japanese activities. The 
Chinese police, for their part, frequ-
ently came into collision with the Japa-
nese police in their efforts to enforce 
Chinese laws, preserve the peace, or 
suppress the activities of "undesirable'' 
Koreans. Although the Chinese and 
Japanese police did co-operate on many 
occasions, as provided for in the so-
called "Mitsuya Agreement" of 1925, 
in which it was agreed that in eastern 
Fengtien Province the Chinese would 
suppress "the Korean societies" and 
tum over "Koreans of bad character" 
to the Japanese on the latter's request, 
the actual state of affairs was really 
one of constant controversy and fric-
tion. Such a situation was bound to 
cause trouble. 
The Korean problems and the result-
ing Sino-Japanese relations over the 
Chientao District had attained a pec-
uliarly complicated and serious char-
acter. Chientao (called "Kanto" in 
Japanese and "Kando" in Korean) 
comprises the three districts of Yen-
chi, Holung and Wangching in Liaon-
ing (Fengtien) Province, and, in prac-
tice, as evidenced by the attitude of 
the Japanese Government, includes 
also the district of Hunchun, which 
four districts adjoin the northeast 
corner of Korea just across the Tu-
men River. 
Regarded Korean Sphere 
The Japanese, describing the tradi-
tional attitude of the Koreans toward 
the Chientao area, have been disinclin-
ed to admit that the Chientao Agree-
l')'lent of 1909 closed once and for all 
the issue whether this territory should 
oelong to China or to Korea, the idea 
being that, since the district is pre-
dominantly Korean, over half of the 
arable land being cultivated by them, 
"they have so firmly established 
themselves in the focality that it may 
practically be regarded as a Korean 
sphere." In Chientao, more than else-
where in Manchuria, the Japanese 
Government has been insistent on ex-
ercising jurisdiction and surveillance 
over the Koreans, over 400 Japanese 
consular police having been maintain-
ed there for years. The Japanese con-
sular service, in co-operation with 
Japanese functionaries assigned by 
the Government-General of Chosen. 
exercise broad powers of an adminis-
trative character in the region, their 
functions including maintenance of 
Japanese schools, hospitals and gov-
ernment-subsidized financing media 
for the Koreans. The area is regard -
ed as a natural outlet for Korean 
emigrants who cultivate rice fields, 
while politically it has special im-
portance since Chientao has long been 
a refuge of Korean independence ad-
vocates, communist groups and other 
disaffected anti-Japanese partisans, :, 
region where, as evidenced by the 
H unchun Rising of Koreans against 
the Japanese in 1920, after the Inde-
pendence Outbreak in Korea, the Japa-
nese have had serious political prob-
lems intimately associated with the 
general problem of governance of Ko-
rea. The military importance of this 
region is obvious from the fact that 
the lower reaches of the Tumen Ri-
ver form the boundary between Japa-
nese, Chinese and Soviet territory. 
The Chientao Agreement provided 
that "the residence of Korean subjects, 
as heretofore, agricultural lands ly'ing 
north of the River Tumen," should be 
permitted by China; that Korean -sub-
jects residing on such lands should 
henceforth "be amenable to the juris-
diction of the Chinese local officials"; 
that they should be given equal treat-
ment with the Chinese; and that, al-
though all civil and criminal cases in-
volving such Koreans should be "heard 
and decided by the Chinese authori-
ties," a Japanese consular official 
should be permitted to attend the court, 
especially in capital cases, with the 
right to "apply to the Chinese authori-
ties for a new trial" under special Chi-
nese judicial procedure. 
The Japanese, however, have taken 
the position that the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty and Notes of 1915 override the 
Chientao Agreement in so far as juris-
dictional questions are concerned, and 
that, since 1915, Koreans, as Japanese-
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subjects, are entitled to all the rights 
and privileges of •extraterritorial status 
under the Japanese treaties with China. 
This contention has never been ad-
mitted by the Chinese Government, the 
Chjn'ese insisting that the Chientao 
Agreement, if applicable in so far as 
the right granted to Koreans to reside 
on agricultural lands is concerned, is 
also applicable in those articles where 
it is provided that the Koreans should 
submit to Chinese jurisdiction. The 
Japanese have interpreted the article 
permitting Korean residence on agri-
cultural lands to mean the right to 
purchase and lease such lands in Chien-
tao; the Chinese, contesting this inter-
pretation, take the position that the 
article must be interpreted literally 
and that only Koreans who have be-
come ' naturalized Chinese subjects are 
t;ntitled to purchase land there. 
Actual Situation Anomalous 
The actu:il situation is, therefore, 
anomalous, since, as a matter of fact, 
there are non-naturalized Koreans in 
Chientao who have acquired lands in 
freehold title, with the' connivance of 
the ' local Chinese officials, aithough as 
a general rule the Koreans themselves 
recognize ··.he acquisition of Chinese 
nationality as a necessary condition· o.f 
obtaining -the right to purchase land in 
Qhientao. Japan.ese official figures rep-
nsent over half the arable land of 
Chientao (including Munchun) as 
''.owned' by Koreans, their figures ad-
mitting that over 15 per cent of the 
Koreans there have become na-
turalized as Chinese subjects. Whethe!' 
it is these naturalized Koreans who 
"own" these lands is impossible to say. 
Such a situation naturally gave rise 
to numerous irregularities and con-
s.tant differences, often manifested by 
open clashes betweeii the Chinese and 
Japanese police. · 
· The Japanese assert that about the 
~nd of 19?7 a move'Illent for persecuting 
Korean 'immigrants in Manchuria broke 
out, under Chinese official instigation, 
as an aftermath of a general anti-Japa-
nese ,agitation, and state that this op-
pression was intensififd after the Man-
i!htµ-ian provinces declated their allegi-
ance to the' National Government at 
~anking. Numerous · translations of 
order~ issued by the· 'central and local 
Chinese authorities in Manchuria liave 
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been submitted as evidence to the corn~ 
mission of a definite Chinese policy of 
oppressing the Koreans by forcing them 
to become naturalized as Chinese, driv-
ing them from their rice fields, com-
pelling them to re-migrate, subjecting 
them to arbitrary levies and exorbitant 
taxation, preventing them from enter-
ing into contracts of lease or rental for 
houses and lands, and inflicting upon 
them many brutalities. It is stated 
that this campaign of cruelty was parti-
cularly directed against the "pro-Japa-
nese" Koreans, that Korean Residents' 
Associations, which are subsidized by 
the Japanese Government, were the ob-
jects of persecution, that non-Chinese 
schools maintained by or for the Ko-
reans were closed, that "undesirable 
Koreans" were permitted to levy black-
mail and perpetrate atrocities upon 
Korean farmers, and that Koreans were 
compelled to wear Chinese clothing and 
renounce any claim of reliance upon 
Japanese protection or assistance in 
their miserable plight. 
The fact that the Manchurian au-
thorities did issue orders discrirninatori 
against non-naturalized Koreans is not 
denied by the Chinese, the number and 
character of these orders and instruc-
tions, especialJy since 1927, establish-
i.ng beyond a goubt that the Chinese 
authorities in Manchuria generally re-
garded the Korean infiltration, in so 
far as it was accompanied by Japanese 
jurisdiction, as a menace which de-
served to be opposed. 
Because of the seriousness of the 
Japanese allegations, and the pitiable 
plight of the Korean population . of 
Manchuria, the commission gave special 
attention to this subject, and, without 
accepting all these accusations as ade-
quately . descriptive of the facts, or 
concluding, that certain of these res-
trictive measures applied to the 
Koreans were entirely unjustified, w~ 
are in a po~ition to confirm this gen-· 
eral descriotion of the Chinese actions 
toward the Koreans in certain parts 
of Manchuria. While in Manchuria, 
the comrn1ss1on received numerous 
delegations, who represented them-
selves as spokesmen of Korean com-
niunities. 
Cop~versies Complicated 
, It is '. obvious that the presence of 
this. large· minority of- Koreans in Man:. · 
churia served · to complicate the Sino.: 
Japanese· controversies over land leas-· 
ihg;, jurisdiction and police, and the 
economic rivalries which formed a pre-
lude to the events of September, 1931. 
While the great majority of the Koreans 
only , wanted to be left alone to earn 
their livelihood, there were among 
them groups which were branded by 
the Chinese or Japanese, or both, as 
''.undesirable Koreans," including the 
advocates and partisans of the inde, 
pendence of Korea from Japanese rule, 
Communists, professional law break-
ers, including smugglers and drug trad-
ers, and those who, in league with Chi-
nese bandits, levied black mail or ex-
torted money from those of their own 
blood. Even the Korean farmer him-
self . frequently invited oppression by 
lµs ignorance, .improvidence and will-
iqgness to incur indebtedness to his 
more agile-minded landlord. 
. Aside from the involvement of the 
Koreans, however unwittingly, in the 
controversies which, in the Chinese 
v,iew, were the inevitable results of the 
general Japanese policies with respect 
to Manchuria, the Chinese submit that 
Ip.uch of what has been termed "op-
pression" of the Koreans should not 
properly be so called, and that certain 
of the measures taken against the 
~-0reans by the Chinese were actually 
either approved or connived at by the 
japanese .authorities themselves. They 
assert that it should not be forgotten 
that the great majority of the Koreans 
ltre · bitterly anti-Japanese, and unre-
~bnciled to the Japanese annexation oi' 
their native land, and that the Korean 
emigrants, who would never have left 
their homeland but for the political 
and economic difficulties under which 
they have suffered, generally desire to 
be free from Japanese surveillance in 
Manchuria. 
The Chinese, while admitting a cer-
tain sympathy with the Koreans, draw 
~ttention to the existence of the "Mi-
tsuya Agreement" of June-July, 1925, 
.is evidence both of a willingness on 
t,lie part of the Chinese authorities to 
curb the activities of Koreans whom 
the Japanese consider "bad characters" 
and a menace to their position in Ko-
rea, and ' of · official sanction on the 
part of the J~panese themselves for 
certain of those ·very acts which the 
Jtipanese would·liave -others believe are 
instances of Chinese "oppression" of 
the Koreans. This agreement, which 
has never been widely known abroad, 
was negotiated by the Japanese Police 
Commissioner of the Government-Gen-
eral of Chosen and the Chinese Police 
Commissioner of Fengtien Province. 
It provided for co-operation betweer. 
the Chinese and Japanese police in 
suppressing "Korean Societies" (pre-
sumably of an anti-Japanese character) 
in eastern Fengtien Province, stipulat-
ing that "the Chinese authorities shall 
immediately arrest and extradite those 
leaders of the Korean societies whose 
names had been designated by the au-
thorities of Korea," and that Koreans 
of "bad character" should be arrested 
by the Chinese police and turned over 
to the Japanese for trial and punish-
ment. The Chinese assert, therefore. 
that "it is largely for the purpose of 
giving practical effect to this agree-
ment that cert.ain restrictive measures 
have been put into force governing the 
treatment of Koreans. If they are 
faken as evidence .proving the oppres-
sion of Koreans by Chinese author-
ities, then such measures of oppres-
sion, if indeed they are, have been 
resorted to principally in the inter-
est of Japan." Furthermore, the Chi-
nese ·submit that "in view of the keen 
eco:domic competition with native far-
mers, it is but natural that the .Chi-
nese authorities should exercise their 
inherent right to take measures to 
protect the inter<:!sts of their ovn1 
countrymen." 
VI. The Wanpaoshan ~ and the 
anti-Chinese riots in Korea 
·The Wanpaoshan affair, together with 
the case of Captain Nakamura, have· 
been widely regarded as the causes im-
mediately contributing to the Sino-
J"apanese crisis in Manchuria. The in-
trinsic importance of the former, how- . 
ever, was greatly exaggerated. The 
sensational accounts of what occurred 
at Wanpaoshan, where there were no 
casualties, led to a feeling of bitter.:. 
ness between Chinese · and Japanese, 
and, in Korea, to the serious attacks 
by Ko~eans upon Chinese residents. · 
These anti-Chinese tiots, in turn, re-
vivea the anti-Japan°ese 'boycott in· 
China. 
0
Judged by itself,• ~e Wanpao- · 
sl1aii 'affair was no more serious than· · 
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~veral other incidents involving clashes 
between Chinese and Japanese troops 
·or police which had occurred during 
the past few years in Manchuria. 
. Wanpaoshan is a small village locat-
ed some 18 miles (30 kilometers) north 
of Changchun, adjoining a low marshy 
area alongside the !tung River. It was 
here that one Hao Yung-teh, a Chinese 
broker, leased on behalf of the Chang 
Nung Agricultural Company, from the 
Chinese owners, a large tract of land 
by a contract dated April 16th, 1931. 
It was stipulated in the contract. that 
it should be null and void in case the 
District Magistrate refused to approve 
its terms. 
Shortly after this, the lessee subleas-
ed . this entire plot of land to a group 
of Koreans. This second contract con-
tained no provision requiring official 
approval for enforcement and took for 
granted that the Koreans would con-
struct an irrigation canal with tributary 
ditches. Hao Yung-teh had subleased 
this land to the Korean farmers without 
first having obtained Chinese formal 
approval of the original lease contract 
with the Chinese owners. 
Immediately after the conclusion of 
the second lease the Koreans began 
digging an irrigation ditch or canal, 
several miles long, in order to divert 
the water of the Itung River and dis-
tribute it over this low marshy area 
for the purpose of making it suitable 
for paddy cultivation. This ditch 
traversed large areas of land cultivated 
by· Chinese who were not parties to 
either lease transaction since their 
lands lay between the river and that 
leased by the Koreans. In order to 
provide ample water supply to be de-
flected through this ditch to their hold-
ings, the Koreans undertook to con-
struct a dam across the ltung River. 
After a considerable length of the 
irrigation ditch had been completed, 
the Chinese farmers whose lands were 
cut by the canal rose up en masse 
~nd protested to the Wanpaoshan au-
thorities, begging them to intervene in 
their behalf. As a result the Chinese 
local authorities, dispatched police to 
the spot and ordered the Koreans to 
stop excavation work at once and to 
vacate the area. At the same time the 
Japanese Consul at Changchun sent 
consular police to protect the Koreans. 
Local negotiations . between the Japa-
M 
nese and Chinese representatives failed 
to solve the problem. Somewhat later 
hoth sides sent additional police, with 
resulting pratesc:;, counter-statements 
and attempted negotiations. 
Investigation Arranged 
On June 8, both sides agreed to 
withdraw their police forces and to 
conduct a joint investigation of the 
situation at Wanpaoshan. This inves-
tigation revealed the fact that the 
original lease contained a clause pro-
viding that the entire contract would 
be "null and void" if it should not 
be approved by the Chinese District 
Magistrate, and that this approval was--
never given. 
The joint investigators, however, ap-
parently failed to agree upon their 
findings, the Chinese maintaining that 
the digging of the irrigation ditch 
could not fail to violate the rights of 
the Chinese farmus whose lands were 
cut by it; 1nd the Japanese insisting 
that the Koreans should be permitted 
to continue their work since it would 
be unfair to eject them on account of 
the error in the lease procedure for 
which they were in no way at fault. 
Shortly thereafter, the Koreans, assisted 
by Japanese consular police, continued 
to dig the ditch. 
Out of this train of circumstances 
came the incident of July 1st, when a 
party of 400 Chinese farmers whose 
lands were cut by the ·irrigation ditch. 
armed with agricultural implements 
and pikes, drove the Koreans away and 
filled in much of the ditch. The Japa-
nese consular police thereupon opened 
rifle fire to disperse the mob and to 
protect the Koreans, but there were 
no casualties. The Chinese farmers 
withdrew and the Japanese police re-
mained on the spot until the Koreans 
completed the ditch and the dam across 
the ltung River. 
After the incident of July 1st, the 
Chinese municipal authorities continued 
to protest to the Japanese Consul at 
Changchun against the action of the 
Japanese consular police and of tfie 
Koreans. 
Far more serious than the Wanpao-
shan affair was the reaction to this dis-
pute in Chosen (Korea). In consequ-
ence of sensational accounts of the 
situation at Wanpaoshan, especially of 
the events of July 1st, which were 
printed in the Japanese and Korean 
press, a series of anti-Chinese riots 
occurred throughout Korea. These riots 
began at Jinsen on July 3, and spread 
· rapidly to other cities. 
The Chinese state, on the basis of 
their official reports, that 127 Chinese 
were massacred and 393 wounded, and 
that Chinese property to the value of 
¥2,500,000 was destroyed. They claim, 
moreover, that the Japanese authorities 
in Korea were in large measure respon-
sible for the results of these riots, since 
it was alleged, they took no adequate 
steps to prevent them and did not sup-
pr&s them until great loss of Chinese 
life and property had resulted. The 
JapaneSe and Korean newspapers were 
not prevented from publishing sensa-
tional and incorrect accounts of the 
Wanpaoshan incident of July 1, which 
we.re of a character to arouse the 
hatred of the Korean populace against 
the Chinese residents. 
Spontaneity Claimed 
The Japanese claim, however, that 
these riots were due to the spontane-
ous outburst of racial feelings, and 
that the Japanese authorities suppress-
ed them as soon as possible. 
A result of importance was the fact 
that these outbreaks in Korea served 
directly to revive the anti-Japanese 
boycott throughout China. 
Shortly after the anti-Chinese riots 
in Korea, and while the Wanpaoshar: 
affair was still unsettled, the Chinese 
Government made a protest to Japan, 
on account of the riots. charginJit Japan 
with full responsibility for failure to 
suppress them. The Japanese Govern-
ment, in reply, on July 15, expressed 
regret at the occurrence of these riots 
and offered compensation for the' fami-
lies of the dead. 
From July 22 until September la, 
there were negotiations and exchanges 
of notes bet ween the Chinese and 
Japanese local and central authorities 
over the Wanpaofhan affair. The Chi-
nese maintained that the difficulties 
llt Wanpaoshan were due to the fact 
that the Koreans were living where 
they had no right to be, since their 
privileges of residing and leasing of 
land did not extend outside the Chien-
tao District, in accordance with the 
Chientao Ag!"eem nt of September 4, 
l!JO?. 
·The Chinese Government protes'-te<l 
agains the stationing of Japanese con-
sular polfce in China and asserted that 
the dispatch of a large force of these 
police to Wanpaoshan was responsible 
for the incident of July 1. · 
The Japanese, on the other hand, iu-· 
sisted that ~he Koreans had a treaty 
· right to reside and lease land at Wan-
paoshan, since their privileges were not 
limited to those specified in the Chien-
tao Agreement. but included the rights 
granted to Japanese subjects in geu-
eral, of residing and leasing land 
throughout South Manchuria. The 
status of the Koreans, it was claimed, 
was identical with that of other Japa-
nese subjects. The Japanese aiso urged 
that the Koreans had undertaken their 
rice cultivation project in good faith 
and that the Japanese authorities 
could not assume responsibility for 
the irregulal•lties of the Chinese broker 
who arranged the lease. The Japa-
nese Government consented to the 
withdrawal of the consular police from 
Wanpaoshan, but the Korean tenants 
remained and continued to cuitivate 
their rice lands. 
A complete solution of the Wanpau-
shan affair had not been reached by 
September 1931. 
vm. The Case of Captain Nakamura 
The case of Captain Nakamura was 
viewed by the Japanese as the culmi-
nating incident of a long series of 
events which showed the utter dis-
regard of the Chinese for Japanese 
rights and interests in Manchuria. Cap-
tain Nakamura was killed by Chines~ 
soldiers in an out-of-the-way regic111 
in Manchuria during the mid-summer 
of 1931. 
Captain Shintaro Nakamura wa., a 
Japanese military officer on active duty, 
and, as was admitted by the Japanese 
Government, was on a mission un4er 
the orders of the Japanese Army. 
While passing through Harbin, where 
his passport was examined by the Chi-
nese authorities, he repr~ented himself 
as an agricultural expert. He was at 
that time warned that the region in 
which he intended to travel was a 
bandit-ridden area, and this fact was 
noted on his passport. He was armed. 
and carried patent medicine whkh, ac-
cording to the Chinese, included narco-
tic drugs fot non-mediCAl purposes. 
: On June .9, . accompanied by three 
u1~rpi;-eters · and assistants, Captain 
N~~mura left Ilikotu Station on the 
western. section of the Chinese Eastern 
Ra,iJ:~a.y. W~n he ~ad reached a 
point some distance in the interior, in 
the direction of Taonan, he and the 
other µiembers ,of his party were placed 
under detention by Chinese soldiers 
under Kuan Yu-heng, the Commander 
of the Third Regiment of the Reclama-
tion Army. Several days later, about 
Juhe 27, he and his companions were 
shot by Chinese soldiers, and their 
1:bdies were cremated to conceal the 
evidence of the deed. 
The Japanese insisted that the killing 
of Captain Nakamura and his com--
panions was unjustified and showed ar-
ro~t disrespect for the Japanese army 
a'.nd nation; they asserted that the Chi-nese authorities in Manchuria delayed 
t.o institute official inquiries into the 
circumstances, were reluctant to as-
~urrie responsibility for the occurrence, 
and were insincere in their claim that 
they · were making every effort to as-
<:,ei:tain the facts in the case. 
The Chinese declared, at first, that 
Captain Nakamura and his party were 
detained pending an examination of 
their permits, which, according to cus-
tom, were required of foreigners travel-
ufg in the interior; that they had been 
treated well; and that Captain Naka-
mura was shot by a sentry while en-
deavoring to make his escape. Docu--
merits, including a Japanese military 
JllaP, ,and two diaries, they stated, were 
fdund on his person, which proved 
that he was either a military spy or 
.th officer on special military mission. 
On July 17 a report of the death of 
Captain Nakamura reached the Japa-
nese Consul-General at Tsitsihar. and 
at the end of the , month Japanese of-
ficials in Mukden informed the 'local 
Chinese authorities that they had defi-
~ite evidence that Captain • Nakamurr,. 
had been killed by Chinese soldiers. 
On
1
August 17 the Japanese military au-
thorit!es in Mukden released for pub-
lication the first account of his death 
(See Manchuria Daily News, August 17, 
1931). On the same day," Consul-Gen-
eral Hayashi, ·and also Major Mori, 
who had been sent by the Japanese 
General Staff from Tokyo to Manchuria 
to imrest~gat~ . the • circumstances, ~had· 
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interviews with Governor Tsang Shih-
yi of Liaoning Province. Governor 
Tsang promised to investigate it at 
once. 
Investigators Appointed 
Immediately thereafter Governor 
Tsang Shih-yi communicated with 
Marshal Clwng Hsueh-Hang, who was 
then ill in a hospital in Peiping, and 
·with the Minister for Foreign affairs 
in Nanking, and, also, appointed two 
Chinese investigators who proceeded 
at once to the scene of the alleged 
murder. These two men returned to 
Mukden on September 3, Major Mori, 
who had been conducting an inde-
pendent investigation on behalf of the 
Japanese General Staff, returned to 
Mukden on September 4. On that d;iy 
Consul-General Hayashi called on Gen-
eral Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief-of-
Staff, and was informed that the find-
ings of the Chinese investigators were 
indecisive and unsatisfactory, and that 
it would therefore be necessary to 
conduct a second inquiry. General 
Yµng Chen left for Peiping on Septem-
ber 4 ·' to consult with Marshal Chang' 
Hsu~h-liang on the new developments 
in · the · Manchurian situation, r eturn-
ing .to., Mukden on September 7. 
Having been informed of the serious-
ness of the situation in Manchuria. 
l\,farshal Chang Hsueh-Hang instructed 
Governor Tsang Shih-yi and General 
Yung Chen to conduct, without delay 
~nd on the spot, a second inquiry into 
the Nakamura case. Learning from his 
Japanese military advisers of the dee~ 
concern of !he Japanese military over 
this affa,ir, · he sent Major Shibayama 
to Tokyo to make it clear that he 
,·dshed to, settle the case amicably. 
Major Shiba :raina arrived in Tokyo on 
September 12, r,nd stated, according to 
subsequent press reports, that Marshal 
Chang Hsueh -liang was sincerely des- · 
irous of securing an early and equit-
able terminatfon of the Nakamura issue. 
In the meant ime Marshal Chang had 
sent Mr. Tang Er-ho, a high official, 
on a special mission to Tokyo to con-
sult with the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Baron Shidehara, in order to 
ascertain .vhat common gr·ound might 
be 'found for a solution of various pend--
ing !Sino-Japanese questions concerning 
Manchuria:, · ' Mr. Tang Er-ho : had 
conversations with Baron Shidehar-i, : 
General Minami and other high , mili-
tary officials. On· September 16 Mar-
shal Chang Hsueh-liang gave put an 
interview to the press which reported 
him as saying that the Nakamura case, 
in accordance with the wish of the 
Japanese, ·would be handled by Gov-
ernor Tsang Shih-yi and the Man-
churian authorities, and not by the 
For~i~ Office at Nanking. 
The second Chinese commission of in-
vestigation, after visiting the scene of 
the killing of Captain Nakamura, re-
turned to Mukden on the morning of 
September 16. On the afternoon of the 
18th the: Japanese Consul called upon 
General Yung Chen, when the latter 
sta~d that Commander Kuan Yu-heng 
had been brought to Mukden on Sep-
tember 16 charged with responsibility 
for the · murder of Captain Nakamura. 
and would be immediately tried by a 
military court-martial. Later it was 
made known by the Japanese, after 
their -occupation of Mukden, that Com-
mander Kuan had been detained by the 
Chinese in a military prison. ' 
Consul-General Optlmistic 
: Consul-General Hayashi, Mukden, was 
reported on September 12-13 to have 
reported to the Japanese Foreign Office 
that "an amicable settlement would 
probably be made after the return of 
the investigators to Mukden," especially 
as General Yung Chen had definitely 
admitted that Chinese soldiers had 
been responsible for the death of Cap-
tain Nakamura. The Mukden corre-
spondent of the Nippon Dempo Service 
telegraphed a dispatch on September 
12 stating that "an amicable settlement 
of the alleged murder case of Captain 
Shintaro Nakamura of the Japanese 
General Staff Office by soldiers of the 
Chinese Reclamation Army Corps is in 
sight.'' Numerous statements of Japa-
nese military officers, however, espe-
ci.ally those of Colonel K. Doihara, 
continued to question the sincerity of 
the Chinese· efforts to arrive at a satis-
. factory solution of the Nakamura case, 
in view of the fact that Commander 
Kuan, alleged to have been responsible 
for the death of Captain Nakamura, 
had been taken into custody in Mukden 
by the Chinese authorities, the date of 
his court-martial having been announc-
ed as to occur within a week. Since 
the Chinese authorities admitted to 
.Japanese consular officials in Mukden, 
in a formal conference held on the 
afternoon of September 18, that Chinese 
soldiers were responsible for the death 
of Captain Nakamura, expressing also 
a desire to secure a settlement of the 
case diplomatically without delay, it 
would seem that diplomatic negotiations 
for attaining a solution of the Naka-
mura case were actually progressing 
fav-0rably up to the night of September 
18. 
The Nakamura case, more than any 
other single incident, greatly aggravat-
ed the resentment of the Japanese and 
their agitation in favor of forceful 
means to effect a solution of outstand-
ing Sino-Japanese difficulties in re-
gard to Manchuria. The inherent seri-
ousness of the case was aggravated by 
the fact that Sino-Japanese relations 
just at this time were strained on ac-
count of the W anpaoshan affair, the 
anti-Chinese riots in Korea, the Japa-
nese military maneuvers across the 
Tumen River on the Manchurian-
Korean frontier and the Chinese mob 
violence committed at Tsingtao, in pro-
test_ against the activities of the- local 
Japanese patriotic ~ocieties. 
Captain Nakamura was' an army of-r 
:fleer on active service, a fact which 
was pointed to by the Japanese as a 
justification for strong and swift mili-
tary action. Mass meetings were held 
in Manchuria and in Japan for the pur-
pose of crystallizing public sentiment in 
favor of such action.. During the first 
two weeks of September the Japanese 
press repeatedly declared that the army 
had decided that the "solution ought to 
be by force," since there was no other 
alternative. 
The Chinese claimed that the impor-
tance of the case was greatly exag-
gerated and that it was made a pre-
text for the Japanese military occupa-
tion of Manchuria. They denied the 
contention of the Japanese that there 
was insincerity or delay on the part 
of the Chinese officials in dealing with 
the case. 
Peaceful Methods Not Exhausted 
By the end of August, 1931, there-
fore, Sino-Japanese relations over Man-
churia were severely strained in con-
sequence of the many controversies and 
incidents described in this chapter . . 
The claim that there were 300 cases 
outstanding between the two countries, 
and· that peaceful methods for settling 
each of them had been progressive-
ly exhausted by one of the parties, 
cannot be substantiated. These so-
called "cases' ' were rather situations 
arising out of broader issues, which 
were rooted in fundamentally irre-
concilable policies. Each side accuses 
the other of having violated, unilate-
rally interpreted, or ignored the sti-
pulations of the Sino-Japanese agree-
ments. Each side had legitimate griev-
ances µgainst the other. 
The account here given of the, ef-
forts made by one side or the other 
to secure a settlement of these ques-
tions at issue between them shows that 
some efforts were being made to dis-
pose of these questions by the normal 
procedure of diplomatic negotiation and 
peaceful means, and these means had 
not yet been exhausted. But the long 
delays put a severe strain on the pati-
ence of the Japanese. Army circles in 
particular were insisting .on the im-
mediate settlement of the Nakamura 
<!ase, and demanded satisfactory rep-
aration. The Imperial Ex-Soldiers' As-
sociation, among t>thers, was inst'ru-
mental in rousing public opinion. 
,. 
In the course of September public 
sentiment regarding the Chinese ques-
t ions, with the Nakamura case as the 
focal point, became very strong. Time 
and again the opinion was expressed 
that the policy of leaving so many is-
sues in Manchuria unsettled had caus-
ed the Chinese authorities to make 
light of Japan. Settlement of all pend-
ing issues, if necessary by force; be-
came a popular slogan. Reference was 
freely made in the press to a deci&ion 
to resort to armed force, to confer-
ences between the Ministry of War, the 
General Staff and other authorities for 
the discussion of a plan with this ob-
ject, to definite instructions regarding 
the execution, in case of necessity, of 
that plan to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Kwan tung Army, and to Colonel 
Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden, 
who had been summoned to Tokyo 
early in Septtmber and who was quoted 
by the press as the advocate of a solu-
tion of all pending issues, if necessary 
by force, and as soon as possible. The 
reports of the press regarding the senti-
ments <expressed by these circles and 
some other groups point to a growing 
and dangerous tension. 
CHAPTER IV 
Narrative of Events in Manchuria on and Subsequent to 
September 18, 1931 
In the preceding chapter the growing 
tension between the Japanese and Chi-
nese interests •in Manchuria was dis-
cussed and its effect on the attitudes of 
the military forces of the two nations 
described. Certain internal, economic 
and political factors had undoubtedly 
for some time been preparing the Japa-
nese people for a resumption of the 
"positive policy" in Manchuria. The 
dissatisfaction of the army; the financia,l 
policy of the Government; the appear-
ance of a new political force emanating 
from the army, the country districts 
and the nationalist youth, which ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with all political 
parties, which despised the compromise 
methods of Western civilization and 
relied on the virtues of Old Japan and 
which included in its condemnation the 
self-seeking methods whether of finan-
ciers or politicians; the fall in com-
modity prices which inclined the pri-
mary producer to look to an adven-
turous foreign policy for the allevia-
tion of his lot; the trade depressi:m 
which caused the industrial and com-
mercial community to be'lieve that bet-
ter businers would result from a more 
vigorous foreign policy-all these fac-
tors were preparing the way for the 
abandonment of the Shidehara "policy 
of conciliation" with China which 
seemed to have achie>ved such meagre 
results. This impatience in Japan was 
even greater am:mg the Japanese in 
Manchuria, where the tension through-
out the summer was increiasing. As 
September wore on, this tension reach-
ed such a point that it was apparent 
to all careful observers that a breaking 
point must soon be reached. The pub-
lic press of both countries tertded 
rather to in.flame than to calm public 
opinion. Vigorous ~peeches of the 
Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, coun-
seling direct action by their army in 
Manchuria wer reported. Protracted 
delay by the Chinese authorities in 
making satisfactory investigation of and 
redress for the murder of Captain 
Nakamura had particularly incensed the 
young officers of the Japanese army in 
Manchuria, who clearly showed their 
sensitiveness to irresponsible remarks 
and slurs made by equally irresponsible 
ChineEe officers on the streets or in 
restaurants and other places of close 
contact. And so the stage was set for 
the events which followed. ' 
On the morning of Saturday, Sep-
tember 19, the population of Mukden 
woke to find their city in the hands of 
Japanese troops. During the night 
sounds of firing had been heard, but 
there was nothing unusual in this; it 
had been a nightly expe'rience through-
out the week, as the Japanese h~d been 
carrying out night maneuvers involv-
ing vigorous rifle and machine-gun 
firing. True, that on the night of Sep-
tember 18, the booming of guns and the 
sound of shells caused some alarm to 
the few that distinguished them, but 
th~ majority of the population consider-
ed the · firing to be merely another 
repetition of Japanese maneuvers, per-
haps rather noisier than usual 
Military Leaders Interviewed 
Appreciating the great importance of 
this occurrence which, as will be-shown, 
was the first step of a movement which 
resulted in the military occupation of 
practically the whole of Manchuria, the 
commission conducted an extensive in-
quiry into the events of that night. 
Of great value and interest, of coutse, 
were the official accounts of the Japa-
nese and Chinese military leaders in-
volved. The Japanese case was pre-
sented by Lieutenant Kawamoto, who 
is the earliest witness in the story, by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the 
Commanding Officer of the battalion 
· which carried · out the attack on the 
North Barracks at Peitaying, and by 
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Colonel Hirata, who captured the wall-
ed city. We also heard evidence from 
Lieutenant-General Honjo, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Kwantung 
Army, and from several members of 
his staff. The Chinese case was pre-
sented by General Wang I-Cheh, the 
officer in command of the Chinese 
troops in the North Barracks, snpple-
mented by the personal narratives of 
his Chief-of-Staff and of other officers 
who were present during the operations. 
We also heard the evidence of Marshal 
Chang Hsueh-liang and of his Chief-
.of-Staff General Yung Chen. 
According to the Japanese version~, 
Lieutenant kawamoto, with six men 
under his command, was on patrol duty 
on the night of September 18, practicing 
defense exercises along the track of the 
South Manchuria Railway to th€:' north 
of Mukden. They were proceeding 
southwards in the direction of Mukden. 
The night was dark but clear, and the 
field of vision was not wide. When they 
reached a point at which a small road 
cr-osses the line, they heard the noise 
of a loud explosion a little way behind 
them. They turned and ran back, and 
after going about 200 yards they dis-
covered that a portion of one of the 
rails on the down track had been blown 
out. ·The explosion took place at ·the 
point of junction of two rails; the end 
of each rail had been cleanly severed. 
creating a gap in the line of 31 inches. 
On arrival at the site of the explosion. 
the patrol was fired upon from the 
fields on the east side of the line. 
Lieutenant Kawamoto immediately 
ordered his men to deploy and return 
the fire. The attacking body, estimated 
at about five or six, then stopped firing 
and retreated northwards. The Japa-
nese patrol at once started in pursuit, 
and, having gone about 200 yards, they 
were again fired upon by a larger body, 
estimated at between three and four 
hundred. Finding himself in danger of 
being surrounde<i by this large force, 
Lieutenant Kawamoto then ordered one 
of his men to report to the Commander 
of No. 3 Company, who was also en-
gaged in night maneuvers some 1.500 
yards to the north; at the same time he 
ordered another of his men to telephone 
(by means of a box telephone. near the 
spot) to Battalion Headquarters at Muk-
1 den for re-enforcement., .: · 
At this · · moment·, the southb6und 
train from Charlgchun·· ~as~ neaira ap-
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proaching. F earing that the train 
might be wrecked when it reached 1:he 
damaged line. the Japanese patrol in-
terrupted their engagement and plac-
ed detonators on the line in the hope 
of warning the train in time. The 
train,' · however, proceeded at full 
speed. · 'when it reached the site of 
the explosion it was seen to swav 
and heel over to one side, but it re-
covered and passed on without stop-
ping. As the train was due at MuJr-
den at 10:30. where it arrived punc-
tually, it must have been about 10:!)j) 
o'clock, according to Lieutenant Kaw3-
moto, when he first heard the ex-
plosion . 
Fighting was then resumed. Captain 
Kawashima, with No. 3 Company, 
having heard the explosion, was al-
ready proceeding southwards when he 
met Lieutenant Kawamoto's messeru!-
er, who guided them to the spot. ThPy 
arrived at about •10:50. Meanwhile. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the 
Battalion Commander,' on receiot o.f a 
telephone message, at once ordered the 
1st and 4th Companies that were with 
him at Mukden to proceed to the soot. 
He also sent orders to the 2nd , Com-
pany. which was at Fushun-an'. hour 
and a half away- to join them as soon 
as possible. The two companies pro-
ceeded by rail from Mukden to Liu-
tiaohu, and then on foot to the scene 
of action, where they arrived a little 
after midnight. 
Lieutenant Kawamoto's patrol. re-
enforced by Captain Kawashima's com-
panv, was still sustaining the fire nf 
the Chinese troops concealed in the tall 
kaoliang grass, when the two companieJ. 
arrived from Mukden. Although his 
force was then only 500, and he believ-
ed the Chinese army in the North Bat -
racks numbered 10,000, Lieutenant-
Colonel Shimamoto at once ordered an 
attack on the barracks, believin~, as 
he told us, that "offence is ·tlie bei:1t 
defence." The ground between · the· rail-
way and the North Barracks-'-a dis-
tance of about· 250 yards- was chffictiJt 
to cross irl mass formation because ·· of 
' p~tches ·of water, and while the Chinese 
troops rwere being driven back over· this 
· ground Lieutenant Noda .was . sent 11 1;> 
• .the rFlilway with · a section, of the 3rd 
, Campany to ,intercept their retreat. 
J, When . the J:ap;mese reached ·the' · N octh 
Barracks, which were desc::ribed as glit-
tering with electric liglo.t; an attack was 
made by the 3rd Company, which sue-
ceded in occupying a corner of the left 
wing. The attack was vigorously con-
tested by the Chinese troops within, 
and there was fierce fighting for some 
hours. The 1st Company attacked on 
lhe ,right, and the 4th Company in the 
center. At 5:00 o'clock· the south gate 
of the barracks was blown in by two 
shells from a small cannon left in an 
outhouse immediately opposite to it by 
the Chinese, and by 6 o'clock the entire 
barracks were captured at the cost of 
two Japanese privates killed and 
twenty-two wounded. Some of the 
barracks caught fire during the fight -
ing; the remainder were burned out by 
the Japanese on the morning of the 
19th. The Japanese stated that they 
buried 320 Chinese but only found 
about 20 wounded. 
· Walled City Taken 
In the meantime operations in ot}:ler 
places were being carried · out with 
equal rapidity and thoroughness. 
Colonel Hirata received a telephone 
message from Lieuten·ant-Colonel 
Shimamoto about 10:40 o'clock to tlie 
effect that the South Manchuria Rail-
way track had been destroyed by Chi-
nese troops and that he was about to 
start to· attack I the enemy. Colonel 
Hirata approved his action- and him-
self decided to attack the walled city. 
The concentration of his troops was 
complete by 11:30 o'clock, and his 
attack commenced. No resistance was 
offered, only occasional fighting on th ':? 
streets, mostly with the Chinese police, 
of whom 75 were killed. At 2:15 
o'clock the wall of the city was scaled. 
By 3:40 o'clock he had captured it. 
At 4:50 o'clock, he receiv
0
ed information 
that the staff of the 2nd Division and 
a part of the 16th Regiment had left 
Liaoyang at 3:30 o'clock. These troops 
arrived sh3r~ly after 5:00 o'clock. At 
'6:00 o'clock the occupation of the 
e:,stern wall was completed; the ar-
, senal and aerodrome were captured at 
7:30 o'clock. The East Barracks were 
then attacked and by 1:00 o'clock were 
occupied without fighting. The total 
casualities in those operations were 
seven Japanese wounded and 30 Chi-
nese killed. 
Lieutenant -General Hot11.fo, who had 
only returned from- his tour of , inspec-... 
tion that very day,- received • the · first 
news of what was happe:n'ing -. at :Muk.:. 
den by telephone from a · new.spapet" 
agent at about 11:00 o'clock. The Chief..: 
of-Staff received a telegraphic report 
at 11:46 o'clock from the Special Ser ... 
vice Station at Mukden, giving details 
of the attack, and orders were ,im-
mediately sent to the troops at Lia~~ 
yang, Yinkow and Fengsheng to pro-
ceed to Mukden. • ~e fleet was ordered 
to leave Port- Arthur and procee<l: tp 
Yingkow and the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Japanese Garrison Army . in 
Korea was asked :to send re-inforce-
ments. Li~utenant-General Honjo left 
Port Arthur at 3:30 o'ciock and .ar-
rived at Mukden at noon. 
According to tl)e Chinese version, the 
J apanese attack on the barracks ,at 
Peitaying was entirely unprovoked and 
came as a complete surprise. On the 
night of September 18th all the ~oldiers 
of the 7th Brigade, numbering' a"bout 
10,000, were in the North Barracks. As 
inst;u~tions bad been ~~c.eiyed from 
Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang on .. Sep-
tember 6th (*) that special care.was to be 
taken to avoid any clash with tqe 
Japanese troops in the tense state' of 
feeling existing at the time, the sep: 
tJ ies at the walls of the Barracks ·were 
only armed with dummy rifles. For 
the same reason the west gate . m tlw 
mud wall surrounding , the camp which 
gave access to the railway had b~n 
closed. The Japanese had been carry; 
ing out night maneuvers around thf 
barracks on the nights of .September 
14th, 15th, 16th and 17th. At 7:QO o'<:l9c~ 
on the Pvening of the 18th, they were 
maneuvering at a village called Wen-
kuantun. At 9 o'clock officer Liu re: 
ported that a train composed of three 
or four coaches, but witho~t t4e. usual 
type of locomotive. had stopped there. 
(*) The text of the telegram sqoWI.1 tp 
the commission at Peiping was as follows': 
"Our relations with Japan have hecqme 
very delicate. We must be particularly 
cautious in our intercourlle with them-. No 
matter how they· may challenge· u);, we 
must be extremely patient and nevn rP-
sort to force, so as to avoid any -conflict 
whatever. You are . insti;ucted to issue 
, secretly and im"mecU11tely, order.s ' · tq' 'all 
the officers. calling their attention to' ttils 
1 point.'J . • • ·, ' ' ' ' 
At 10 o'clock the sound of a loud ex-
plosion was heard, immediately fol-
lowed by rifle fire. This was reported 
over the telephone by the Chief-of-
Staff to the Commanding Officer. Gen-
eral Wang 1-cheh, who was at his pri-
vate house situated near the railway, 
about six or seven miles from the bar-
racks, to the south. While the Chief-
of-Staff was still at the telephone, 
news was brought to him that the 
Japanese were attacking the barracks 
and that two sentries had been wound-
ed. At about 11 o'clock a general at-
tack on the southwest corner of the 
barracks began. and at 11:30 o'clock the 
Japanese had effected an entry through 
a hole in the wall. As soon as the 
attack began the Chief-of-Staff gave 
oTders for the lights to be extinguish-
ed, and ag.ain reported to General 
Wang I-cheh by telephone. The latter 
replied that no resistance was to be 
offered. Distant artillery fire was heard 
at 10:30 o'clock from the southwest and 
noiihwest. At midnight live shells be-
gan to, f.all inside the barracks. On 
reaching the south gate, the retreating 
troops of the 621st Regiment found that 
the Japanese were attacking that gate, 
and that the guard was withdrawing. 
They accordingly took shelter in some 
trenches and earthworks until after 
the Japanese soldiers had passed 
through into the interior, when they 
were able to make their escape through 
the south gate and reached the vil-
lage of Erhtaitze, to the east of the 
barracks, abot1t 2 o'clock. Other troops 
made their escape throu~h the east 
gate and the emuty barracks just out-
side the east w.a 11, finally reaching thP 
same village between 3 and 4 o'clock. 
One Regiment Resists 
The only Tesistance was offered by 
the 620th Regiment, quartered in the 
northeast rorner building and th& 
second building south of it. The com-
mander of this Regiment stated that 
when the Japanese troops entered 
,th-rough the south gate at 1 o'clock-
the Chinese troops withdrew from one 
building to another, leaving the Japa-
. nese to attack emt>tY buildings. After 
. the main body of the Chinese troops 
hl\d withdrawn, the Japanese turned 
· eastwal"ds and occupied the el\step1 
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exit. The 620th Regiment thus found 
themselves cut off, and had no option 
but to fight their way through. They 
started to break through at 5 o'clock. 
but did not get completely clear until 
7 o'clock; This was the only actual 
fighting that took place in the bar-
racks, and was Tesponsible for most of 
the casualties. This regiment was the 
last to reach the village of Erhtaitze. 
As soon as they were all assembled, 
the Chinese troops left the village in 
the early morning of the 19th for 
Tungling. From here they made their 
way to a village near Kirin, where 
they obtained a supply of winter cloth-
ing. Colonel Wang was sent to obtain 
permission from General Hsi Hsia for 
the troops to enter Kirin city. The 
Japanese residents at KiTin were so 
alarmed at the 9pproach of the Chi:-
nese soldiers that re-enforcements 
were at once sent from Changchun. 
Ssupingkai and Mukden to Kirin. Con-
sequently the Chinese turned back to-
ward Mukden. They left their trains 
thirteen miles outside Mukden, sepa-
rated into nine groups, and marched 
round Mukden by night. To escape 
detection by the Japanese, General 
Wang I-cheh himself rode through the 
town disguised as a peasant. In the 
morning the Japanese obtained news 
of their presence and sent air planes 
to bomb them. They were obli~ed to 
lie hidden by day, but continued their 
march at night. Eventually they reach-
ed a station on the Peiping-Mukden 
Railway, and here they were able to 
order seven trains, which brou~ht 
them to Shanhaikwan by October 
4th. 
Such are the two stories of the so-
called incident of September 18 as they 
were told to the commission by the 
participants on both sides. Clearly, and 
not unnaturally in the circums~ances, 
they are different and contradictory. 
Appreciating the tense situation and 
high feeling which had preceded this 
incident, and realizing the discrepancies 
which are bound to occur in accounts 
of interested persons, espec:ally with 
regard to an event which took place at 
night, we, during our stay in the Far 
East, interviewed as many as possihle 
of the repre:entative foreigners wl\•:> 
had been in Mukden at the time of 
the occurrences or soon after, including 
newspaper correspondents and other 
persons who had visited the scene of 
conflict shortly after the event, and to 
whom the first official Japanese account 
had been given. After a thorough con-
sideration of such opinions, as well as 
of the accounts of the interested parties, 
and afte:r a mature study of the con-
siderable quantity of written material 
and a careful weighing of the great 
mass of evidence which was presented 
or collected, the commission has come 
to the following conclusions: 
Conclusions Offered 
Tense feeling undoubtedly existed 
between the Japanese and Chinese mili-
tary forces. The Japanese, as was ex-
plained to the commission in evidence, 
had a carefully prepared plan to meet 
the case of possible hostilities betwe?n 
themselves and the Chinese, On the 
night of SeptE'mber 18th-19th this plan 
was put into operation with swiftness 
and precision. The Cl: ir.ese in accor-
dance with the instructions previously 
referred to had no plan of attacking 
the Japan-?3e troops, or of endang~ring 
the lives or property of Japanese na-
tionals at this particular time or place. 
'!'hey made no concerned or autho:. ized 
;.ttack on •he Japanese forces, and 
were surprised by the Japanese attack 
and subsequent operations. An ex-
plosion undoubtedly occurred on or 
near the railroad between 10 o'clock 
and 10:30 o'clol!k e,n September 18, but 
the damage, if any, to the railroad did 
not in fact prevent the punctual arrival 
of the southbound train from Chang-
chun, and was not in itself sufficient 
to justify military action. The mili-
tary operations of the Japanese troops 
during this night, which have been 
e:f'Scribed above, -~annot be regard~ as 
measures of legitimate self-defens?. 
In saying this the commission does 
not exclude the hypothesis that the 
officers on the spot ma have thought 
they were acting in self-defense. Thi? 
narrative of the subsequent events must 
r.ow be resumed. . 
On the night of September 18 the 
Japanese troops in Manchuria were 
distributed as follows: In addition to 
the four companies of the Battalion of 
Railway Guards, which took nart in 
fhe attack on the North Barracks, and 
the 29th Regiment • of the 2nd Division 
un~ Colonel ~rata, which captured, 
the Walled City_ of Mukden, already 
de.scribed, the rest of the 2nd Divi-
sion was distributed in various places: 
the Headquarters of the 4th Regiment 
was at Changchun, of the 16th at 
Liaoyang, of the 30th at Port Arthur; 
other parts of these regiments were 
stationed at Antung, Yingkow and at 
many smaller places on the Chang-
chun-Mukden branch and the Mukden-
Antung branch of the South Manchuria· 
Railway. Another battalion of Railway 
Guards was at Changchun, and units 
of the Railway Guards and Gendar-
merie were distributed with the 2nd 
Division in the smaller p:aces already 
mentioned. Lastly, there were the 
Garrison troops of Korea. 
All the forces in Manchuria, and some 
of those in Korea, were brought into 
action almost simultaneously on the 
night of September 18th over the whole 
area of the South Manchuria Railway 
from Changchun to Port Arthur. Their 
total strength was as follows: 2nd Divi-
sion, 5,400 men and 16 field guns, Rail• 
way Guards about 5,000 men, Gendar-
merie about 500. The Chinese troops 
at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and 
other smaller towns were overcome 
and disarmed without resistance. The 
Railway Guards and Gendarmerie re-
mained in those places while the units 
of the 2nd Division at once concen-
trated at Mukden to take part in the 
more serious operations. The 16th and 
30th Regiments arrived in time to join. 
Colonel Hirata and assisted in the cap-
ture of the East Barracks. The 39th 
Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division 
(4,000 men and artillery) concentrat-
ed at 10 o'clock on the 19th at Shing-
ishu on the Korean frontier, crossed 
the Yalu River on the 21st and ar-
rived at Mukden at midnight. From 
here detachments were sent to Cheng-
chiatun and Hsinmin, which they oc-
cupied on the 22nd. 
Changchun Occupied 
The Chinese Garrisons of Kuan-
chengtze and Nanling at Changchun, 
with an estimated strength of 10,000 
men and 40 guns, were attacked on the 
night of the 18th of September by the 
4~h Reg~ment of the 2nd Division and 
1st Railway Guard Battalion stationed 
there (under Major-General Hasebe). 
Here, however, some re, istance was 
shown by the Chinese. Fighting began 
63 
a"t -midnight. ·' ·Nanl.i~ ' barracks werel 
captured by' 11 'o'clock in the morning: 
on the 19th, those of Kuanchengtze by 
3 o'clock that day. The · total· Japanese 
casualties involved were 3 officers and 
64 men killed and 3 officers and 85 men 
wounded. As soon as the fighting at 
Mukden' was · over, -the Regiments of 
the 2nd Division were concentrated at 
Changchun, the staff, with General 
Tamon, the 30th Regiment and one Bat-
talion of Field Artillery arriving on the 
20th, and the 15th Brigade under Gen-
eral Amano arriving on the 22nd . . Kirin 
was occupied on the 21st without the 
firing of a shot, · and the Chinese troops 
were removed to a distance of about 
.eight miles. 
The Herald of Asia, a semi-official 
Japanese publication of that time, states 
that all military operations were then 
regarded as completed, and that no 
further movements of troops were anti-
cipated. The military operations which 
in fact ensued are attributed to Chi-
nese provocation; an anti-Japanese 
demonstration at Chientao on the 20th: 
the. destruction of a railway station at 
Lungsingtsun; and the explosion of 
some bombs which did no damage on 
Japanese premises at Harbin on Sep-
tember 23rd, are m~ntio~ed as examples 
of such provocation. Complaint" is also 
made of growing banditry and of the 
activities of disbanded soldiers. All 
of these things, · it is claimed, finally 
forced the Japanese to new military 
operations agai~t their will. 
The first of these operations was the 
bombing, on Octo})er 8th, of Chinchow, 
to which place the Proyincial Govern-
ment of Liaoyang Province had been 
transferred by Marshal Chang Hsueh-
liang at the end of September. Ac-
cording to the 'Japanese account, the 
bombing was chiefly directed ~gainst 
the military barracks and the Commun-
ications University, where ' the offices 
of the Civil Governm:ent had b~n esta-· 
blished. 'Tlie · bombing of a civil ad-
ministration -b-y mil~tary forces cannot 
be justified and there is· some doubt 
whether the area- bombed ;was in fact 
as restricted as the -Japanese allege. 
Mr. Lewis, an American honorary ad-
viser of the Chinese Government. ar-
rived at Chinchow oh Ocfober 12th and 
wrote an ' account of what' he found 
there to Dr. · Koo; who passed · on th~ 
information later · to · the commission, ih 
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his ·capacity or assessor. Accorclini to1 
Mr: Lewis, the military barracks w~re, 
in fact not touched at all and a ·multi-i 
tude of bombs fell everywhere in · the, 
town, even on the hospital, as , well -as· 
on the university buildings. The com-1 
mander of the bombing planes inform- : 
ed a Japanese newspaper shortly after- • 
wards that four planes from Chang- : 
chun 'were ordered to Mukden a·t 8:30 -
o'clock on the morning of the 8th. There: 
they joined Qther planes and ~ squad' 
of six scouting and five bombing planes' 
were immediately dispatched to Chin-: 
chow heavily loaded with bombs and 
fuel. They arrived at about 1 o'clock, 
within ten to fifteen· ·minutes dropped 
eighty bombs and immediately 'return-
ed to Mukden. The Chinese, acc,ording 
to Mr. Lewis, did not return the fire. , 
Operations at N onni 
The next ci:eration was that of the . 
Konni River Bridges, which started in~ 
the middle of October and ended .on . 
the 19th of ~ovember with the oc. 
cupation of Tsitsihar by the Japanese_ 
troops. The justification for this 
given by the Japanese was that they 
were : attacked while repairing the 
bridge over the Nonni River w_hich, 
had been des1royed by General Ma_ 
Chan-shan. But the story must be· 
begun earlier and an explanation given: 
of the destruction of -the bridges, ; 
At the ·beginning of October ,Genenl, 
Chang Hai-peng, the Garrison <::om-, 
mander at Taonan, who -in former• 
times had held the same rank as · Ma, 
Chan-shan and Wang Fu-lin, and had 
tried to become Governor of- Heiiung-
kiang in their place, started an ad-• 
vance · movement along the Taonan-' 
Angangchi Railway with the · obvious. 
object of seizing the Provincial Gov~, 
ermnerit by · force. It is alleged in th~ 
Chinese assessor's docuil'l.ent No. 3, 
an'd this view is supported · by infor-: 
mation from neutral sources,. that this-
offensive was instigated by the Japa~' 
nese.· · h1 order to prevent the advaneer 
of Chang Hai-peng's troops, General 
Ma Chan-shan ordered the destruc-
tion of the bridges over the Nonni 
River and . both armies faced each. 
other across the large and swam,py-
valley. of that river. 
1 The Taona'n-Angangchi Railway· had 
been built with capital supplied · by the 
South Manchuria Railway and the line, 
was pledged as security for the loan. • 
Accordingly, the South Manchuria -Rail- , 
way authorities felt that the interrup- · 
tion to . the traffic on this line <;ould 
not be allowed to continue at a season 
when the transportation of crops from , 
the north of Manchuria was particular-
ly needed. The Japanese Consul-Gen-
eral at Tsitsihar, on instructions from 
his Government, requested General Ma 
Chan-shan, who had arrived at Tsitsi-
har on October 20, to have the bridges 
repaired as soon as possible, but no 
time limit accompanied this request. 
The Japane e authorities believed that 
General Ma Chan-shan would delay 
as long as possible the repairing of the 
bridges, as this interruption helped him 
to keep General Chang Hai-peng's 
troops at a distance. On October 20 
a small party of employes of the Tao-
nan-Angangchi Railway and the South 
Manchuria Railway, without military 
escort, attempted to inspect the damage 
to the bridges, and was fired upon by 
Chinese troops in spite of explanations 
previously given to an officer of the 
Heilungkiang Provincial forces. This 
aggravated the situation, and according-
ly on October 28th Major Hayashi, the 
representative of General Honjo at 
Tsitsihar, demanded the completion of 
the repairs by noon of November 3rd, 
stating that if they were not carried 
out by that date, engineers of the South 
Manchuria Railway, under the protec-
tion of Japanese troops, would take 
over the work. The Chinese authori-
ties asked for an extension of the time 
limit, but no answer was returned to 
this request and Japanese troops were · 
dispatched from Ssupingkai for the 
purpose of protecting the execution of 
the repair work. 
Negotiations Indecisive 
By November 2nd the negotiations . 
had not progressed and no decision had • 
been reached. On that day Major 
Hayashi delivered an ultimatum. to • 
Generals Ma Chan-shan and Chang 
Hai-peng, demanding that neither of 
them should use the railway for tac-
tical purposes and that both should 
withdraw their forces to a distance of 
10 kilomet~r-s • from each side of the 
river. It was intimated ·that if. the 
troops of either of these generals ob-
structed the repair of the bridges , by . 
the. ,engine~ of the South ,Mp.ncliuri~,, 
Railway, the Jana.pese, .would • regard., 
them as enemies~ The ulti.inatu~ vJ~~ ; 
to take effect as from- noon . of N ovem;- , 
ber 3rd, and the .Japanese protective,: 
detachment was . under orders to .'ad- ·, 
vance to Tahsing, on the nO'Ith side of . 
the valley, by noon of November 4th. ' 
The Chinese assessor (document -No. ' 
3), the Japanese Consul-General at 
Tsitsihar and various officers of the , 
2nd Division all concur that General. 
Ma Chan-shan replied that pending in-
structions from the Central Govern- · 
ment he provisionally accepted, on· his , 
own authority, the Japanese demands. 
But the Japanese witnesses, on · the 
other hand, added that they did not ' 
believe in the sincerity of General Ma, 
who obviously did not intend to per-
mit the damaged bridges to be quick-
ly or effectively repaired. . Twice on 
the 4th of November a joint commis-
sion, including Major Hayashi, a rep-
resentative of the Japanese Consul-. 
General and Chinese officers and civi 
offici~ls, went to the bridges in O'I"der 1 
to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and l 
the Chinese delegates asked for a ,p{>st- ·; 
ponement of the Japanese advance. 
The demand was not complied with, 
and Colonel . Ham2moto. the . ,com- ' 
mander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, , 
in compliance with his orders, advanc- . 
ed to the bridges with one battalion. of 
his regiment, two companies . of field ' 
artillery and one company of engineers 
to begin the repair work in acco:rd,mce ' 
with the terms of the japanese ulti- : 
matum. The engineers, under the com- · 
mand of Captain Hanai, st~rted work .' 
on the morning of November 4th, and . 
one infantry company, with two Ja:p~-:-.; 
nese flags, began its advance to _Tahsµig ~ 
Station by noon of that day. · 
Hostilities actually began during the -
second attempt Qf the above-mention-': 
ed mixed commission which went to 
the spot earlv in the afternoon of the·: 
4th in order to make a last attempt to 
secure the withd'Iawal of the ·Chinese 
troops. . As ~oon as firing began Colo-
nel Hamamoto realised that his men 
were jn a very difficult pqs_ition and , 
went immediately to their support 
with whatever troops .he had available . . 
A ·rapjd reco,nnaissanc~ c,onvipced him 
that . a frontal attack was imp9ssible 
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on account of the swampy ground, and 
that nothing but an encircling move-
ment against the left wing of the op-
posing force would help him out of 
this difficult situation. Accordingly he 
dispatched his reserve companies to 
attack the hill on which the left wing 
of the opposing forces rested, but the 
small number of Ms forces and the 
impossibility of bringing his guns near 
enough for action pTevented him from 
gaining the position before nightfall. 
The hill was captured by 8:30 o'clock, 
but no further advance was possible 
on that day. 
The Kwan tung Army Headquarters, 
on Teceiving a report of the position, 
immediately dispatched strong re-en-
forcements, and another battalion of in-
fantry arrived during the night, enabl-
ing the Colonel to re-o~en his attack 
at dawn of November 5th. Even then, 
after a couple of hours and reaching 
the first Chinese position, he found 
himself confronted with a strong line 
of trenches defended, according to his 
own statement to the commission, with 
about 70 automatic and machine guns. 
His attack was he]d up, and h;s troops 
suffered )leavy losses, as a result of a 
Chinese encircling counter-attack ex-
ecuted by infantry and cavalrymen. 
The Japanese troops were forced to 
retire, and for the second time they 
could do nothing but hold their posi-
tion until nightfall. During the night 
of November 5-6, two fresh battalions 
arrived. This relieved the situation, 
.;.nd a renewed attack on the morning 
of the 6th rolled up the entire Chinese 
front, and brought Tahsing Station in-
to the hands of the Japanese troops 
by noon. As Colonel Hamamoto's mis-
sion was only to occupy Tahsing Sta-
tion, in orde-r to cover the repair work 
of the bridges, no pursuit of the re-
treating Chinese troops was m3de, but 
the Japanese troops remained in the 
vicinity of the station. 
New Requests Alleged 
The Chinese assessor, in the same 
document No. 3, alleges that Major 
Hayashi, on Novem">er 6. m 3de a new 
request to the Heilungkiang Govern-
ment, asking (1) that General Ma 
Chan-shan should resign from the 
Governa:ship in favor of General 
6G 
Chang Hai-peng, and (2) that a pub-
lic safety committee should be organiz-
ed. A photograph of Major Hayashi's 
letter containing these requests was 
shown to the commission. This docu-
ment further states that on the fol-
lowing day, without waiting for a Te-
ply, the Japanese troops began a new 
attack on the provincial forces now 
stationed at Sanchienfang; about 20 
miles north of Tahsing, and that on 
November 8 Major Hayashi sent an-
other letter Tepeating the demand for 
General Ma Chanshan's retirement 
from the governorship of the province 
in favor of General Chang Hai-peng, 
and for a reply before midnight of that 
day. On November 11, the Chinese 
account continues, General Hcmjo him-
self asked by telegram for Ceneral Ma 
Chan-shan's retirement, the evacuation 
of Tsitsihar and the right for the 
Japanese troops to advance to Angang-
chi Station, again requiring a reply 
before nightfall of that day. Vn 
November 13 Major Hayashi increased 
the third demand to one for the Japa-
nese troops to occupy not only An-
gangchi Station but Tsitsihar Station 
as well. General Ma Chan-shan point• 
ed out in reply that Tsitsihar Station 
had nothing to do with the Taonan-
Angangchi Railway. 
On November 14 and 15 the Japa-
nese combined forces renewed their 
attack with the support of four air-
planes. On November 16 General 
Honjo demanded that retreat of Gen-
eral Ma Chan-shan to the north of 
Tsitsiha1", the withdrawal of Chinese 
troops to the north of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, and an undertaking 
not to interfere in any way with the 
traffic and operation of the Taonan• 
Angangchi Railway, these demands to 
be carried out within 10 days from 
November 15, 2nd a reply to be sent 
to the Jananese Special Bureau at 
Harbin. When General Ma Chan-shan 
declined to accept these terms, General 
Tam on began a new genera 1 attack 
on November 18. General Ma Chan-
shan's troops retreated, first to Tsitlli-
har, which was taken by the Jana-
nese on November 19, and then to Hai-
ltut, to whirh ph ce the administrativ 
offices of the Government were :re-
moved. 
Ma Gathers Troops 
According to the evidence of Japa-
nese generals commanding on the spot, 
the new operations did not begin be-
fore November 12. General Ma Chan-
shan a.t that time had gathered about 
20,000 of his troops to the west of 
Sanchienfang and even sent for the 
land colonization troops in Heilung-
kiang Province and the forces of Gen-
eral Ting Chao. Against these lax-ge 
forces, which showed an increasingly 
threatening attitude, the Japanese 
could oppose only the now concentrat-
ed division of General Tamon, consist-
ing of two bridgades under Generals 
Amano and Hasebe. In arder to re-
lieve this tense situation General Hon-
jo demanded, on November 12, that all 
Heilungkiang troops should retire to 
the north of Tsitsihar and that his 
troops should be allowed to proceed 
northward for the protection of th~ 
Taonan-Angangchi Railway. The ad-
vance did not begin before November 
17. when the Chinese sent cavalry 
troops around the right flank of the 
Japanese and attacked them. General 
Tamon informed the commission that 
in spite of his small strength of 3,000 
infantrymen and 24 field guns he ven-
tured to attack the Chinese forces. and 
completely defeated them on Novem-
ber 18, with the result that Tsitsihar 
was occupied on the morning of the 
19. One week later the 2nd Division 
returned to its original quarters, leav-
ing General Amano with one infantry 
regiment and one battery of artillery 
at Tsitsihar to hold the place against 
General Ma Chan-shan's troops. This 
small Japanese force was subsequent-
ly re-enforced by the newly-formed 
"Manchukuo" troops, but these new 
troops at the time of our visit to 
Tsitsihar in May, 1932, were not yet 
considered capable of fighting the 
forces of General Ma Chan-shan. 
The attached Military Situation 
Chart No. 2 shows the distribu-
tion of regular troops of both sides 
at the time of the first !resolution of 
the Council. No account is taken of 
disbanded soldiers and bandit groups 
which, at that time, specially infested 
the areas east and west of the Liao 
River and the Chientao District. Both 
the parties have accused each other 
of purposely instigating banditry,-the 
Japanese attributing to the Chinese 
the motive of wishing to create 
disorder in the lost parts of 
Manchuria, and the Chinese suspect-
ing the Japanese of wishing to 
find pretexts for occupying the 
country and still further extending 
their military o,;>erations. The strength 
and military value of these gangs is 
so vague and changeable that it would 
not be possible to insert an accurate 
estimate uf their significance into the 
picture of the milita:ry situation. The 
chart shuws that the command of the 
N ortheastem troops had succeeded in 
orgamzmg a force of considerable 
strength in the southwestern part of 
Liaoning Province. These troops had 
been able to construct a strongly en-
trenched position on the right bank of 
the Taling River very close to the 
fo:remost Japanese outposts. Such a 
situation may well have caused the 
Japanese military authorities some 
anxiety as they estimated the total 
strength of these regular troops at 35, -
000 men, or about double the total ad-
mitted strength of their own forces in 
Manchuria at that moment. 
The Tlentsln Incident 
This situation was relieved by ac-
tion taken in consequence of certain 
events which occurred at Tientsin dur-
ing the month of November. Reports 
as to the origin of the trouble differ 
widely. There were two outbreaks, 
on the 8th, and the 26th, of November 
respectively, but the whole .affair is 
extremely obscure. According to the 
Japanese account in the Herald of 
Asia, the Chinese population at Tien-
tsin was divided between those who 
supported and those who opposed ,Mar-
shal Chang Hsueh-Hang, and the latter 
organized farces to create a political 
demonstration in the Chmese city by 
attacking the guardians of public or-
der on November 8. In this dispute 
between two Chinese factions the com-
mander of the J·apanese garrison ob-
served strict neutrality from the begin-
ning but was forced to open fire when 
Chinese guards In the vicinity of the 
Japanese Concession began to shoot 
indiscriminately into his district. His 
demand that the combating Chinese 
forces should keep at 300 yards' dis-
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: tance, the f>order of the Concession, 
<Jid' 'not :relieve the I situation' which 
grew so tense that on November 11 or 
· 1~, all foreign garrisons mounted guard. 
1,; T4e account given by the Municipal 
Giovernment of Tientsin is very dif ·· 
ferent. They assert that the Japanese 
, employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese 
plain-clothes men, who were formed 
.into ,1operating gangs within the Japa-
•nese Concession in order to start 
' trouble in the Chinese city. Their 
police authorities being timely infonn-
. e4 by agents of this situation, were 
:able to repulse the disorderly bands 
emergin~ from the Japanese Conces-
sion. They say that from the con-
_fession of arrested. members of these 
gangs they are able to prove that the 
riot was organized by the Japanese 
.and that the men were armed with 
guns and ammunition of Japanese 
make. They admit that the Japanese 
garrison commander complained on the 
morning of the 9th that some of hls 
men had been wounded by stray bul-
lets and that he had asked for a with-
drawal to a distance of 300 yards, but 
they · assert that in spite of their ac-
ceptance of these conditions the Japa-
nese regular troops attacked the Chi-
nese C!ity with armored cars and 
shelled it. 
Withdrawal Arranged 
The account of the Municipal Gov-
ernment further states that on Novem-
ber 17, an agreement was reached 
which fixed the details for the with-
drawal to a distance of 300 yards, but 
it asserts that the Japanese did not 
carry out their part of the agreement 
and that consequently the situation 
grew worse. 
On November 26 a terrific explosion 
was heard, immediately followed by 
firing of cannons, machine-guns and 
rifles. The electric lights in the Japa-
nese Concession were put out, and 
plain-clothes men emerged from it, at-
tacking the police stations in the 
vicinity. 
Th.e Japanese account of this later 
disturbance as given in the Herald of 
Asia is to the effect that on the 26th 
the situation had become so much bet-
ter that their volunteer corps was dis-
banded and that on the same evening 
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the Chinese opened fire on the Jaoa-
nese barracks, and as the fire, in spite 
of their protests, did not stop until 
noon of the 27th, they had no choice 
but to accept the challenge and to 
fight the Chinese. The battle went on 
until the afternoon of the 27th, when 
a peace conference was held. On that 
occasion the Japanese demanded the 
immediate cessation of hostilities and 
the withdTawal of Chinese troops and 
police forces to a distance of 20 Chinese 
Ii from all places where foreign 
troops were stationed. The Chinese 
agreed to withdraw their soldiers but 
not their police forces, which were 
alone responsible for the safety of 
foreigners in that district. The Japa-
nese say that on November 29 the 
Chinese offered their withdrawal from 
the neighborhood of the Concession: 
their offer was accepted; the Chinese 
.&rmed police withdrew on the morn-
ing of the 29th, and the defence work 
was removed on the 30th. 
The threatening situation at Tientsin 
on the 26th caused the staff officers of 
the Kwantung Army to propose to the 
commander an immediate expedition 
of troops via Chinchow and Shanhai-
kwan to re-enforce the endangerPd 
small force at Tientsin. ~s a mere 
transport problem it would have been 
easier and quicker to dispatch re-en-
forcements by sea via Dairen. But 
considered strategically, the suggested 
route had this advantage, that it 
would enable the advancing troops to 
dispose en route of the very incon-
venient Chinese concentration around 
Chinchow. It was assumed that the 
delay in taking this route would not 
be long, as little or no :resistance from 
the Chinese was anticipated. The su2-
gestion was approved, and one armor-
ed train, one troop train, and a couple 
of air planes crossed the Liao Rive-: 
on November 27 and thP.ir attack on 
the first Chinese outposts was suffi-
cient to initiate a retreat of the Chi-
nese troops from their entrenched 
position. The armoured car corps 
also changed its position. A. shade of 
resistance led the Japanese to re-en-
f orce their strength by more armored 
trains, infantry trains and artillery. 
,They also repeatedly threw bombs on 
Chincliow, but news of the improved 
. sit~tjqn at 1'i~tsin soon deprived the 
expedition of its original objective and 
on November 29, to the great surprisP-
• of ' the Chinese, the Japanese forces 
w~e withdrawn to Hsinmm. 
· Henry Pu-yi Goes to Port Arthur 
'Another consequence of the earlier 
disturbances at Tientsin was that the 
former Emperor, who had been living 
in the Japanese Concession there. 
sought a safer refuge at Port Arthur on 
November 13, after a talk with Colonel 
· Dohihara. 
The districts evacuated by the Japa-
nese were re-occupied by the Chinese 
· troops, and this fact was widely ad-
vertised. Chinese morale was slightly 
raised; and the activities of irregular 
· foxces and bandits increased: Profit-
ing by the winter season, they crossed 
the frozen Liao River at many points 
: an4 raided the country round Mukden. 
The Japanese military authorities 
realized that even to maintain their 
existing positions re-enforcements 
. would be necessary, and with these re-
enforcements they hoped to be able 
to get rid of the menace of the Chi-
nese concentration at Chinchow. 
Meanwhile the situation in Man-
churia was a subject of further dis-
cussion in Geneva. When accepting 
the resolution on December 10 the 
Japanese delega te stated that his ac-
ceptance "was based on the under-
standing that this paragraph (No. 2) 
was not intended to preclude the Japa-
nese forces from taking such action 
as might be necessary 'to providP 
directly for the protection of the lives 
and property of Japanese subjectia; 
against the activity of bandits and law-
.less elements rampant in various paru. 
of Manchuria.' Such action was ;icl-
mittedly 'an exceptional measure call-
ed for by the special situation prevr1i l-
ing in Manchuria,' and its necessity 
would end when normal conditions 
should be restored there." To tru:i t the 
Chinese representative replied "that 
the injunction to the parties not to at:-
. gravate the situation should not be 
violated under the pretext of the e'!('-
istence of lawlessness caused by the 
state of affairs in Manchuria," and 
'several Council members taking part 
in the discussion admitted that "cir-
cwnstances might arise there causing 
da,nger to Japanes~ lives and property 
and in such an emergency it might be 
i~evitable that Japanese forces in the 
nejghborhood should take action." 
When this matter has been referred to 
by Japanese officers who have given 
evidence before the commission it is 
usually asserted that the resolution of 
December 10 "gave Japan the right to 
maintain her troops" in Manchuria, or 
made the Japanese army responsible 
for the suppression of banditry there. 
In describing the subsequent opera-
tions they assert that while executitU?. 
this right against the bandit forces 
near the Liao River, they incidentally 
came in conflict with the remaining 
Chinese forces near Chinchow 
which were in consequence withdrawn 
within the Great Wall. The fact rP-
mains that having made their reserva-
tion at Geneva the Japanese continued 
to deal with the situation in Manchuria 
according to their plans. 
Re-enforcements Arrive 
The 2nd Division, with the exception 
of its garrison at Tsitsihar, was con-
centrated west of Mukden. Re-en-
forcements soon bei;!an to arrive; the 
4th Brigade of the 8th Division (*) be-
tween the 10th and 15th of December. 
On December 27 Imperial sanction 
was obtained for the dispatch of the 
staff of the 20th Division and another 
brigade from Korea. Changchun and 
Kirin were for the time being only 
protected by Independent Railway 
Guards. 
As a Japanese advance on Chinchow 
was imminent, the Chinese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs made an attempt 
to prevent further fighting by offerim? 
to withdraw the Chinese troops to 
within the Great Wall provided that 
three or four foreign Powers were 
willing to guarantee the maintenance 
of a neutral 70ne north and south of 
Chinchow. Nothing came of the pro-
posal. Meanwhile conversations were 
initiated between Marshal Chang Hsu-
eh-Hang and the Japanese Charge d'A-
faires at Peiping, but these too were 
(• ) All the statements here given con-
cerning numbers of units and strength of. 
the Japanese forces are pased on official 
Jap~nese information . . 
abortive for diff'erent reasons. The 
Chinese aliege in their document No. 
3, Annex "E", that at each successive 
visit, on December 7, 25 and 29, the 
Japanese delegate· increased his de-
mands concerning the Chinese retreat 
and his promises with regard to the 
restraint of the Japanese troops be-
came more and more vague. The 
Japanese, on the other hand, claim 
that the Chinese promises to withdraw 
were never sincere. 
The concentrated attack of the Japa-
nese forces began on December 23 when 
the 19th Chinese Brigade was forced to 
give up its position. From that the 
advance continued with perfect re-
gularity and hardly met with any re-
sistance at all, the Chinese commander 
, having given out a general order to re-
treat. Chinchow was occupied on the 
morning of January 3, arid the Japa-
nese forces continued their advanc~ 
right up to the Great Wall at Sharthaj-
kwan, where they established a perma-
nent contact with the Japanese gar-
rison in that place. · 
The complete evacuation of Man-
churia by the trooos of Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-Hang, practically without strik-
ing a blow, was not unconnected with 
th:e internal conditions of China south 
of the Wall. Reference has been made 
in an earlier chapter to the feuds be-
tween rival generals, and it must be 
remembered these feuds had not ceased. 
The OcclU)ation of Harbin 
The comparative ease with which the 
offensive down to Shanhaikwan was 
carried out enabled the Japanese to 
release some of their troops from their 
original positions and make them avail-
able for advances in other directions. 
The main force of the 2nd Division, 
which had done nearly all the fighting 
so far, returned to their quarters at 
Liaoyang, Mukden and Changchun for 
a rest. On the other hand, the increas-
. ed. length of railway line to be pro-
tected against possible bandit raids at 
. any point necessitated the use of a 
lai;ge number of troops the fighting 
strength of which was diminished by 
their distribution over such wide areas, 
The two- brigades under the command 
of the staff of the 20th Division ·were 
left for this purpose in the newly oc-
cupied zone, and the , 4th Brigade of 
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the 8th Division joined them more to 
the north. The Japanese military au-
thorities assured us that within these 
well guarded areas a state of law and 
order was soon established and that 
banditry was practically extinguished 
on both sides of the Liao River during 
the following weeks. This statement 
was made to us in the month of June, 
but at the moment of writing this re-
port we read of vigorous raids from 
volunteer troops on Yingkow and Hai-
cheng, with threats even to Mukd~ 
and Chinchow. 
The district which at the beginning 
of this year gave more tro-uble than 
any other was that north and east of 
Harbin, to which the remaining fol-
lowers of the two former Provincial 
Governments of Kirin and Heilune;-
kiang had withdrawn. The Chinese 
generals in this northern sector seemed 
to have maintained some contact with 
Headquarters at Peiping, whence they 
received some support from time· to 
time. The advance on Harbin began, 
as that on Tsitsihar had done, by an 
encounter between two Chinese forces. 
General Hsi Hsia at the beginning of. 
January prepared for an expedition to 
the North with the view to occupying 
Harbin. Between him and that citv 
were Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. 
with what are described as anti-
Kirin forces. According to informa-
tion provided by the Japanese asses.5or, 
when our preliminary report was under 
consideration, satisfactory tenns would 
have been arranged by negotiation be-
tween the parties had it not been for 
the influence of the authorities at Peip-
ing. Negotiations were in fact initiat-
ed and while they were being carried 
on General Hsi Hsia advanced with his 
troops as far as Shuangcheng, which 
they reached on January 25, but when 
it came to serious fighting on the fol-
lowing morning in the immediate neigh'" 
borhood south df the city, the ad-
vance was at once checked. The situa-
tion thus created was felt by the Japa-
nese to be full of danger for the large 
Japanese and Korean colonies at Har-
bin. Fighting between two more or 
less irregular Chinese forces in the 
immediate neighborhood would have 
resulted in the retreat on the town of 
a defeated army, the horrors of which 
the recent history of China prcwidas 
so many examples. Urgent appeals were 
· therefore Eent th the Kwantung Army 
even Chinese merchants. so the· Japa~ 
nese assert, joining in the appeal from 
fear that their property might be loot-
ed. 
Anxiety for Residents 
Colonel Dohihara (now General). who 
in this emergency, was sent to Harbi~ 
on the 26th in ,order to take over the 
office of the special Japanese service 
there, told the commission that the 
fighting between the two Chinese forces 
around Harbin continued for about 10 
days, and that there was e;reat anxiety 
for the 4,000 Japanese residents who 
mostly )ived in a menaced area, ' toge-
ther with 1,600 Koreans in the Chi-
nese suburb of Fuchiatien. who were 
exposed to the danger of massacre. In 
spite of the fact that the anti-Kirin 
forces held the town during 10 days 
of continual fighting, the casualties 
among the Korean and Japanese re-
sidents were comparatively few. The 
latter organized themselves into armed 
volunteer bands and helped their na-
. tionals to escape from the Chinese sub-
urb. One Japanese and three Koreans 
are said to have been killed while try-
ing to escape. In addition, one of the 
Japanese airplanes, sent to reconnoitre 
the threatening situation, was forced to 
land owing to engine trouble, and its 
occunants are said to have been killed 
by Ting Chao's troops. 
These two incidents decided the 
Japanese military authorities to inter-
vene. Again the 2nd Division was call-
ed upon to help its endangered coun-
trymen. But this time the problem 
was not so much one of fighting as of 
transportation, the railway north of 
Changchun being a joint Sino-Russian 
widertaking. As the roJling stock of 
the southern branch of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway was greatly depleted, 
the commander of the 2nd Division de-
cided to send, in the first instance, 
only General Hasebe and two infantry 
battalions. Negotiations with the rail-
way authorities were started, but when 
these seemed likely to be long drawr-
out, the Japanese officers decided to 
enforce the transport of their troops. 
The railway authorities protested and 
refused to work the trains, but iri 
spite of their opposition the Japauc c 
military authorities succeeded on :he 
night of January ?.8 in fonning three 
military trains, which went as .far 
north as the second Sungari ,brid~e 
which they found damaged by the Chi~ 
nese forces. As the repairs were made 
on the 29th, Shuangcheng was reached 
on the afternoon of January 30. Early 
on the following morning, and still 
under cover of darkness. the smllll 
Japanese force was attacked by Ting 
Chao's troops, and severe fighting took 
place, resulting in the repulse of th~ 
Chinese. but no further progress was 
possible that day. By that time the 
Soviet and Chinese railway authorities 
had agreed that the transport of Japa-
nese troops on the Chinese Eastern 
Railway would be allowed, on the 
understanding that they were proceed-
ing with the sole object of givin"' 
protection to the Japanese residents at 
Harbin. The fares of the troops wer12 
paid for in cash. On February 1 the 
Japanese troops began to arrive and 
the main force of the 2nd Division 
was concentrated near Shuangcheng on 
the morning of February 3. Re-en-
forcements were even called upon 
from Tsitsihar, where, as will be re-
membered, a part of the 2nd Divi.c,ion 
had remained since November 19. But 
many difficulties had still to be over-
come, as the line between Harbin and 
Tsitsihar was cut by the Chinese who 
at the same time attacked detachments 
of the Independent Railway Guards on 
the southern branch of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway at different places .. 
Troops Enter City 
On February 3 the anti-Kirin troops, 
now estimated to have a total strength 
of about 13,000 to 14,000 soldiers with 
16 guns, had taken up an entrenched 
position along the southern boundary 
of the city. The 2nd Division began to 
advance against this position on the 
same day, reaching the Nanchengtze 
River, about 20 miles north of Shuang-
cheng, on the night of February 3-4. 
Fighting commenced on the following 
morning. On the evening of the 4th the 
Chinese position was partly taken by 
the Japanese troops and by noon w 
the 5th a final decision was reached'. 
Harbin was occupied on the afternoon 
of the same day, and the Chinese with-
drew in the direction of Sanhsing. 
The successful attack of the 2nd 
Division brought the town of Harbin 
into the hands -of the Japanese authori-
ties, but as it was not immediately fol-
lowed by any pursuit of the retia-ing 
· Chinese forces, little change was pro-
' duced on the situation in northern 
Martchuria as a whole. The railways 
I north and east of Harbin and the im-
! portant waterway of the Sungari River 
still remained .under the control of the 
. anti-Kirin troops and those of Ma 
Chan-shan. The arrival of further re-
. enforcements, repeated expeditions to 
· the east and north and six months of 
.fighting took place before the occupied 
area was extended as far as Hailun in 
, the north and the districts of Fang-
cheng and Hailin in the east. Accord-
ing to Japanese official statements, the 
anti-Kirin troops with those of Gen-
eral Ma Chan-sban were completely 
routed, but according to official Chi -
nese sources, they are still in existence. 
· Although reduced in their fighting 
strength they continually hamper the 
Japanese forces, at the same time 
avoiding actual encounters in the open 
field. According to newspaper informa-
tion, both the eastern and westent 
branches of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way are still being attacked and damag-
ed at different places between Harbin 
and Hailin. 
Operations Summarized 
• The Japanese operations since the 
· beginning of February may be sum-
marized as follows: 
Toward the end of March the main 
part of the 2nd Division left Harbin 
in the direction of Fangcheng in orde1· 
' t'l suppress the anti-Kirin troops of 
' Generais Ting Chao and Li Tu. The 
Division aavanced as far as the region 
of Sanhsing and returned to Harbin 
· in the ·earlier part of April. By that 
time ' the 10th Division had arrived at 
Harbin and took over the sector from 
the 2nd Division. This unit was en-
gaged lor _ about . .a month in constant 
fighting against the anti-Kirin troops 
with the greater Dart of its forces in 
the district near Sanhsing and with 
a minor detachment alon,e: the eastern 
branch of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way, in the direction of Hailin. 
In the earlier part of May, the Japa-
nese forces in the north of Manchuria 
were further re-enforced by the 14th 
,Division. A detachment of this unit 
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took part in the fighting against the 
anti-Kirin forces and advanced as far 
as the valley of Mutan River, south 
of Sanhsing, forcing the opposing 
troops to withdraw to the most east-
ern corner of Kirin Province. But the 
main operations of the 14th Division. 
which beg:m in the iatter, part of 
May, took place in the region north of 
Harbin and were directed against the 
troops of General Ma Chan-shan. The 
14th Division carried out its main at-
tack to the north of Harbin, along 
the Hulan-Hailun Railway, and, with 
minor forces to the east from Koshan, 
the proposed terminus of the Tsitsi-
har-Koshan Railway. The Japanese 
claim that during the earlier part of 
August the troops of General Ma 
Chan-cman were again effectively 
routed, and that they have strong 
evidence that the General himself 
v;-as killed. The Chinese assert that 
the General is still alive. In this ac-
tion cavalry, newly arrived from 
Japan, likewise took part. 
During the month of August, several 
minor engagements took place on the 
borders of Fengtien and J ehol Pro-
vinces, mainly near the Chinchow-
Peipiao branch line (of the Peiping-
Mukden Railway), which is the only 
means of access to Jehol by railway. 
There are widespread fears in China 
that these events are only a prelude 
to larger military operations at an ear-
ly date, aimed at the occupation of 
Jehol by the Japanese. The main lines 
of communication which still exist be-
tween China Proper and the Chinese 
forces in Manchuria run through J e-
hol, and the fear of a Japanese attack 
in this Province, which is already 
claimed as part of the territory of 
"Manchukuo," is not unreasonable. Its 
imminence is freely discussed in the 
Japanese press. 
Japanese Version Given 
The Japanese version of the recent 
events submitted to the commission by 
the Japanese assessor is as follows: 
An official attached to the Kwantung 
Army Headquarters named Ishimoto 
was kidnapped by Chinese "Volunteers" 
on Ju~y 17 from a train traveling be-
tween Peipiao and Chi.nchow, within 
the boundaries of the Province of J e-
hol. A small detachment of Japanese 
infantry, with light artillery, made .an 
immediate· attempt to rescue him but 
1 failed in their purpose, and the result 
• was the occupation of a village on the 
· frontier of J ehol by Japanese troops. 
During the latter part of July and 
in August, Japanese airplanes demon-
. strated several times over this part of 
J ehol and dropped some bombs, but 
"uninhabited areas outside the villages" 
· were carefully selected. On August 
19 a Japanese staff officer was sent to 
' Nan).ing, a small town situated between 
Peipiao and the provincial boundary, to 
ne,:!otiate for the release of Mr. Ishi-
moto. On his return journey with a 
small infantry detachment he was fired 
' upon. In self-defense the fire was re-
turned, and on the arrival of another 
infantry detachment, Nanling was oc-
cupied but evacuated on the following 
1 day. 
Through the Chinese assessor extracts 
' were submitted to the Commission 
. from th~ reports of General Tang Yu-
ling, the Governor of the Province of 
Jehol. These reports claim that fight-
ing on a much larger scale took place, 
and that a Chinese battalion of railway 
guards was in action against a superior 
.number of Japanese infantry, supported 
by .two armored trains. They ~1a;m 
that the bombing referred to bv the 
Japanese was directed against Chao-
yang, one of the larger towns in thRt 
region, and that RS a result 30 casualti~ 
were caused among both military and 
civilians. The Japanese offensive was 
resumed on August 19, when an armor-
ed train attacked Nanlin2. 
· The information given by the Japa-
. nese assessor concludes by stating that, 
although the maintenance of order in 
Jehol is "a matter of internal policy 
for Manchukuo, Japan cannot be in-
different to the situation in that re~ion 
in view of the important role plaved 
by Japan in tbe maintenance of pP.ace 
and order in Manchuria and Mon-
golia, and that any disorders in Jeho, 
would immediately produce very seri-
ous repercussions throu!?hout Manchu-
ria and Mongolia." 
Tang Reports Measures 
· General Tang Yu-lin concludes bis 
report by stating that' all possible meas-
. a.res were being taken to offer eff ectivc 
resistance shoU:d the Japanese attacks 
' be· : renewed. 
·,· From these commurtications it seems 
· that an extension of the area ·of con-
flict in this region is a contingency 
which must be reckoned with. 
Although the main Chinese army was 
withdrawn within the Great Wall at 
the end of 1931, the Japanese continued 
to meet with opposition of an irregular 
kind in different parts of Manchuria. 
· There have been no further battles 
such as occurred on the Nonni River 
but fighting has been constant and wide-
ly dispersed. It has been the practice 
of the Japanese to describe indiscrimi-
nately as "bandits'' all the forces now 
opposed to them. There are, in fact, 
apart from bandits, two distinct cate-
gories of organized resistance to the 
Japanese troops or to those of "Man-
chukuo;" namely, the regular and ir-
regular Chinese troops. It is extreme-
ly difficult to estimate the number of 
these two, and, as the commission was 
not able to meet any of the Chinese gen-
erals still in the field, it is necessary 
to make reservations with regard to the 
reliability of the information given be-
low. Chinese authorities are naturally 
reluctant' to give away exact informa-
tion about such troops as are still of-
fering resistance to the Japanese in 
Manchuria. Japanese authorities, on 
the other hand, are disposed to mini-
mize the numbers and fighting value 
of the forces still opposed to them. 
The remnants of the original North-
eastern armies are to be found ex~u-
sively in the Provinces of Kirin and 
Heilungkiang. The reorganization of 
troops which took place around Chin-
chow late in 1931 was not of long dura-
tion, because all those units were sub-
sequently withdrawn inside the Great 
Wall. But the regular Chinese troops, 
which, before September, 1931, were 
stationed in the Sungari region and 
along the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
have never been seriously engaged with 
the Japanese troops and continue to 
carry on a ~erilla warfare which has 
given, and still gives, much trouble 
to the Japanese and "Manchukuo" for-
ces. The Generals Ma Chan-shan, Ting 
Chao and Li Tu have acquired great 
fame throughout China as leaders of 
these troops. All three are former bri-
gade-generals in command of railway 
guards or garrison troops in North 
Manchuria. Probably the greater part 
·of the troops under their command re-: 
rilained faithful to their respective 
leaders and the cause of China after 
the destruction of the Young Marshal's 
regime. The strength of General Ma's 
troops cannot easi~y be det.ermined, be-
cause, as will be remembered, this 
general changed his allegiance. As 
Governor of Heilungkiang Province he 
was in command of all the provincial 
troops, the number of which was given 
to us as seven brigades in all. Since 
the month of April he has definitely 
taken up a position against Japan and 
"Manchukuo." The number of troops 
at his disposal between Holan River, 
Hailun and Taheiho is estimated by 
Japanese authorities as six regiments, 
or between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Gen-
erals Ting Chao and Li Tu control six 
old brigades of Chang Hsueh-liang's 
army and have since raised in the 
country three additional brigades. Their 
total strength at the time of our pre-
liminary report was estimated by Japa-
nese authorities as about 30,000. But 
it is very probable that the troops of 
General Ma Chan-sh;in as well as those 
of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu have 
considerab~y diminished in number 
since the month of April and are now 
below the estimated figure. Both units, 
as will be seen later on, have suffered 
a great deal from concentrated attacks 
of regular Japanese troops since the 
occupation of Harbin. At present they 
seem unable to hinder any operation 
by the Japanese troops and carefully 
avoid meeting them in the open field. 
The use of airplanes by the Japanese 
and the complete absence of this wea-
pon on the other side account for the 
great.er part: of such losses as they have 
sustained. 
Irregulars Distinguished 
When considering the irregular fore~ 
it is necessary to distinguish between 
the different volunteer forces in Kirin 
Province co-operating with the annie.<: 
of Generals Chao and Li. In our preli-
minary report of April 29, 1932, we 
mentioned, on page 5, under the head-
ing "Volunteers," three different volun-
teer armies and several minor corps. 
one of the latter between Tunhua and 
Tienpaoshan remaining in touch with 
these regular troops of Generals Ting 
Chao and Li Tu. Owing to the absence 
of railways and other means of com -
munication in these districts this corps 
still keeps the same position. Its Chief, 
H 
Wang Teh-ling, united different . .. antj_-
Manch~uo" forces and kept them 
f\rmly under his command. Th~ugh 
tliis force may 1;>e of small significance 
compared with Japanese troops ,(which 
hardly exhibit any activity to the. east 
of Tunhua), it seems well able to hold 
its own against the "Manchukuo" trol.)ps 
and maintains its position in a conc:;i-
dErable part of Kirin Province. No 
,
3 \flclence is available concerning thP 
pre:::ent activity of the "Big Sword 
Society" which, while keeping in touch 
with Wang Teh-ling,, created consider-
abJe disturbance in the C!lient~~ Dh~-
trict . One the other hand, no action 
of importance has been undertaken 
against it by Japanese troops. 
,An official Japanese document has 
been submitted to the commission enu-
merating a large number of so-call~ 
route-armies and other Chinese ,unit.c;, 
each containing not more than 2.00. to 
~00 men, which form the subdjvisions 
of the volunteer armies. Their field 
of activity extends to the areas around 
Mukden and the Mukden-Antun2 Rail-
way, to Chinchow and the boundary 
between J ehol and Fengtien Provinces. 
to the western branch of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway and to the district 
betwe.en Hsinmin and Mukden. Thus 
the area covered by these volunteers 
and the anti-Kirin forces combined 
comprises the greater part of Man-
churia. 
In the middle of August, fighting 
broke out in the immediate neighbor-
hood of Mukden, at different piaces 
of the southern part of the South Man-
churia Railway, eEpecially at Haicheng 
and at Yingkow. On several occasion., 
the Japanese troops have found them-
selves in a difficult position, but 
nowhere have the volunteers succeeded 
in attaining a victory of any impor-
tance. It seems doubtful whether any 
change in the general situation in Man-
churia is to be anticipated in the n~ar 
future, but at the time of the com-
pletion of our ireport fighting con-
tinues over a wide area. 
Many Bandits Found 
As in China, banditry has alway:, 
existed in Manchuria. Increasin~ or 
diminishing in numbers in relation tn 
the activity or the weakness of the 
Government, professional bandits are t#) 
be found in all parts of the ThreP 
Provinces and their services wete often 
employed by different parties for poli-
tical purposes. The Chinese Govet'n-
ment has presented to the commissior• 
a document statin.E that durin.e: the 
last 20 or 30 years Japanese agen~ to 
a great extent instigated bandits I t<> 
serve their political interests. A pa!>-
sage from the Second Report of Pro-
gress of Manchuria in 1930, published 
by the South Manchuria Railway, is 
quote$! in this document to the effect 
that within the railway area alone the 
aumber of cases of banditry had in-
creased from 9 cases in 1906 to 368 in 
1929. According to the Chinese docu-
ment quoted above, banditry has bet>n 
encouraged by the smuggling of arms 
and munitions on a large scale from 
Dairen .and the Kwantung Leased Ter-
ritory. It is asserted, for instance, that 
the notorious bandit chief, Lin Yin-shih, 
was provided in November last with 
arms. munitions and other means in 
order to establish the so-called Inde-
pendent Self-Defence Army which was 
organized with the help of three Japa-
nese agents and destined to attack 
Chinchow. After the failure of thic; 
attempt another bandit chief got Japa-
nese help for the same purpose but 
tell into the hands of the Chinese au-
thorities with all his material of Ja,.1<1-
nese origin. 
Japanese authorities, of course, see 
the state of banditry in Manchuria in 
quite a different light. Accordin2 to 
them, it~ existence is due exclusively 
to the inefficiency of the Chinese Gov-
ernment. They allege also that Chang 
Tso-lin to a certain extent favored the 
existence of bandit gangs in his ter• 
ritory, because he thought that in time 
of need they could easily be convert• 
ed into soldiers. The Japanese au• 
thorities, while adrnitting the fact that 
the complete overthrow of Chang 
Hsueh-liang's government and army 
greatly added to the number of bandits 
in the country, claim that the presence 
of their troops in the country will en-
able them to wipe out the principal 
bandit units within from two to three 
years. They hope that the organiza 
tion of "Manchukuo" police and of 
self-defense corps in each community 
will help to put an end to banditry. 
Many of the present bandits are be-
lieved to have been peaceful citizens 
who on account of the complete loss 
of their property were induced to take 
up their present occupation. Given the 
opportunity of resuming the occupation 
of farming, it is hoped that they will 
return to their former peaceful mode 
of life. 
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,CHAPTER V :·· .,id 
Shanghai 
At the end of January :fighting broke 
out . at Shanghai. The story of that 
affair has a:ready been told in its broad 
outlines down to February' 20 by the 
Consular Committee appointed by the 
League. The fighting was still in pro-
gress when the commission arrived ., at 
Tokyo on the 29th, and · several discus-
sions took place with members of the 
Japanese Government on the , origin; 
motives and consequences of their arm-
ed intervention in this place. When 
we reached Shanghai, on March 14th, the 
fighting was over, but the negotiations 
for an armistice were proving difficult. 
The arrival of the commission at this 
moment was opportune and may I have 
helped to create a propitious · atmos-
phere. We were able to appreciate the 
tense feeling which had been created-
by the recent hos~ilities and to obtain 
an immediate and ,vivid impression. 
both of the difficulties and Qf the fssues 
involved in this controversy. The 
commission was not instructed to con- · 
tinue the work of the Consular Com-
mittee or to make a special study of 
the recent events there. In fact, we 
were informed by the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League of Nations that the 
Chinese Government had expressed 
themselves as opposed to any suggestion 
that the comm1Ssion should delay its 
journey to Manchuria for the purpose 
of studying the situation at Shanghai. 
We heard the views of both the Chi-
nese and the Japanese Governments 
on the Shanghai affair, and were the 
recipients of a large amount of litera-
ture from both sides on the subject . 
We also visited the devastated area 
and heard statements from Japanese 
naval and military officers on the re-
cent operations. In an individual capa-
city, too, we had conversations with 
the representatives of many shades of 
opinion on matters which were fresh 
in the memory of every one living in 
Shanghai. But we did not, as a com• 
7u 
mission, officially investigate the Sluing- ' 
hai affair and therefore · express . no 
opinion upon the disputed points con-1 
nected with it. We shall, however; fo'r ' 
purposes of record, complete the story· 
of the operations from February · 20· 
until the final withdrawal of the JaD3·- · 
nese troops. 
No Marked Success 
... , ~ 
The last report of the Consular Com-.· 
mittee endl:!d, it will be remembered, by . 
stating that the Japanese, on Fepruary, 
20, opened a new attack in the Kiang~ 
wan and Woosung areas. This . attack' 
brought no marked success to ·the·. Ja- ' 
panese troops, despite the fact that' 
it was continued on the following days, · 
but it enablecl them to learn that parts ' 
of the so-called Chinese Bodygu~d, 
Army, viz., the 87th and 88th Divisions, : 
were now 'fighting against them ~ .w.eU 
as the 19th Route Army. This fact,; 
together with the difficulties wliich tliei 
nature of the country presented, decid-1 
ed the Japaul:!se to re-enforce their 
troops by two more divisions, namely 
the 11th and 14th. 
On February 28 the Japanese troops 
occupied the western part of Kiang-
wan, which had been evacuated by 
the Chinese. On the same day the 
Woosung fort and fortifications along 
the Yangtze River were again bomb-
ed from the air and from the sea, 
and bombing planes operate<i over the 
whole front, including the airdrome at 
Hungjao and the Nanking Railway. 
General Shirakawa, who was appoint-
ed to the supreme command of the 
army, arrived in Shanghai on Febru-
ary 29. From this date onwards the 
Japanese Headquarters announced sub-
stantial progress. In the rlistrict of 
Kiangwan the_y advanced slowly, and 
the naval headquarters stated that the 
opposing forces at Chapei showed 
signs of giving way as a consequence 
of the daiiy bombardments. On the 
same day the air drome at Hangchow. 
which is 100 miles distant , from Sbang-
hai, was bombed from th~ air, ; 
On March 1, as the f,rontal · attack 
had advanced but slowly, the .J;apanesttl 
army commander initiated a wide en-
veloping, movement by landing, -the 
main force of the 111th -Division : at 
some distance on the right bank of 
the Yangtze River, in the vicinity of 
Tsiyakow, for the purpose Qf making 
a surprise attack on the left , flank of 
the Chinese Army. The maneuver 
was successful in compeiling an im-
mediate retreat of the Chinese forces 
beyond the 20 kilometer limit original-
ly asked for in the .Japanese command-
der's ultimatum of February 20. Woo.: 
sung fort had been evacuated by the 
Chinese troops when on March 3, it 
was entered by the Japanese troops 
after many aerial and na~al °b9JI?.bard-
ments. .On the previous day bombing 
operations had been extended as far 
as 7 kiiometerr, east of Quinsan Sta-
tion on the Shanghai-Nanking Rail-
way, with the alleged object of pre-
venting the transportation of re-en-
forcements to the Chinese .fro11t. 
Fighting Is Stopped 
On March 4 the Assem.bly of . the 
League, recalling the suggestions of 
the Council. (1) called .on both Gov-
ernments to make the cessation of hosti-
lities effective: (2) reauested other in-
terested Powers to inform th~ As-
sembly on the execution of the previous 
paragraph and .(3) recommended negoti-. 
ations, with the assistance of other 
PQwers, for the conclusion pf the ar-
rangements in order to render d.efinite 
the cessation of hostilities and to re-. 
gulate the withdrawal of the Japanes.e 
troops, wishing to be informed by the 
Powers on the development pf these 
negotiations. 
Readiness to Negotiate . 
On March 9 the Japanese seni a 
memorandum to the Chinese , through 
the intermetliary of the British 'Minis-
ter, in which their readiness to nego-
tiate on the basis of the poirlts laid 
down b • the Assembly was expressea. 
On March 10 the Chinese · replied 
through the same chanriel that they 
too were ready , to neg6tiate · ori this 
basis, but on condition that the con-
ference should be 'limited: to ·matters 
pertaining to the · definite cessation of 
hostiiities and , the . complete and tm"' 
conditional withdrawal of the _Japanese1 
troops. On March 13 the Japanese in,- , 
timated that they were not disposed : 
to regard the Chinese 'resewations . •as! 
modifying the sense of the resolutions! 
of the League of Nations or in any · 
way binding on themselves. They• 
thought that both parties should ·. meet : 
on the basis of the resolutions. . , 1 , ; 
On the afternoon of March' 3 · the ' 
Japanese Commander gave the order to; 
stop fighting. The Chinese Commar,der1 
issued a similar order on March 4.· A ' 
strong complaint was made by the Chi- '. 
nese that the 14th Japanese Division 
w&s landed at Shanghai between the 
7th and the 17th of March, ~fter the• 
cessation of hostilities, and about a ' 
month later was transported "to .Man-: 
churia in order to re-enforce the Japa-· 
nese troops there. ' 
In the meantime attempts to secure 
a cessation of hostilities th:r;ough · the 
good offices of friendly Powers and of 
the League of Nations had been con-· 
tinued. On February 28 the Br~tish 
Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, received' 
on his flagship the delegates of both' 
parties. An agreement on the basis 
of mutual and · simultaneous withdraw-
al and of a temporary character was 
proposed. The conference was not sµc-
~e~sful, . owing to the differing opinio~s 
of the two parties as to the basis ot 
the negotiations. 
On February 29 the President of the. 
Council of the Leag\le of Nations made: 
recommendations which contemplated, 
among other things, "a mixed confer-
ence in the presence of other interested• 
Powers in view of the final conclusion· 
of the fighting and for a definite ces-, 
sation of hostilities, subject to , local, 
arrangements." Both parties accepted, 
but a successful outcome of the nego-: 
tiations was rendered impossible by 
the conditions of the Japanese delegates; 
who demartded that: (1) the Chintsa 
troops should first begin to withdraw 
and (2) the Japanese, having ascer-
tained that the withdrawal was taking 
place, should then retire, not, as form-
erly stated, to the International Set~le-: 
ment and the extra-Settlement streets, 
but to an area extending from Shanghai. 
to · Woosung. 
On M~rch 24 the Sino-Japanese con-
ference, ,,on the cessation of hostilities 
Ti 
was opened. In the meantime the with-
drawal of Japanese military and naval 
forces had actually begun. On March 
2A) naval and air contingents left Shan~-
hai, . reducing the remaining strength 
to "something not far above normal." 
The Japanese Headquarters announced 
on ,March 27, on the occasion of fur-
ther withdrawal, that this had nothing 
to do with the above-mentioned confer-
ence or with the Lea,rue of Nations, 
but was simply the outcome of the in-
dependent decision of the Headquarter.i;: 
of the Imperial Japanese Army to re-
~ll units no longer required at Shan2-
hai. 
On March 30 the conference announc-
ed that on the preceding day an a~ree-
ment relative to a definite cessation t1f 
b.ostiliti€s had been reached, but fur .. 
ther difficulties supervened, and it was 
not until May 5 that a complete armi-
stice agreement was ready for siin,a-
ture. It provided for a d?fi.nite ces• 
sation of hostilities, fixed a line to the 
west of Shanghai as a temporary limit 
for the advance of Chinese troops, pen-
ding further arran2ements upon the re-
establishment of normal conditions and 
provided for the withdrawal of the 
Japanese troops to the International 
Settlement and the extra-Settlement 
streets as previous to January 28. Cer• 
tain areas outside the Settlement had 
to be temporarily included, because 
the number of Japanese troops was too 
large to be quartered within the Settle-
ment alone, but those do not require 
to be mentioned as they have since 
been evacuated. A Joint Commission, 
in whieh the assistant friendly Powers, 
the United States of America, Great 
Britain, France and Italy and the t,wo 
parties were represented, was establish-
ed to certify the mutual withdrawal. 
This corrtmission was also to collabo· 
rate in arranging for the transfer from 
the Japanese forces to the Chinese 
police. 
Qualifications Added 
The Chinefe added two qualifications 
to the agreement. The first declared 
that nothing in the agreement was to 
irtlply permanent restriction of the 
tnovement of Chinese troops in Chi• 
nese territory, and the second tl1at it 
was to be understood that even i:l 
areas temporarily provided for the sta• 
tioning of the Japanese troops all muni-
cipal function;;, including that of polic-
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ing, would remain with the Chinese 
authorities. 
The terms of this agreement as ~ 
whole have in the main since been 
carried out. The evacuated areas were 
turned over to the Chinese Special 
Police Force between May 9 and 30. 
The turning over, however, of these 
four areas has been somewhat delayed. 
It was but natural that when the Chi-
ne~e owners of houses and factories. 
officials of railways and companies, and 
others began to re-enter the evacuated 
areas, numerous complaints concerning 
looting, willful destruction and carry-
ing away of property should have been 
addressed to the Japanese military au-
thorities. In the opinion of the Chi-
ne:e, the whole question of reparations 
remains for further negotiations. They 
estimate the casualties in killed and 
wounded and missing as 24,200 officers. 
men and civilians, and the btal ma-
terial loss at approximately 1,500,000.000 
Mexican dollars. A draft agreement 
dealing with the extra-Settlement road-
areas has been initialed by represen-
tatives of the Shanghai Munich:l6l 
Council and of the Chinese Municipality 
of Greater Shanghai. But it hes no1 
yet received the approval of either the 
Municipal Council or of the city Gov...-
ernment. The Municipal Council '1as 
referred it to the Senior Consul for the 
observations of the Consular Body. 
The Shanghai affair undoubtedly ex-
ercised considerable influence upon the 
situation in Manchuria. The ease with 
which the Japanese had been able to 
occupy the greater part of Manchuria 
and the absence of any resistance by 
the Chinese troops not only led to a 
belief in Japanese naval and military 
circles that the fighting quality of the 
Chinese anny was negligible but caused 
profound depression throughout China. 
The stout resistance put up from the 
first by the Chinese 19th Route Army, 
with the assistance later of the 87tn 
and 88th Guard Divisions, was hailed 
throughout China with the greatest 
enthusiasm, and the fact that the 
original 3,000 marines had to be sup-
plemented by three divisions and a 
mixed brigade of the Japanese Army 
before the Chinese forces were finally 
dislodged and driven back after silt 
weeks of fiehting creat"'d a profound 
irttpression upon the Chinese morale. 
The feeling prevailed that China must 
he saved by lier <>wn efforts. The Sino-
Japanese .conflict w.as brought home to 
the people throughout China. Ever-y-
whe're opinion hardened and the spirit 
of" resist.ance increased. Former pessi-
mism ga place to equally exaggerated 
<0.Ptimism. In Manchuria the news 
from Shanghai put fresh heart into the 
.scattered forces still opposing the Japa-
nese troops. It encouraged t,he sub-
sequent resistance of General Ma Chan-
shan and stimulated the patriotism of 
the Chinese all over the world. The 
resistance of the Volunteer Armies in-
creased. Expeditions to suppress them 
met with indifferent success, and in 
some areas the Japanese stood on the 
defensive, taking up positions along 
certain railway lines which were frequ-
ently attacked. 
Incident in Nanking 
The hostilities at Shanghai were fol-
lowed by several other incidents, one 
of which was the short bombardment 
of Nanking. This incident created 
much excitement and alarm, even out-
side China. It happened on the late 
evening of February 1, but did not last 
for more than one hour. The incident 
was probab!y caused by a misunder-
standing, but had the important con-
sequence of a temporary removal of 
the Chinese Government from Nanking 
to Loyang. 
Chinese and Japanese versions both 
of the origin and of the facts are wide-
ly divergent. Two justifications were 
given to us from Japanese course. The 
first was that since the outbreak of 
hostilities at Shanghai the Chinese had 
extended the Lion Hill Forts, con-
structed trenches and established artil-
lery positions at the gates near the 
river and on the opposite side of it, 
thus making military preparations on 
a ~cale sufficient to arouse concern 
among the Japanese, who had warships 
stationed on the river. The second was 
that the vernacular press had spread 
untruthful stories of Chinese victories 
at Shanghai, which had caused great 
excitement among the Chinese popula-
tion of Nanking. In consequence, Chi-
nese employed by Japanese were, it is 
a:leged, forced by threats tn give up 
their situations, and Chinese merchants 
refused to sell even the necessary food 
supplies to Japanese residents, includ-
ing the Consular staff and tlie crews 
of warships. 
The Chinese did · not comment on 
these complaints. They assP.rt that 
the general uneasiness and tense at;. 
mosphere prevailing were caused by 
the fact that the Japanese, after -th 
Shanghai · outbreak. incrensE?d the 
nu.ml>er of their warships from two 
to five, · and subsequently to :seven 
(the Japa)J.~se authorities give the 
number as si~, these being thre.e _ old 
gunboats ~nd three destroyers); that 
the commander of the warships land-
ed a certain number of sailors and 
put them on guard duty before the 
wharf of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, 
where the Japanese Consuh:tr Staff 
and all the Japanese residents had 
U:ken refuge on a hulk. With the 
events of Shanghai fresh in their 
memories, such measures may well 
have fili.ed the minds of the already 
excited population at Nanking with 
fears of a similar experience. 
Landing Is Resented 
We know from a report of the Police 
Commissioner of Nanking to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs that the au-
tho:rities at Nanking who wert! solely 
responsible for the protection of their 
own subjects and of foreign nationals 
at that place greatly re~ented the land-
ing of Japanese naval force:i. They 
addressed representations to the Japa-
nese Vice-Consul, who replied 1 hat he 
w.2s unable to do anything in the? mat-
ter. At the same time, special in-
structions were given to the local police 
station at Hsiakwan, where the war-
ships were anchored and the above-
mentioned wharf was situated, to 
prevent, if possible, any contact be-
tween Chinese and Japanese in this 
area, especially at night time. Accord-
ing to the Ja:;>anese official reports, 
their refugees were taken on board a 
steamer of the same Nisshin Kisen 
Kaisha during the <lays following Jan-
uary 29, and a considerable mun 'Jer 
were transported to Shanghai. On the 
late evening of February 1 the Japa-
nese assert that three gunshots were 
sudden \v fired aprprentlty from the 
Lion Hill Fo-r ts. At the same t:me 
Chinese regulars fir€d on the Japan2se 
naval guards on the river banks, caus-
ing two c:.sualties, of which one was 
i'[9 
fatal. The fire was returned, but 
directed only at the immediate neigh-
borhood of their landing place , and 
stopped as soon as the firing from the 
shore had ceased. Such is the Japa-
•nese version. 'l'he Chinest'!, on the · 
other hand, stoutly deny that any fir-
ing at all took place, but u Upge that 
eight shells in all were fiTPd at the 
forts, at Hsiakwan station and at other 
places, accompanied by machine-gun 
and rifle ftrlng, and that during this 
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time searchlights were directed at the 
shore. This caused considerable panic 
among the inhabitants, who rushed in-
to the interior of the city; but no 
casualties were reported and the 
material damage was not greot. 
It is also possible that the incident 
was first started by the firing of 
crac.kers by the excited Chinese popu-





1. Stages in the formation of the 
"new State" 
As a result of the events of Septem-
ber 18, 1931, as described in the last 
Chapter, the civil administra~ion of 
Mukden city and of the Provmce of 
Liaoning (Fengtien) was completely 
disorganized and even that of the other 
two provinces was affected to a lesser 
extent. The suddenness of the attack 
on Mukden, which was not only the 
political center of all Manchuria but, 
next to Dairen, the most important 
commercial center of South Mant'huria. 
created a panic among the Chinese 
population. Most of the prominent of-
ficials, and the leading members of the 
educational and commercial communi-
ties, who could afford to do so, left im-
mediately with th~ir families. During 
the days following the 19th of Septem-
ber over 100,000 Chinese residents left 
Mukden by the Peiping-Mukden Rail-
way, and many who could not get 
away went into hiding. The police, 
and even the prison warders, disappear-
ed. The municipal, district and pro-
vincial administrations at Mukden com-
pletely broke down, the public utility 
companies for the supply of electric 
light, water, etc., the buses and 
tramways, and the telephone and tele-
graph services, ceased to function. 
Banks and shops kept their doors clos-
ed. 
The immediate necessity was the or-
ganization of a municipal government' 
and the restoration of the ordinary civic 
life of the city. This was undertaken 
by the Japanese and carried through 
quickly and efficiently. Colonel Dohi-
hara was installed as Mayor of Mukden 
and within three days normal civil ad-
ministration was restored. Several 
hundred police and most of the prison 
warders were brought back with the 
help of General Tsang Shih-yi, the 
Civil Governor of the Province, and 
the public utility services were restor• 
ed. An Emergency Committee with a 
majority of Japanese members helped 
Colonel Doihara, who held his post for 
one month. On October 20 the reiris 
of municipal government were restor-
ed to · a qualified Chinese body, with 
Dr. Chao Hsin-po (a lawyer who had 
studied for 11 years in Japan and was 
a Doctor of Law of Tokyo Cniversity) 
as Mayor. · 
Provincial Regime Reorganized 
The next problem was to reorganize 
the provincial administration in each 
of the Three Provinces. This task was 
more difficult in Liaoning than in ei-
ther of the other two, because Mukden 
was the center of this provincial ad-
ministration; most of the influential 
men had fled, and for a time a Chinese 
provincial administration continued to 
be carried on at Chinchow. It was 
three months, therefore, before the re-
organization was completely accom-
plished. Lieutenant General Tsang 
Shih-yi, the existing President of the 
Liaoning Provincial Government, was 
first approached on September 20 and 
invited to organize a Provincial Gov-
ernment independent of the Chinese 
Central 'Government. This he refused 
to do. He was then put under arre::.'"t 
and released on December 15. 
After General Tsang Shih-yi had re-
fused to help in the establishment of 
an independent Government, another 
influential Chinese official, Mr. Yuan 
Chin-kai, was appreached. He was a 
former provincial governor and a 
Vice-President of the Northeastern 
Political Committee. The Japanese 
military authorities invited him and 
eight other Chinese residents to form 
u "Committee for the maintenance of 
Peace and Order." This committee 
was declared to have been formed on 
September 24. The Japanese pres.c; at 
once acclaimed it as the first step in 
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a separatist movement, but Mr. Yuan 
Chin-kai publicly disclaimed any snch 
intention on October 5. The commit-
tee, he said, had "been brought into 
being to pr~ervP. peace and order 
after the breakdown of the former 
administration. It assisted, moreover, 
in re:i.ieving refugees, in restoring the 
money market, and it attended tn 
some other matters, solely for the 
isate of preventing unnecessary hard-
ship. It had, how~ver, no intention 
of organizing a Provincial Government 
or 'declaring independence " 
On Octobei- 19 the committee opened 
the Board 'of Finance, and Japanese 
advisers were appointed to assist 
the Chinese functionaries. The DirP,.~ 
tor of the Board of Finance had to 
obtain the approval of the military 
uthorities before giving effect to the 
board's decisions. In the districts the 
tax col1ectors' offices were controlled 
by the Japanese gendarmerie or other 
agencies. In some cases they had t:> 
submit their books daily for insoec-
tion to the gendarmerie, whose ao-
proval had to be obtained for the dic::-
bursement of any moneys on public 
objects such -as police, justice, educa-
tion, etc. Any case of remittance of 
taxes to the "hostile party" at Chin-
chow was to be at once reoorted to 
the .Japanese authorities. At the same 
time a Financial Readjustment Com-
mittee was organized, the chief busi-
ness of which was to reorganize the 
taxati:m sy::tem._ Japanese representa-
•tives and the representatives of Chinese 
guilds were allowed to take part in 
discussions on taxation. According to 
a statement in the Histocy of the 
Independenc'i of Manchukuo, dated 
May 30, 1932, and submitted to the 
commission hy the "Department of 
Foreign Affairs" at Changchun, these 
·discussions led to the abolition on 
November 16, 1931, of six taxes, the 
reduction of four others by half, the 
transfer of eight others to local gov-
·ernments and tbe prohibition of all 
levies, without a legal basis. 
Industry · Board Opened 
On October 21 the Board of lndustry 
was ope.nEcl by the committee, w11ose 
name was now changed to that of 
"Liaoning Province Self-Governmeni" 
Office. The consent of the Japanese 
military authorities was sought and ob-
·s2 
tained and a number of Japanese ad-
visers were appointed. Before issuing 
any orders the Director was required 
to obtain the approval of the Japa-
nese military authorities. 
Lastly, the Liaoning Self-Government 
Office organized a new Northeastern 
Communications Committee, which gra-
dually assumed control of various rail-
ways not only in Liaoning Province 
but also in Kirin and Heilungkia.ng. 
This committee was separated from the 
Liaoning Self-Government Office on 
November 1. 
On November 1 the Liaoning Pro-
vince Self-Government Office trans• 
forn'led itse:f into the Liaoning_ Prot 
vincial Go,qerrunent ad interim, which 
issued a declaration by which it severed 
'its relations with the former North.:. 
eastern Government and with the Cenl,,, 
tral Government at 'Nanking. It request• 
ed the local governments in Liaoning 
to abide by the decrees it had issued, 
and announced that henceforth it 
would exercise the authority o'f a Pro.:. 
vincial Government. On November 10 
a public opening ceremony took place 
Simultaneously with the transforma"' 
tion of the Self-Government Office in• 
to the Liacming Provincial Goernment 
ad interim, a Supreme Advisory Board 
was inaugur.ated under the Chairman-
ship of Mr. Yu Chung-han, who had. 
been Vice-Di'rector of the Peace and 
Order Maintenance Commtttee. Mr. 
Yu announcC:?d the objects of this Board 
as: the maintenance of order, the im .. 
provement of administration by the 
suppression uf bad taxes, the xeduc-
tion of taxation and the improvement 
of the organization of production and 
sale. The board was, furthermore. to 
direct and supervise the acting Provin-
cial Government and to foster the de-
velopment uf local self-11overnment in 
accord:; nce with the traditions of local 
communities and with modern needs. 
It comprised sections dealing with 
General Affairs, Investigation, Protocol, 
Guidance, Supervision and an insti-
tute for Training in Self-Government. 
Nearly all the important functionaries 
were Jap,mesc. 
On November 20 the name of the 
Province was changed to that of Feng-
tien, which had been its name befor~ 
its union with Natio11alist China in 1928, 
and on December 15 Mr. Yuan Chin-
kai was replaced by Gener.al Tsan~ 
S,h.Ui ..:yi, who was ·released from hi~ 
<ronfb:l:ement a,nd installed as, Governor 
of Fengtien Province. 
. Kirin Task Easier 
The task of establishing a Provincial 
Government in the Province of Kirin 
was far easier. On the 23rd the com-
piander of the 2nd Division, Major-
General Tamon, had an interview with 
i,ieutenant-General Hsi Hsia, the act-
ing head of the provincial administr~-
tion in the absence of General Chang 
Tso-,bsiang, and invited him to assume 
ijie, chairmanship of the Provincial Gov-
ermhent. After this interview Gen-
eral Hsi Hsia summoned the various 
government organizations and public 
associations to a meetiag on Septem-
ber 25 which was also attended by 
Japanese military officers. No opposi-
tion was expressed to the idea pf e..s:-
tablishing a new provisional govern-
ment, and a proclamation to th~t e~ect 
was published on September 30. TbP. 
Organic Law of the New Provincial 
Government of Kirin was subsequently 
announced. The committee system of 
~overnment was abolishe4, and Gov-
ernor Hsi Hsia took full responsibility 
for the conduct of government. Some 
days . later the principal officials of the 
new Government were appointed by 
him and some Japanese functionaries 
were added lat~. The chief q:f thP. 
Bureau of General Affairs was a Ja.:>a-
nese. In the dic;tricts also some ad-
ministrative reorganization and chan2e 
of personnel took nlace. 0-q.t of 43 
districts 15 w~re reorganized, which 
involved the dismissal of the Chinese 
District Officers. In 10 others the Dis-
trict Officers were retained after de-
claring their allegiance to General Hsi 
Hsia. The other$ still remained under 
Chinese military leaders loyal to the 
old regime, or kept aloof from the 
contending factions. 
· The Chief Aclministrator of the 
Special District, Lieutenant-General 
Chang Ching-hui, was friendly to the 
Japanese. He had no miiitary force 
oehind him, whereas the old rel?ime 
could still dispose of consideq1ble 
forces both in Kil'in and Heilumtkiang, 
as well as the railway guards in the 
Special DistFict itself. On Septeqiper 
?7 he summoned a conference in h~ 
office at Harbin to discuss the oraani-
zati9n . 9f .th~ Em~r~.en<:Y, CQmmi~~e 
9.f the Spe_cial District. This commit-
tee was formed with q,eneral (;h~nz 
as Chairman, and ~ieht 9ther members, 
among whom were General Waµ2 
Jui-hwa anQ Gen,eral Tin~ Chao. who 
later, in Januacy, 1932, became the 
leader of the "anti-Kirin" forces in 
opposition to General Hsi Hsia. On 
November 5 the anti-Kirin army ,mder 
the command of the generals of Chang 
Tso-hsiang, established a new Kirin 
Provincial Government at Harbin. 
After General Chang Ching-hui haq 
been appointed, on January 1, 19~2, 
Governor of Heilungkiang, he declared 
in that capacity the independence o~ 
the Province on January 7. On J anu-
ary 29 General Ting Chao took pos-, 
session of the office of the Chief Ad-
ministrator anQ placed Oeneral Chang 
under restraint in his own house. The 
latter regained his liberty when the 
Japanese forces came north and oc-
cupied Harbin on Fabruary 5 after 
ciefeating General Ting Chao. Fr?m 
tha, time onwards the JaJ?anese m-: 
fluence made itself increasingly fel~ 
in the SpeC'ial District. · 
Complications in Heilungkiang 
In Heilungkiang Province a more 
complicated situation had arisen owing 
to the conflict between General Chan~ 
Hai-peng and General ~ Chan-shan. 
which was described in the last chap-
ter. After the occupation of Tsitsihar 
by the Japanese on November 19, a 
Self-Government Association of the 
usual type was established, and this 
Association which was said to repre-
sent the ~ill of the people, invited 
General Chang Ching-h11i of the ~pe-
cial District, to act concurrent~y as 
Governor of Heilungkiang. As the 
situation around Harbin was still un-
settled and no definite agreement with 
Gener~! Ma had been reached, this in-
vitation was not accepted until early 
in January, 1932. Even then General 
Ma's attitude was ambiguous for some 
time. He co-operated with General 
Ting Chao until the latter's def.eat in 
Fehruary, ;md then came to terms with 
~he Japanese, accepting the Governor-
ship of Heilungkiang out of General 
Charig's hands, and subsequently c?-
operated with the qther Governors in. . 
the establishment of the new "State . " 
A ~elf-Gov~ep Gui<}il}g Committe~ 
was. establisheg ~t Tsitsip.ar on ,Janu-
~ry 25 and the same form of Provincial 
Government as in the other Provinces 
was · gradually established. 
The Province of Jehol has hitherto 
kept aloof from the political changes 
which have taken place in Manchuria. 
.'rehol is part of Inner Mongolia. Over 
3,000,000 Chinese settlers now live in 
the Province and they are gradually 
pushing out to the north the nomadic 
Mongob, who still live under their 
traditional tribal or Banner system. 
These Mongols, who are said to num-
ber about one million, have maintained 
some relations with the Mongol Ban-
ners settled in the west of Fengtien 
Province. The Mongols in Fengtien and 
Jehol have formed "Leagues," the most 
influential of which is the Cherim 
League. The Cherim League joined thP 
independence movement, as did also 
the Mongols in the Barga District, or 
Hulunbuir, in the west of Heilungkiang 
who have often attempted to free them-
selves from Chinese rule. The Mon-
gols do not easily assimilate with the 
Chinese. They are a proud race, and 
every Mongol remembers the exploits 
of Chenghis Khan and the conquest of 
China by Mongol warriors. They re-
sent Chinese overlordship and they 
resent particularly the immigration of 
Chinese settlers, by which they are 
being gradually extruded from their 
territory. The Leagues of Chaota and 
Chosatu in Jehol are keeping in touch 
with the Banners in Fengtien, which 
are now ruled by committees. General 
',l'ang Yu-lin, the Governor of the Pro-
vince, is reported to have assumed full 
responsibility for his Province on 
Sept~mber 29, and to have kept in 
touch with his colleagues in Manchu-
ria. At the inauguration of "Manchu-
kuo'' on March 9, J ehol was included 
in the new "State." In fact, however, 
no decisive step was taken by the 
Government uf the Province. The 
latest events in this Province were re-
f erre~ to at th~ end of the last chapter. 
'Independent State' Created 
, The local st!lf-governing administra-
tions thus established in all the Pro-
vinces were subsequently combined 
into a reparate' and independent "State." 
To · understand the ease with which 
this war accomplished and the amount 
~f evidence which it has been pos-
sible to bripg ~o;rward of Chinese sup-
port' for· it · when it ·was accomplished, 
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it is . ne~ary to • consider a peculiar 
feature of Chinese organized life which 
in some circumstances is a strength and 
in others a weakness. As has been 
already stated in Chapter I, the com-
munity obligations recognized by the 
Chinese are rather to the family, to o 
locality, or to persons, than to the 
State. Patriotism as it is understood in 
the West is only beginning to be felt. 
Guilds, associations, leagues, armies, 
are all accustomed to follow certain 
individual leaders. If, therefore, the 
support of a particular leader can be 
secured by persuasion or coercion. the 
support of his adherents over the whole 
area of his influence follows as a mat-
ter of course. The fore going narrative 
of events shoVlfl how successfully this 
Chinese characteristic was utilized in 
the organziatiou of the Provincial 
Governments, and the agency of the 
Eeme few individuals was used to com -
plete the final stage. 
The chief agency in bringing about 
independence was the Self-Govern-
ment Guiding Board, which had its 
central office in Mukden. By reliable 
witnesses it was stated to the com-
mission to have been organized and 
in large part officered by Japanese, 
although its chief was a Chinese, and 
to have functioned as an organ of the 
Fourth Department of the Kwantuil.ll 
Army Headquarters. Its main pur-
pose was to foster the independence 
n1ovement. Under the direction and 
supervision of this Central Board, 
local Self-Government Executive Com-
mittees were formed in the districts 
of Fen~ien Province. To those vari-
ous districts, as occasion demanded, 
the Central Board sent out members 
from its large and experienced staff 
of inspectors, directors and lecturers. 
many of whom were Japanese. It utili-
lized also a newspaper, which it edit-
ed and published. 
The nature of the instructions given 
by the Central Board is apparent from 
the proc~amation which it issued as 
early as January 7, under date of 
January 1. The proclamation stated 
that the North-east was faced with the 
need of developing, without delay, a 
great popular movement for the esta-
blishment of a new independent State 
in Manchuria and Mongolia. It desc-
i:ibed the development of its work in 
various districts in Fengtien Province 
and ou~lined its plan for the extension 
of its activities to the remaining dis-
tricts and even to the other Provinces. 
It then appealed to the people of the 
Northeast to overthrow Marshal Chang 
:tJsueh-liang, to join the Se:£-Govern-
ment Association, to co-operate in set-
ting up a clean administration and im-
proving the living conditions of the 
people, and it ended with the words: 
''Organizations of the Northeast, Unite 
Toward the new State Toward Inde-
pendence" Of this proclamation 50,000 
copies were distributed. 
Chief Makes Plans 
As early as January, also, the Chief 
of the Self-Government Guiding 
Board, Mr. Yu Chung-han, was already 
making plans, together with Governor 
Tsang Shih-yi, for the new "State" 
which, it w.as reported, · was to be es-
tablished on February 10. But the 
Harbin outbreak of January 29, and 
General Ma's ambiguous attitude dur-
ing ihe conflict with Ting Chao, ap-
pear to have been the m ~in reasons 
for the temi;iprary postponement of. 
further preparations at that time. 
. Later, after Ting Chao's defeat, 
negotiations between Lieutenant-Gen-
eral Chang Ching-hui .and General Ma 
had brought about, <ln February 14, a 
settlement according to which GeneTal 
Ma was to become Governor of Hei-
lungkiang. The meeting at which the 
foundation . of the new State was to be 
arranged was held on February 16 and 
l:7 at Mukden. The Governors of the 
Three; Provinces ana the Special Dis-
trict were present in person, as well 
as Dr. Chao Hsin-po, who had played 
a· prominent part in all the prepara-
tory work. 
At a meeting of these five men it 
was decided that a new State should 
be established, that a Northeastern 
Adininistrative 'Council should be or-
ganized which would exercise tempor-
arily· the supreme authority over the 
Provinces and the Special District, and, 
finally, , that this Supreme Council 
should,· without delay, make all neces-
sacy pr-eparations for the founding of 
l\eW ·"$tate." On the second day of 
the conf~rence, two Mongol Princes 
at;t~ded, one representing the . Barga-
I;?istri.ct-, (Hulu,nbuir) in western Hei-
1\mg~ng, · th~ , cOthEµ", ~ince-Chiw~ 
of the Cherin Leagues, representing 
practically all Banners, who respect 
this Prince more than any other lead-
er. 
. The Supreme Administrative Council 
was constituted the same day. Its mein .. 
hers were Lieutenant-General Chang 
Ching-hui, Chairman of the council, the 
Governors of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilung-
kiang and Jehol, and Prince Chiwang 
and Prince Ling Sheng for the Mon-
golian districts. The first decisions of 
the Council were: to adopt the republi-
can system for the new "State"; to res-
pect the autonomy of the constituting 
Provinces; to give the title of "Regent" 
to the Chief Executive and to issue a 
J)eclaration ~f Independence, to be 
signed by the Governors of the four 
Provinces and the Special District; by 
Prince Chiwang for all the Banners, 
and by Prince Kueifu for Hulnnbuir 
in Heilungkiang. The Commander-in-
Chief of the Kwantung Army gave 
that night an official dinner in honor 
of the "Heads of the new State," whom 
he congratulated on their success and 
assured of his assistance in case of 
need . 
Independence Declared 
The Declaration of Independence wall 
published on February 18. It refer-
red to the ardent wishes of the people 
to have permanent peace and to the 
duty of the Governors, who were said 
~o have been chosen by the people, 
to fulfill those wishes. The declara-
tion referred to the necessity of the es-
tablishment of a new State, · and claimed 
that the N ortheastem Administrative 
Council had been constituted for this 
purpose. Now that relations with the 
Kuomintang and the Government at 
Nanking had been severed, the people 
were promised the enjoyment of good 
government. This declaration was 
sent by circular wire to all places in 
Manchuria. Governor Ma and Gov-
ernor Hsi Hsia then returned to their 
respec~ive provincial capi~ls, but: they 
desig.nated representatives to meet 
Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor 
Chang Chiilg-hui, and Mayor Chao 
Hsin-po for the purpose of working 
out the details Qf, the plan. 
In a subsequent meeting held by this. 
group, on · February 19, it was decided 
to establish a , Repub:ic, to lay down 
~e p:i;inciple of the :;eparation of 
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powers in the Constitution, and to ask 
the former Emperor Hsuan-Tung to 
become the Chief Executive. In the 
following days it was decided that the-
capital should be Changchun; the ~ew 
era of government was to be styled 
''Tatung" (Great Harmony) and the 
design of the national flag was fixed. 
Notification of the decisions taken was 
sent, on February 25, to all provincial 
governments, including J ehol, as well 
as to the Mongol admi.nistrative offices 
of Hulunbuir and of the Cherim, Cha-
cota and Chosatu Leagues. The last-
named Leagues are established in Je-
hol. They could, therefore as already 
stated, take no steps against the wishes 
of the Chairman of the Government of 
that Province. 
' After the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the announcement of the 
plans for the new State, the Self-Gov-
ernment Guiding Board took the lead-
ing part in organizing popular mani-
festations of support. It was instru-
mental in forming societies for the 
"Acceleration of the Foundation of thP 
New State." It instructed its branche'3 
in the various districts throughout 
Fengtien, the Self-Government Execu-
tive Committees, to do everything pos-
.iihle to strengthen and hasten the in-
'dependence movement. In consequ-
ence, the new "Acceleration" societies 
sprang up rapid:iy centering around 
the Self-Government Executive Com-
mittees. . 
From February 20 onwards, these 
newly-formed "Acceleration Societies'' 
became active. Posters were prepared. 
slogans printed, books and pamphlets 
issued, a "Northeastern Civilization 
Half .. Monthly" was edited and red 
scrolls were distributed. Leaflets were 
sent by post to various prominent citi-
zens asking them to help the propa-
ganda work. At Mukden the scro)lc; 
were distributed by the Chinese Cham 
ber of Commerce, to be placed on the 
door-posts. 
Popular Approval Organized 
. During the same time the ~elf-Gov-
ernment Ex~cutive Committees in the 
districts summoned meetings of popu-
lar representatives, such as members 
of the local gentry, and the chairmen 
and prominent members of comrnf'rcial, 
agricultural, industrial and educa-
tional associations. tp. addition, mass 
meetings wet~ dt'ganized and pnrades 
Bo 
or processiO'.'lS were conducted through, 
the principal str.eets of the district 
capitals. Resolutions expressihg the 
wishes either of the people in general 
or of special groups were passed at 
conferences of prominent local men-
and at the mass meetings, in which 
it was claimed many thousancl.5 of 
persons took part. These resolutions 
were naturally sent to the Self-Gov-
ernment Guiding Board at Mukden. 
After the Acceleration Societies and 
the Self-Government Executive Com-
mittees had been active in various 
districts of Fengtien, a provincial con-• 
vention was organized at Mukden t.o 
give concrete evidence of the general 
desire of the people for the establish-
m~nt of the State. Accordingly, on 
February 28, a meeting was held in 
which about 600 persons took part, 
including all the district officers of 
the Province and the representatives 
o.f nearly all classes and organizations. 
This meeting issued a declaration 
which stated that it expressed the joy 
of the 16,000,000 inhabitants of Feng-
tien Province at the downfall of the 
old oppressive military caste and the 
dawn of a new era. As far as Feng-
tien was concerned, the movement had 
thus been brought to a conclusion. 
The movement in Kirin Province in 
favOT of a new State was also or-
ganized and dirE"Cted. While in the 
conference .at Mukden on February 16, 
Governor Hsi Hsia sent a circular 
telegram to his District Officers ask-
ing them to enligliten him as to pubJic 
opinion in regard to the policy to be 
followed by tlie new State. The Dis-
trict Officers were enjoined to give 
adequate guidance to the various guilds 
and associations in their districts. In 
dixect response to the telegram, inde-
pendence movements sprang up every-
where. On February 20, the Kirin 
Provincial Government created the. 
State Foundation Committee, which 
was to guide the vaTious organizations 
in conducting their independence cam-
paigns. On February 24, the People's 
Association at Changchun held a mass 
meeting in which about 4,000 persons . 
are reported to have taken part. They 
demanded the acceleration of the foun-
dation of the new "State." Similar 
meetil)gs were held in other di$tricts 
and a.lso in Harbin. On February 25, 
the mass meeting for the whole J>ro-
vince was held at the city of Kirin. 
About 10,000 persons were reported to 
have been present. A declaration was 
duly issued similar to that passed at 
Mukden on February 28. 
Heilungkiang Independent 
. In Heilungkiang Province, the Muk-
den Self-Government Guidance Board 
played an important part. On January 
7, after General Chang Ching-hui had 
accepted the governorship of Heilung-
~..iang, he- declared the Province to hf> 
independent. 
The board lent its assistance in con-
ducting the acceleration movement in 
Heilungkiang. Four directing officeHi, 
two of whom were Japanese, were di.._ 
patched from Mukden to Tsitsihar. Two 
days after their arrival, on February 
22, they convened a meeting in the 
r-eception hall of the Government 
House, in which a lar,ge number of as-
so~iations were :represented. It was 
a Pan-Heilungkiang conference, which 
~as to decide upon the mthods of. 
preparing for the establishment of the 
State. It was resolved to hold a mass 
demonstration on February 24 .. 
Many thousands of persons took part 
in the mass demonstration at Tsitsihar. 
which was covered with posters, scrolls, 
streamers and -penno.nts in commemora-
tion of the event. The Japanese artil-
lery fired 101 guns in honor of the 
day. Japanese plane,c:; circled overhearl, 
dropping down leaflets. A declaration 
was promptly issued which favored a 
republican form of government, with 
a responsible form of government, 
with a responsible cabinet and a presi-
dent as the head of the State. All 
powers were to be concentrated in the 
Central Government, and the provinda 1 
government.c:; were to be abolished. 
leaving districts and municipalities as 
the units of local .f!overnment. 
By the end of February, Fengtien 
Kirin, Heilungkiang and the Speci 1 
District had passed the stages of dis-
trict and provincial declarations. The 
Mongol Banners had also given thPir 
allegiance to the new State, since it 
was known that it would mRt 'k off 
special autonomous Mongol districts 
and would in other ways guarantP.e 
the rights of the Mongol inhahitant..c:;. 
The Mohammedans had already, at a 
meeting on February 15, at Muk,den.. 
pledged their allegiance. The majority 
of the .small number of una::-simila~d 
Man,chus were also in favor of thP 
new "State" es s6on as it had become 
known that their former Emperor 
would probably be offered the post o( 
Chief Executive. 
After the districts and provinces had 
given formal support to the plan ot 
a new State, the · Self-Government 
Guiding Board took the lead in con-
vening an All-Manchuria Convention. 
which was held at Mukden on· Feb-
ruary 29. There were present ·officia1 
delegates from the provinces, the dis-
tricts of Fengtien Province and the 
Mongol territories, and, in addition 
many others, including representatives 
of various groups, such as the Kore~ns 
in Kirin Province and the Speci&.l Dis-
trict, and the branches of the Y onth 
League of Manchuria and Mongolia 
altogether over 700 persons. 
Resolutions Adopted 
Speeches were delivered and a de-
claration and resolution were unanim-
ously approved, the former denouncing 
the previous regime, the latter welcom-
ing the new "State." A second resolu-
tion was also adopted designating as 
the provisional President of the new 
State the former Emperor Hsuan Tung, 
now known by his personal name as 
Mr. Henry Pu-yi. 
The Northeastern Administrative 
Council met at once in urgent session 
and elected six delegates to proceed to 
Port Arthur, to convey their invitation 
to the former Emperor at Port Arthur, 
where he had been residing since he 
left Tientsin in the previous November. 
Mr. Pu-yi at first declined it, but on 
March 4 a second delegation compris-
ing 29 delegates, obtained his consent 
to accept the post for one year only. 
Then the Administrative Council elect-
ed its chairman, Lieutenant-General 
Chang Ching-hui, and nine others, t<, 
be the reception committee. On March 
5, the committee went to Port Arthur 
and was received in audience. 1n re-
sponse to its request the former Em-
peror, on March 6, left Port Arthur for 
Tangkangtze, and after two days began, 
on the 8th, to receive homage as the 
Regent of "Manchukuo." 
The inauguration ceremonies were 
held at the new capital, Changchun, 
on March 9. Mr. Pu-yi, as Regent, 
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made a declaration in which he pro-
mised to found the policy of the new 
State upon the basis of "morality, be-
nevolence and love." On the 10th, the 
principal members of the Government 
were appointed; the members of the 
Cabinet, the Presidents of the Board 
of Legislation and the Board of Con-
trol; the President and Vice-President 
and Councillors of the Privy Council, 
the Governors of the Provinces and 
of the Special District. the Command-
ers of the Defense Forces of the Pro-
vinces and some other high officials. 
A notice regarding the establishment 
of "Manchukuo" was issued by tele-
gram on March 12 to the foreign 
Powers. The declared vurpose of this 
notice was to communicate to the for-
eign Powers the fundamental object 
of the formation of "Manchukuo"; and 
the requ_est that they recognize it as 
a new State 
Prior to the arrival of the Regent. a 
number of laws and regulations, on 
which Dr. Chao Hsin-po had been 
working for some time, had been made 
ready for adoption and promul~ation. 
They came into force on March 9. 
simultaneously with the law regulat-
ing the organization of the Gover11.-
ment, while the laws which theretQ-
fore had bP.en in effect, insofar as 
they were not in conflict with thP. 
new laws. or with the fundamental 
policy of the State. were provisionally 
adopted by gpecia l ordinance nf thP 
same date. 
All Sources Used 
This narrative of the stages by which 
the "State of Manchukuo" was created 
ha'd been compiled from all the sources 
of information available. The event.. 
were reported at length as they oc-
curred in J apa.."'lese newspapers and 
most fully perhaps in the columns -0f 
the Japanese-edited Manchuria Dailv 
News. The two documents entitled 
Histoire de l'lndependance du Man-
chuku~Ministere des Affaires Etran:. 
geres 'du Manchukuo and A General 
Out:ine of Manchukuo,-Department of 
Foreign · Affairs, Manchukuo, which 
were prepared at Changchun on May 
30 by the present administration; and 
the Memorandum on the so-called In-
dependence Movement in the Three 
~stem Provinces, prepared by the Chi-
nese assessor, have also been· carefully 
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studied'. In addition, wherever pos-
sible. neutral sources of information 
were utilized. 
The measures of civil administration 
taken by the Japanese military authori-
ties between September 18 and the es-
tablishment of the "Manchukuo Gov-
ernment," notably the control of the 
banks, the administration of the pub-
lic utility services and the manage-
ment of the railways, indicated that 
from the commencement of the opera-
tions objects more permanent than the 
requirements of a temporary military 
occupation were being pursued. Im-
mediately after the occupation of Muk-
den, on September 19, guards were 
placed in or in front of all Chinese 
banks, railway offices, the administra-
~ive offices of public utility services, the 
office of the Mining Administration and 
simii.ar premises. Investigations were 
then · conducted into the financial and 
general situation of these enterprises. 
When they were allowed to reopen, 
Japanese were appointed as advisers, 
e~perts, .or secretnries to officials, usu-
ally with administrative powers. Many 
business enterprises were owned by the 
former administration of th e Three 
Eastern Provinces, as well as by the 
provincial administrations; and as the 
previous Government was r egarded as 
are enemy Governments in time of war, 
no bank, no mining, agricultural or 
tndustrial enterprise, no railway offices, 
no public utility- in fact, no single 
source of revenue in which they had 
been interested in either their public 
or private caoacities, was left without 
s?-pervision. 
· ~way Measures Taken 
, As regards railways, the measureci: 
taken by the Japanese authorities from. 
the outset of the per iocl of military, 
Qccupation were designed to settle de-
finitely; in a manner favor.able to Jap-
anese interests, some of the questioni;-
which had Iona- been in dispute be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese rail-
ways, i;i,nd which have been described 
in Chapter III. The fo: lowing measur-
es we:r:e promptly taken: 
. ·1. All ·the Chinese-owned r.s ilways 
north of the Great Wall, and the 
moneyg standing to their credit in 
banks in Manchuria, were seized. 
,: 2. In order that the railways might 
be :co~rdinated with the:, South Man- · 
<;huria Railway, certain cban11;es were 
iµade in the arrangement of' tracks in 
~d around Mukden, by cutting the 
tracks of the Peiping-Mukden Rail-
way at the viaduct under the 8011th 
Manchuria Railway, thus closing the 
(.iaoning Central sta~ion, the Fengtien 
E;ast station, the Fengtien North Gate 
station and thus severing the connec-
~ion with the Chinese Government 
railway to Kirin Oater replaced). 
3. At Kirin a physical connectiotJ 
was made between the Hailun-Kirin 
line and the Kirin-Tunhua and Kirin-
Changchun railways. 
4. A staff of Japanese technical ad-
visers was installed in various de· 
partments of the railways. 
1 5. The "special rates" adopted by the 
Chinese authorities were abolished and 
the original tariffs restored, thus 
bringing freight rates on Chinese rail-
ways more into conformity with those 
of the South Manchuria Railways. 
During the period between Septem-
ber 18, when the Northeastern Com-
munications Committee ceased to func-
tion, and the date of the creation of 
the "Manchukuo Ministry of Com-
~uni~tions," the Japanese authorities 
assumed entire respondbility for the 
administration of the railways. 
Measures of a similar kind, which 
went beyond those which were nec•'.S-
sary for the protection of the lives nnd 
property of their nationals, were take1! 
by the Japanese in respect of the pnb-
lic electricity supplies at Mukden and 
Antung. Also, in the period between 
September 18 and the establish-
ment of "Manchukuo," the Japanese 
authorities made changes in the ad-
ministration and management of the 
Chinese Government telephone, tele-
graph and wireless services which 
would ensure their intimate co-ordina-
tion with the Japanese telephone and 
telegraph services in Manchuria. 
Conclusions Presented 
. Since September 18, 1931, the activi-
~es of the Japanese military authori-
ties, in civil as well as in military 
1:0atters, were marked by essentially 
political considerations. The proin-es-
sive military occupation of the Three 
Eastern Provinces removed in succes-
sion from the control of the Chinese 
~-µthorities the towns of Tsitsihar, 
Chincliow and Harbin, finally all the 
µnportant towns of Manchuria; and fol-
lowing each occupation the civil ad-
ministration was reorganized. It is 
dear that the Independence Movement 
which had never been heard of in Man-
churia before September, 1931, was only 
made possible by the presence of the 
Japanese troops. 
A group of Japanese civil and mili-
tary officials, both active and retired, 
who were in close touch with the new 
political movement in Japan to which 
reference was made in Chapter IV, con-
ceived, organized and carried through 
this movement, as a so:ution to the 
situation in Manchuria as it existed 
after the events of September 18. 
With this object they made use of 
the names and actions of certain Chi-
nese individuals, and took advantage 
of certain minorities among the inhabi-
tants, who bad grievances against the 
former administration. 
It is also clear that the Japanese 
General Staff realized from the start, or 
at least in a short time, the use which 
could be made of such an autonomy 
movement. In consequence they 
provided a&,Sistance and gave direc-
tion to the organizers of the move-
ment. 
The evidence received from all 
sources has satisfied the commission 
that while there were a numbei: of 
factors which contributed to the crea-
tion of "Manchukuo" the two which, 
in combination, were most effective, 
and without which, in our judgment, 
the new State could not have ~n 
formed, were the presence of Japanese 
troops and the activities of Japanese 
officials, both civil and military. 
For this reason the present regime 
cannot be considered to have been 
called into existence by a genuine and 
spontaneous independence movement . 
Part D 
The Present Govemmepi .. of 
"Ma.nchukuo" 
"Manchukuo" is governed in accor-
dance with an Organic Law and a 
Guarantee Law of Civil Rights. The 
Organic Law prescribes the funda-
mental organization of the Govern-
mental organs.. It was promul~ted by 
Qi:dinance ,No. 1 issued on March 9,. 
the ,first year .of Tatung (1932>. 
. The Rege:n't is ·head. of the State. All 
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e-xecutiv~ l)ower is vest~d in him., an.d 
he .has also the authority to ovenult' 
the Legislative Coun~l. He ls as-
~isted by a Privy Council, which is to 
advise him upon impo,rtant affairs. 
. A characteristic feature of the Or-• 
ganic Law is the separation of de-
partments: the Executive, the Le£i~-
lative, . the Judicial and the SuDervi-
sory. 
The functions of the Executive o~ 
partment are carried out, under th~ 
direction of the Regent, by the PrP-
i;nier and tl1e Ministers of State, who 
together form :\ State Council or Cabi-
et. The Premier supervises the work 
of the Ministries, and, throu,gh the 
r?owerful Board of General Affairs. ha; 
direct charge of their confidential 
matters, perconnel, accountlng aud 
supplies. Subordinate to the f;tate 
Council are various bureaus, especial-
ly the important Advisory Bureau and 
the Legislative Bureau. Executive 
f)ower is thus largeiy concentrated in 
the hands flf the Premie~ and the Re-
gent. 
· The legislative power ls vestE'r1 ln 
the Legislative Council. Its approval 
uri.ll be nece~~ry for ail laws anrl rP-
venue acts. But should it reject any 
Bill, the Regent may ask the Council 
to reconsider its decision, and if it 
should again reject it, the Re,gent, 
after consulting the Privy Council, 
sb,all decicJe the matter. At present, 
l:owever, no law has yet been ·pass~d 
for the organization of the Council, 
with the result that laws are drafted 
by the State Council and become ef-
fective after the Privy Council has 
been consulted and the approval of 
the Re~ent has been obtained. Ro 
long as the Legislative Council is i,ot 
or£'$a,ni?.Prl, the Premier's position Is 
predominant, 
The judiciary comori~es a number 
of law courts, divided into three 
grades, the Sunreme Court, Higher 
Courts and District Courts. 
Supervisory Council 
The Supervisory Council supervtses 
the conduct of officials, and aurlits 
their accounts. The members of the 
Council may not be dismis.c;ed except 
fo:I" a criminal offenc~ or disciplinarv 
punishment and may not be ~bjected 
to suspension or transfer . of pffice. ,-.r 
Mduction of salary, against their wishes. 
00 
For p~oses of local ~ove,rmnen~ 
~•Manchukuo" is divided into five Pro-
vinces and two S~cial Districts. "he 
Provinces are Fengtien, Kirin, Hei-
Iungkiang, Jehol and Hsin-An oi: Hsin-
gan. The last-named, which conb:\ins. 
the Mongol districts, is sub-divide~ 
into three areas or Sub-Provinces, so 
as to conform to the traditionr1 l Ban-
ner system and the union of Banners 
into Leagues. The Special Districts 
are the old Chinese Eastern Railway, 
or Harbin District, and the newly-
established Chientao, or Korean Di&-
ttict. By means of this administrative 
division the important minorities, Mon-
gols, Koreans ~d Russians. are to be 
guaranteed, as far as possihle, special 
administration in conformity with 
their needs. Although the commission 
made several requests to be f;hown a 
map of the area claimed to be included 
in the "State of Manchukuo," this was 
not provided, but a letter was receiv-
ed giving the boundaries of the "State" 
as follows: 
"The new State is bounded on the 
south by the Great Wall, and the Mon-
gol Leagues and Banners in the ::rune 
comprise Hulinbuir and the Le~e, 
of Cherim, Chaota and Chosatu and 
their Banners." 
At the head of the Provinces ere 
Civil Governors. But since it is de-
sired to concentrate executive power in 
the Central Government, they are to 
be given no authority over either troqp:, 
or finance. In the Provinces, as well 
as in the Central Government, the 
General Affairs Department holds a 
controlling position. It is in charge of 
confidential matters, of personnell ac-
counting, correspondence and matters 
which do not come under other de-
partments. 
Provinces are divided into districts. 
These are administered largely py dis ... 
trict Self-Government officers, wh1ch 
have- under their direction varlou'i 
governmental departments, particularly 
that of General Affairs. Municipal gov-
~ents exist at Mukden, Harbin and 
Changchun. At llarbin, however, it is 
planned to create a Greater Hiirbin 
which will include both the R-us:-ian 
and the Chinese cities. The Sp~i~l 
~ilway District is to be abg~ished. 
Part of it will be included in Greijt;er 
!Jarbi,n, i}nd the remainder stretching 
eaat and west along the Chine&.e Ea&t-. 
em Railway~ is to be added to Heilung-
kiang and Kirin Provinces. 
Units of Finance 
The "Government .of Manchuku.o" re-
gards the Provinces as administrative 
area~ and the districts and the muni-
cipalities as units of finance. It deter-
mines the amount of their taxes and 
passes upon the budget. All local re-
venues must be paid into the central 
treasury which will then supervise the 
propet disbursement. These revenues 
may not be retained, in whole or in 
part, by the local authorities, as was 
·customary under the old regime. Na-
tural:y, this system has not as yet 
been brought into satisfactory 0pera-
ion. 
In the "Government: of Manchukuo" 
Japanese officials are prominent, and 
Japanese advisers are attached to all 
important departments. Although the 
Premier and his Ministers are all Chi-
hese, the heads of the various Boards 
'Of General Affairs, which in the organ-
ization of the new State exercise the 
igreatest measure of actual power, are 
Japanese. At first they were designat-
ed ·as advisers, but more recently those 
olding the most important posts have 
been made full Government officials on 
the same basis as the Chinese. In the 
<centra11 government alone, not incl~d-
ing those in local governments or in 
the War Office and the military forces, 
or in government enterprises, nearly 
•200 Japanese are "Manchukuo'' offi-
·cials. 
Japanese control the Board of Gen-
eral Aff2irs and the Legislative and 
Advisory Bureaus, which in practice 
constitute a Premier's office, the Gen-
eral Affairs Department in the Min-
istries and in the Provincial Govern-
ments, and the Self-Government 
Directing Committees in the Dis:ricts, 
•and the police departments in the 
Provinces of Fengtien, Kirin and Hei-
lungkiang. In most bureaus, tnore-
over, there 2re Japanese advisers, coun-
cillors and secretaries. 
There are also many Japanese in the 
railway offices and in the Central 
Bank. In the Supervisory Councn 
Japanese hold the pos~s of Chief of the 
Bureau of Gener.21 Affairs, Chief of 
the Control Bureau, and Chief of the 
Auditing Board. In the Legis1ativt? 
Council the Chiel Secretaty is a Japa-
nese. Finally, some of the most im-
portant officials of the Regent ate 
Japanese, including the Chief oI the 
Office of Internal Affairs and the Com-
mander of the Regent's bodyguard. 
The aim of the Government, as ex-
pressed in the proclamation of the 
Northeastern Administrative Commit-· 
tee of February 18, and of the "Govern-
ment of Manchukuo" of March 1, is 
to rule in accordance with the fun-
damental principle of "Wang Tao." It 
is difficult to find an exact English 
equivalent for this phrase. The inter-
preters provided by the "Manchukuo" 
authodties trainslated it "love,'' but 
scholars give the meaning as the 
"kingly way," which may have many 
shades of meaning; which according to 
Chinese tradition, has been of old the 
basis of a good administration, sin-
cerely concerned with the welfare of 
the peo;,le. Traditionally, the ChinesE:· 
have used the expression "Wang Tao" 
as antithetical to "Pa Tao,' ' whi.ch lat-
ter expression as discussed by Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen in his "San Min Chu Yi' '. 
{Three Peoples' Principles), connotes 
reliance upon physical force and com -
pulsion. Sun Yat-sen explained that 
"Wang T-20," therefore, was the an-
tithesis of "Might makes right." 
Policy Continued 
The policy of the Self-Government 
Guiding Board, the chief agency in 
the creation of the new Governmenf:, 
was continued by the Advisory Bureau, 
which had superseded it. Militar1 of-
ficers were not to be allowed to in-
terfere in matters of administration. 
Regulations governing the qualifications 
for government service are to enacted, 
and appointments are to be made on 
the basis of the ability of the candi-
dates. 
Taxatioh is to be reduced and placed 
on a legal basis, and reformed in ac-
cordance with sound principles of 
economics and administration. Direct 
taxes are to be transferred to the Dis-
trict and Municipal Governments, 
while the Central Government is to 
SE>cure the income derived from in-
direct taxes. 
The documents supplied by the 
Changchun autborities ~hte th:it a 
num bPr of 'taxes have already been 
abolished, while others have been re-
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duced. Hopes are expressed that read-
justment of Government enterprises' 
and Government-owned resources wili 
increase revenue, and that the eventual 
reduction of the military forces wm' 
lessen expenditure. However, for the' 
time being, the financial position of the 
new State is unsatisfactory. Guerilla 
warfare has kept military expenditure 
high, while, at the same time, the 
Government is not receiving revenues 
from various normal sources. Expendi-
ture for the first year is now roughly 
estimated at $85,000,000, against revenue 
$65,000,000, showing a deficit of $20,-
000,000, which it is intended to cover 
by a loan from the newly established 
Central Bank, as explained hereafter. 
The Government declares its inten-
tions, as financial conditions improve, 
to spend as much as possible of its 
revenue upon education, public wel-
fare, and development of the country, 
including reclamation of waste land, 
exploitation of mineral and forestry 
resources and extension of the sys-
tem of communications. It states that 
it will welcome foreign financial as.: 
sistance in the development of the 
country and that it will adhere to the 
principles of Equal Opportunity and 
of the Open Door. 
The Government has already begun 
to reopen primary and secondary 
schoois, and it intends to train a large 
number of teachers who will thorou-
ghly understand the spirit and policies 
of the new State. A new curriculum 
i's to be adopted, new textbooks com-
piled, and all anti-foreign education 
aboiished. The new educational sys-
tem will aim to improve primary 
schools and tc stress vocational edu-
cation, the training of the primary 
school teachers, and the teaching of 
sow1d ideas as to sanitary living. The 
teaching of English and Japanese is to 
be com;,ulsory in the middle schools 
and of Japanese is to be voluntary in 
the Primary Schools. 
Justice and Police 
The "Manchukuo" authorities have 
decided that in the domain of justice, 
the interference of administrative au-
thorities should not be tolerated. The 
status of judicial officers is guaranteed 
by the law and their salaries are to be 
adequate. The qualifications for judi-
cial positions will be raised. Extrater-
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ritorial r ights, for the time being, will 
be respected, but the Government in~ 
tends to start negotiations with for..) 
eign Powers for their abolition as soon 
as adequate reforms in the present sys-
tem shall have been effected. The police 
are to be properly selected, trained and 
paid, and completely separated from the 
army, which is not to be allowed to 
usurp police functions. 
Reorganization of the army is plan-
ned, but since at present it consists 
largely of the old Manchurian soldiery, 
caution is felt to be necessary in orde? 
to avoid increasing discontent and 
mutiny. 
The Central Bank of "Manchukuo" 
was established on June 14, and of-
ficially opened its doors for business 
on July 1. The bank has its head 
offices in Changchun, the capital o-f 
"Manchukuo" and branches and sub-
branches to the number of 170 in most 
of the cities of Manchuria. 
The bank was organized as a Joint 
Stock Company with a charter to · run 
for 30 years. Its first officers were 
Chinese and Japanese bankers and fi-
nanciers. It was empowered to "re-
gulate the circulation of the domestic 
currency, maintain its stability and 
control the financing service." The capi~ 
tal of the bank was authorized at $30,-
000,000 (silver) and permission was 
given it to issue notes against a specie 
reserve of at least 30 per cent. 
The old provincial banks, including 
the Frontier Bank, were amalgamated 
with the new Central Bank and their 
,entire businesses, including affiliated 
enterprises, were turned over to it. 
Provision was further made for liqui-
dating the non-Manchurian branches of 
the old provincial banks. 
In addition to what it will be able 
to salvage from the old banks, the Cen-
tral Bank has a Japanese loan reported 
at ¥20,000,000 and a subscription to its 
capital of $7,500,000 (silver) from the 
"Manchukuo" government on which to 
· establish itself. The bank has planned 
to unify all the Manchurian currencies 
by redeeming them for new notes at 
rates which have been officially pres-
cribed as from July 1, 1932. These 
notes are based on the silver dollar 
and are to be covered to the extent of 
at least 30 per cent by silver, gold, 
foreign currency or deposits. Whether 
or not the new currency is to be con-
vertible on demand and without limit 
.into hard money is not made clear in 
official pronouncements. The old notes 
will be permitted to circulate for two 
years from the passage of the Conver-
sion Act but will not be valid after 
that time. 
Not Yet in Circulation 
The order for the new Central Bank 
notes has been placed with the Japa-
nese Government but thus far neither 
the notes nor the new hard money are 
in circulation. The present currencies 
of Manchuria remain what they w~re 
prior to September 18, 1931, with the 
exception that the notes are being sur-
charged with the signature of Mr. 
Yung-hou, (the presidemt of the new 
Central Bank) as they . pass through 
the various banks. 
It is not clear how the new "Man-
chukuo" bank can hope to accomplish 
its ambitious program of unifying and 
siabilizing all Manchurian currencies 
with the limited amount of capital at 
its disposal. The resources inherited 
from the old provincial banking in-
stitutions with the addition of a loan 
from Japanese banks and a subscrip-
tion to its capital from the "Manchu-
kuo" Government seem entirely in-
adequate for the purpose. Moreover·, 
it is not clear on what basis the fi-
nancial relations between the bank 
and the "Manchukuo Government" 
will be established. According to the 
preliminary "Manchukuo" budget sup-
plied to the commission by the Fi-
n&nce Minister, "Manchukuo" expects 
to face a deficit of over 20,000,000 Yuan 
(*) during its first year of existence. 
According to the Minister, this was 
to be covered by a loan from the 
( •) This and the following items in the 
budget were given as Yen in an interview 
by the "Manchukuo" Finance Minister 
with a Commissioner but in the English 
translation of A General Outline of Man-
chukuo presented by the "Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Manchukuo," they are 
given in terms of Yuan. The commis-
sion therefore takes the liberty of using 
Yuan rather than Yen in its reference to 
this and the following budgetary items. 
The fact that the Chinese symbol for 
Yuan is the same as the one which the 
Japanese employ for the Yen has been a 
constant source of difficulty in dealing 
with the English and French translations 
supplied the commission by both the Chi-
nese and Japanes~. 
Centl·al Bank (not then in existence>. 
A government which subscribes 7,500.-
000 Yuan to its bank and then bor-
rows over 20,000,000 Yuan from it to 
baiance its 1::udget is not establishing 
either its central bank or its budget 
on a sound financial basis. 
Unless the Q_entral Bank can obtain 
rr.ore actual hard money than it now 
nppears to possess, it can hardly hope 
to unify and stabilize all :Manchuriaj1 
currencies on a convertible silver 
dollar basis. Even if it were to suc-
c:eed in creating a currency which was 
uniform though not convertible it 
would possibly have accomplished 
something, but even a uniform cur-
rency, the stability of which is not 
guaranteed by· conversion, falls short 
of the requirements of a sound mone"." 
tary system. • 
Systems Linked 
In regard _to various public utilities, 
as well as m regard to the railways, 
arrangements have been made which 
have tended to link up the Chinese an<J 
Japanese system. Before the outbreak 
at Mukden the Japanese were anxious 
to bring this about, but the Chinese 
consistently refused to give their con;,_ 
sent. Between September 18 however 
and the formation of "M~nchukuo,'; 
steps were at once taken to realize the 
wishes of the Japanese, as already men-
tioned in the first section of this chap-
·ter. Since the formation of the "new 
State" the policy of the "Manchukuo 
Ministry of Communication" seems to 
be to enter into agreements with the 
South Manchuria Railway Company for 
. the exploitation of at least some of the 
main railway lines under its authority. 
The Chinese telephone, telegraph and 
radio systems in Manchuria, being en-
tirely Government-owned, had their 
own executives, and, in addition were 
subject to a unified control by the 
Northeastern Telephone; Telegraph and 
Radio Administration. Since September 
· 18, all three of these sytems have been 
brought into closer co-operation with 
existing Japanese systems throughout 
Manchuria. Moreover, arrangements 
have been made between the Japa-
. nese and the Northeastern Telegraph 
Administration for through telegrams 
from or to any place in Manchuria and 
to or from any place in Kwan tung 
• Leased Territory, Japan, Korea, For-
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mosa and the South Sea Islands. Be-
tween the principal centers in North 
Manchuria and the Japanese postoffices 
at Dairen, Mukden and Changchun, 
tlitect circuit lines have been construct-
.~d to ensure the quick transmission 
of messages. 
, Jl;\Panese "kana" messages have been 
given especially low rates. To learn 
to handle Japanese "kana" syllables, 
spE>cial training is being given to the 
Chinese staff, and it is planned to have 
Japanese clerks gradually join the 
Chinese telegraph workers at the chief 
centers. Thus, every facility has been 
given to favor telegraphic intercourse 
between Manchuria and the whole Ja-
panese Empire. Naturally, the com-
mercial connections between the coun-
tries are thereby greatly strengthened. 
After the events of September 18-19, 
,the Japanese authorities issued orders 
to the offices and banks in which the 
revenue of the Salt Gabelle was re-
ta1ned that no payment from these 
funds was to be made without their 
consent. 
Supervision over the Salt Gabelle was 
insisted upon on the ground that the 
greater part of the revenue from this 
source, though nominally national, had 
in fact been retained by Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang's government. Income from 
this source, in 1930, had amounted to . 
about $25,000,000, silver, of which $24,-
000,000 had been retained in Man-
churia. Only $1,000,000 had been re-
mitted to the Inspectorate-General of 
the Salt Gabelle in Shanghai. 
Chang Agreed to Pay 
After Marshal Chang Hsueh-liar.g had 
joined the National Government in De-
cemoer, 1928, he agreed to pay the 
monthly quota of $86,600 silver which 
had been fixed as the amount due from 
Manchuria t:>ward the loans secured on 
the Salt Gabelle. Somewhat later, in 
April, 1930, a revised table was an-
nounced in which the Manchurian 
mon~hly quota was raised to $217,800. 
Because of local pressure upon th<? 
Manchurian finances, however, Marshal 
requested a postponement of the new 
a~signment. At the time of the MukdE'r. 
Incident, h i:, arrears amounted to $576.-
200. The first TE:mi:tance at the new 
·rate of $217,800 was actually made on 
September 29, 1931, by consent of the 
Japanese army officers. Since then, ' 
;M 
to March, 1932, inclusive, tne newly:. 
established authorities in Manchuria 
have ren1itted to the Central Gl>vernr-
ment not only these monthly · quota$ 
but also the quota arrears leff llnpaid 
by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.- The 
surplus from the salt revenue, how-
ever. they regairded as Manchurian. 
and not National income, and there-
fore considered that they were justified 
in retaining it for local purp:>ses. 
After th-e Mukden Committee for the 
Maintenance of Peace and Order had 
been transformed into the Provincial 
Government ad interim, it ordered the 
District Salt Inspectorate at fiew.'.. 
c.hwang to transfeT all its funds to the 
Provincial Bank for disbursement by 
the Board of Finance. According t9 
Chinese official reports the Bank of 
China at N ewchwang was, likewise, on 
October 30, forced to give Ui> the salt 
funds on deposit, amounting to $672, -
709.56 silver without authority from 
the original depositors. A receipt was 
given in the name of the Liaoning 
Finance Board, which was si ctned only 
by the Japanese adviser to that •Board. 
The new Kirin Provincial Govern-
ment took similar steps with regard to 
the Salt Transportation Office of Kirin 
and Heilungkiang. According to Chi-
nese official report it demanded the 
transfer of the salt revenue to its 
provincial treasury. When the Chief 
of the office refused, he was detained 
for some days and replaced by a 
nominee of Governor Hsi Hsia, who, on 
October 22, forcibly took possession of 
the office, while the Auditorate Office 
was closed under Governor Hsi" Hsia's 
orders. In this case, too, the salt funds 
de~osited in the Bank of China antl 
the Bank of Communications were 
claimed by the new Kirin authorities, 
and on November 6, were transferred 
to the Provincial Bank. Since then 
salt funds 'have from time to time been 
withdrawn and expended by the local 
authorities, while the monthly quotas 
have been sent r egularly to ~han1h-'.3 i. 
From October 30, 1931, to August .25, 
1932, for which period Chinese offi::ial 
.figures are available, rnlt revenu.e 
amounting to .$14,000,000, silver, was 
retained in Manchuria. 
Properties· Taken Over 
--The Salt Administration thr~ughout 
Manchuria continued to function, al-
though under the restrictions described 
and under supervision until March 28, 
when the Minister of Finance of the 
"Manchukuo Government" ordered that 
the deposits, accounts, documents and 
other properties belonging to the In-
spectorate shou1d be handed over on 
the following day to the Salt Comptrol-
ler of "Manchukuo" and that the col-
lection of Salt revenue, which was ori-
ginally undertaken by the Bank of the 
Tmee Eastern Provinces. He stated that 
those officials who wished to continue 
their service in the Salt Gabelle Ad-
ministration of the "Manchukuo'' should 
report their names to the Salt Comp-
troller's office and promised that their 
applications would receive serious con-
sideration provided they first renounc-
ed allegiance to the Government of the 
Republic of China. 
On April 15, the District Inspectorate 
at Newchwang was dissolved by force. 
The Director and Deputy-Director were 
put out of office. The premises were 
occupied and safes and documents and 
seals were seized. The remaining offi-
cials were requested to continue their 
service, but they are all reported to 
have refused. A number of those who 
had been in the Salt Administration 
followed the Director to Tientsin and 
waited for further instructions from 
Shanghai. The work of the former 
Salt Inspectorate in the Three Eastern 
Provinces was thus completely taken 
over ·by the new Comptroller's Office 
of· "Manchukuo." The new "Govern-
ment," however, has stated that it is 
prepared to continue to pay its equit-
able proportion of the sums required 
for the service of the foreign loans 
secured on the salt revenue. 
Since the customs funds collected in 
Manchuria ha-1 always been remitted 
to the Central Government, the Japa-
nese miatary authorities did not in-
terfere with the customs administra-
tion nor with the remittance of funds 
to Shanghai. Interference with this 
revenue was first made by the "Man-
c1mkuo Government" on the ground 
that their "State" was independent. 
One of the first acts of the North-
eastern Administrative · Committee, 
which was established on February 17 
as the Provincial "Goverpment of· 
Manchukuo," was to instruct the Sup-
erintendents of Customs at the Man-
churian treaty ports that although the' 
customs reven-ie belonged of right to 
"Manchukuo" and would, in the· 
future, be under the control of the 
committee, for the time being the 
Superintendents and Commissioners of 
Customs should carry on their duties 
as usual. They were informed that 
a Japanese Customs Adviser had been 
aroointed at each Manchurian port 
for the purpose of supervising the 
general Customs administration. ·The 
ports concerned were Lungchingtsu:n, 
Antung, Newchwang and Harbin, to-
gether with some sub-stations, at 
which the revenue collected in 1931 
amounted respectively to HK. Tls. 
574,000, 3,682,000, 3,792,000 and 5,272,000. 
The port of Aigun, which is still out-
side the i;;phere of control of the 
"Manchukuo Government," is function-
ing under the Chinese Customs Serv-: 
ice. The port of Dairen, in the Kwan.: 
tung Leased Territory, has a distinct 
status." The fact that the customs re-
venue coli:eoted in the Mancliurlian 
ports, including Dairen, amounted in 
1930 to 14.7 per cent and in 1931 to 
13-5 per cent of the total for all Chin~. 
shows the importance of Manchuria in. 
the Chinese Customs Administration. · 
Antung Procedure Described 
The procedure by which the "Man-
chukuo" authl)rities took over the en-
tire customs administration in Man-
churia, is well illustrated by the ac-· 
tion taken at Ar,tung, which has been 
described as follows by the Inspecto-
rate-General of Customs: 
A Japanese Customs Adviser was 
appointed to the Antung Customs Of-
fice in March, but he took no active 
steps until the middle of June, when' 
he sent definite orders from the "Man-
chukuo" Ministry of Finance to the 
Bank of China that customs funds were 
no longer to be remitted to Shanghai. 
On June 16, four armed "Manchukuo" 
police, accompanied by the Assistant 
Superintendent of Police, a Japanese, 
visited the Bank of China and inform-
ed the manager that they had come 
to guard the revenue: On June 19 the 
Bank of China handed over to the 
Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces• 
Tls. 783,000 and informed the commis-
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sioner that this action was taken as a 
result of force majeure. 
On June 26 and 27 a Japanese Adviser 
of the "Manchukuo Government" de-
manded that the Customs House at 
Ant ... ng should be handed over to him. 
The commissioner refused, but "Man-
chukuo" police, all Japanese subjects 
fwced the commissioner to leave the 
Customs House. The commissioner, 
however, still attempted to carry on 
the customs work in his home, since 
80 per cent of the Antung customs 
revenue is collected in the railway 
area, hoping that the Japanese authori-
ties would not permit interference 
withi1;1 this area. But the "Manchu-
kuo" police entered the Japanese rail-
way area, arrested a number of the 
customs staff, intimidated the others 
and forced the commissioner to suspend 
the Chinese Customs Service. 
Until June 7, the Dairen Customs re-
venue was remitted to Shanghai at in-
tervals of three or four days, but. 
under date of June 9, the "Manchukuo 
Government" gave notice that these 
i::emittances should no longer be made. 
When no further funds reached Shang-
hai, the Inspector-General of Customs 
took up the matter by telegraph with 
the Japan commisEioner at Dairen. As 
a result the commissioner refused to 
send on the customs receipts 011 the 
ground that the Chief of the Foreign 
Section of the Government of the Japa-
nese Leased Territory had advised him 
that the remittance of the customs 
revenue might severely affect JapaneSt' 
interests. The Inspector-General. 
therefore, on June 24, dismissed th<> 
Dairen commissioner for insubordi-
nation. 
Named Manchukuo Officials 
The "Manchukuo Government" on 
June 27, appointed the diEmissed com-
missioner and the members of h~s staff 
as "Manchukuo'' officials, to serve in 
their former positions. It had threa-· 
tened to establish a new Custom House 
at Wafangtien, on the frontier of th~ 
Leased Territory, if the Japanese au-
thorities should prevent them from 
taking charge of the Dairen customs. 
The Japanese authorities of the Leased 
Territory did not oppose the paEsing 
of the customs administration into thP 
hands of the .newly-appointed "Man-
chukuo" officials. They maintained 
that the problem did not co1;1cem Japan, 
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but was an issue solely between "Man-
chukuo" on the one hand the Gov-
ernment of China and its Dairen com· 
mis:ioner on the other. 
The "Manchu~uo GQ_vernment" main-
tains that, since "Manchukuo'' is an 
independent state, it exercises the 
right of complete jurisdiction over the 
Customs Administration of its territory. 
Bu,t it has slated that, in view of the 
fact that various foreign loans and in-
demnities were based upon the Chinese 
customs revenue, it is prepared to pay 
its equitable proportion of the annual 
sums necessary to meet these obliga-
tions. It hopes that after . depositing 
this amount in the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, there will be a customs surplus 
for 1932-1933 available for local use of 
about $19,000,000 silver. 
The Japanese military authorities in 
Manchuria after September 18 did not 
greatly interfere with the Postoffice, 
apart from exercising a certain censor-
ship of newspapers and letters. After 
the establishment of "Manchukuo" the 
"Government" desired to take over the 
postal services of the territory, and ap-
pointed, on April 14, special officers 
to take charge of the transfer of the 
postal administration. On April 24, it 
applied for permission to join the In-
ternational Post Union for which they 
have not yet qualified. 
As the Pos4rl Commissioners refused 
to surrender their offices, the status 
quo was for some time respected, al-
though "Manchukuo" supervisors were 
placed in certain offices with a view to 
exercising a measure of control. · The 
"Manchukuo Government," however, 
finally decided to issue its own stamps 
and to discontinue the use of the Chi-
nese stamps. By ordinance of the Min-
istry of Communications of July 9, it 
informed the nublic that the new 
stamps and cards would be offered for 
sale on August 1. At this stage the 
Chinese Government ordered ·i.he Postal 
Commissioners to close the offices in 
Manchuria and to give the staff the 
choice of receiving three months' pay 
or of returning to designated bases in· 
China for service at other places. The 
"Manchukuo" authorities in turn offer-
ed to take into their service all the 
postal employes who wished to remain 
and promised to guarantee their nnan-
cial and other rights acquired under 
the Chinese Administration. On July · 
26 the "Manchukuo Gov rnment" took 
over completely the postal service 
throughout Manchuria. 
Private Property 
The "Manchukuo Government" has 
stated that it will respect private pro-
perty and all concessions awarded by 
either the Central Government of 
Manchuria provided the concessions 
were legally granted in accordance with 
the laws and regulations previously in 
force. It has also promised to pay the 
lawful debts and obligations of the 
former administration and has appoint-
ed a commission to pass upon claims of 
indebtedness. In regard to the pro-
perties belonging to Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang and some of the other 
prominent leaders of the former re-
gime, it · yet too early to state what 
action will be taken. According to Chi-
nese official reports, all the personal 
property of Marshal Chang Hsueh-
liang, General Wan Fu-lin, General 
Pao Yu-lin and certain others has been 
confiscated. The "Manchukuo" au-
thorities, however, take the view that 
since the former Government officials 
used their power to amass wealth for 
themselves; they are not yet prepared 
to recognize property thus acquired 
as properly "private property." A care-
ful investigation is being made of the 
possessions of the former officials. This 
is reported to have been finished as far 
as bank deposits are concerned. 
Having thus described the organiza-
tion of the "Manchukuo Government," 
its program and some of the measures 
it has taken lo affirm its independence 
from China, we must state our con-
clusions regarding its operations and 
its principal characteristics. · 
The progr.s m of this "Government" 
contains a number of liberal reforms, 
the application of whicH would be 
desirable not only in Manchuria but 
in the rest of China; in fact, many of 
these reforms figure equally in the 
program of the Chinese Government. 
In their interviews with the commis-
sion the representatives of this "Gov-
ernment" claimed that with the lielp 
of the Japanese they would be able 
to establish peace and order within a 
reasonable time, and would thereafter 
be able to maintain it permanently. 
They expressed the belief that they 
would be able to secure the support 
of the people in time by assuring them 
an honest and efficient administration. 
security from bandit raids lower taxa-
tion as the result of reduced milit:::ry 
expenditure, currency reform, im-
proved communications and popular 
political representation. 
But after making every allowance for 
the short time which has hitherto been 
at the disposal of the "Manchukuo 
Government"for carrying out its policy 
and after paying due regard to the 
steps already taken, there is no indi-
cation that this "Government'-' will m 
fact be able to carry out many of its 
reforms. To mention but one example, 
there seem to be serious obstacles in 
the way of the realization of their 
budgetary .anq currency reforms. A 
thorough program of reforms, orderly 
conditions and economic prosperity 
could not be realized in the conditions 
of insecurity and disturbance which 
existed in 1932. 
Titular Heads Chinese 
As regards the "Government" and the 
public services, although the titular 
heads of the Departme11ts are ChinesP 
residents in Manchuria, the main poli-
tical and administrative power rest · 
in the hands of Japanese officials and 
advisers. The political and administra-
tive organization of the "Government" 
is such as to give to these officials 
and advisers opportunities not merely 
of giving technical advice but of ac-
tual],y controlling and directing the 
administration. They are' doubtless not 
under the orders of the Tokyo Gov-
ernment, and their policy has not al-
ways coincided with the official policy 
either of the Japanese Government or 
of the Headquarters of the Kwan-
tung Army. But in the case of all 
important problems these officials and 
advisers, some of whom were able to 
act more or less independently in the 
first days of the new organization, have 
been constrained more and more to fol-
low the direction of Japanese official 
authority. This authority, in fact, by 
reason of the occupation of the coun-
try by its troops, by the dependence 
,of the "Manchukuo Government" in 
those troops for the maintenance of its 
authority both internally and external -
ly, in con.c;equence, too, of the more 
and more important role entrusted to 
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the South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany in the management of the rail-
ways under the jurif diction of the 
"Manchukuo Government," and finall'\' 
by the presence of its consuls, as liai-
son agents, in the most important ur-
ban centers, posserses in every con-
tingency the means of exercising an 
irresistible pressure. The liaison be-
tween the "Manchukuo Government" 
and Japanese official authority is still 
further emphasized by the recent ap-
pointment of a special ambassador, not 
officially accredited, but resident in the 
capital of Manchuria, exercising in his 
capacity -of Governor-General of the 
Kwantung Leased Territory a control 
over the South Manchuria Railway 
Company and concentrating in tht. 
same office the authority of a diploma-
tic representative, the head of the-
collfular ~rvice and comm.ander-in-
chief of the Army of Occupation. 
The relations between "Manchukuo" 
and Japan have hitherto been some-
what difficult to define, but the latest; 
information in the possession of the 
commission indicates that it is the in-
tention of the Japanese Government 
to define them before long. A letter 
dated August 27, 1932, addressed to 
the commission by the Japanese as-
sessor, states that the Special Ambas-
sador, General Muto, "left Tokyo on 
August 20 fot Manchuria. On arrival 
he will commence negotiations for the 
conclusion of a fundamental treaty 
concerning the establishment of friend-
ly relations between Japan and Man-
churia. The Government of Japan re-
gards the conclusion of this treaty as 
a formal recognition of Manchukuo." 
Part m 
The Opinions of 'Ihe Inhabitants of 
Manchuria 
It was one of the objects of the 
commission to ascertain the attitude 
of the inhabitants of Manchuria to-
ward the new "State." Owing to the 
circumstances in which the inquiry 
had to be made, however, the obtain-
lng of evidence presented some dif-
ficu~ty. The danger, real or supposed, 
to the commission from bandits, Ko-
re&n Communists or supporters of the 
new "Government" who might be 
angered by the presence of the Chi-
nese assessor on ~ccount of his criti-
cism _o.f that regime, provided a rea-
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son for exceptional measures of pro-
tection. There were no doubt occa-
sional real dangers in the unsettled 
conditions of the country, and we are 
grateful for the efficient protection 
with which we were provided through-
out our tour. But the effect of 
the police measures adopted was to 
keep away witnesses; and many Chi-• 
nese were frankly afraid of even 
meeting members of our staff. We 
were informed at one place that be-
fore our arrival it had been announced 
that no one would be allowed to see 
the commission without official per-
mission. Interviews were therefore 
usually arranged with considerable 
difficui. ty and in secrecy, and many 
informed us that it was too dangerous 
for them to meet us even in this way. 
In spite of these difficulties we were 
able to arrange private interviews with 
businessmen, bankers, teachers, doctors, 
police, tradesmen and others, in addition 
to our public interviews with "Man-
chukuo" officials, Japanese consuls and 
military officers. We also received over 
1,500 written communications, some de-
livered by hand, the majority sent by 
post to different addresses. The in-
formation so received was checked as 
far as possible from neutral sources. 
Many delegations representing pub-
lic bodies and associations were receiv-
ed and usually presented to us writ-
ten statements. Most of the delega-
tions were introduced by the Japanese 
or "Manchukuo'' authorities and we 
had strong grounds for believing that 
the statements left with us had pre-
viously obtained Japanese approval 
In fact, in some cases persons who 
had presented them informed us after-
wards that they had been written or 
substantially revised by the Japanese, 
and were not to be taken as the ex-
pression of their real feelings. These 
documents were remarkable for the 
studied neglect to comment either 
favorably or otherwise upon Japanese 
participation in the estab:ishment or 
maintenance of the "Manchukuo" ad-
ministration. In the main these state-
ments were concerned with the relation 
of grievances against the former Chi-
nese administration, and contained ex-
pressions of hope and confidence in the 
future of the new "State." 
- Letters Relate Feelings 
The letters received came from far-
mers, small tradesmen, town workers 
and students, and related the feelings 
and experiences of the writers. After 
the return of the commission to Pei-
ping in June this mass of correspon-
dence was translated, analysed and ar-
ranged by an expert staff specially 
selected for the purpose. All these 
1:ssc leters, except two, were bitterly 
hostile to the new "Manchukuo Gov-
ernment" and to the Japanese. They 
appeared to be sincere and spontane-
ous expressio~ of opinion. 
The higher Chinese officials of the: 
"Manchukuo Government" are in of-
fice for various reasons. Many of them 
were previously in the former regime 
and have been retained either by in-
ducements or by intimidation of one 
kind or another. Some of them con-
veyed messages to the commission to 
the effect that they had been forced 
to remain in office under duress, that 
all power was in Japanese hands, that 
they were loyal to China, and that 
what they had said at their interviews 
with the . commission in the presence 
of the Japanese was not necessarily to 
be· believed. Some officials have re-
mained in office to prevent their pro-
perty from being confiscated, as has 
happened in the case of some of those 
who have fled into China. Others, men 
of good repute, joined in the hope that 
they would have the power to im-
prove the administration, and under 
promise of the 1Japanese th.at they 
would have a free hand. Some Man• 
chus joined in the hope of getting bene-
fits for persons of Manchu race. Some 
of these have been disappointed and 
complained that no real authority was 
_conceded to them. Lastly, a few men 
are in office because they had personal 
grievances against the former regime 
er for reasons of profit. 
The minor and local officials have in 
the main retained their offices under 
the new regime, partly because of the 
necessity of earning a living and sup-
porting their families, and partly be-
cause they feel that if they go, worse 
men might be put in their place. Most 
of the local magistrates have also re-
mained in office, partly from a sense 
of duty to the people under their 
charge and partly under pressure. 
While it . was often difficult .to_ .fill the 
higher posts with reputable Chinese, 
it was an easy matter to get Chinese 
for service in minor posts and local 
offices, though the loyalty of the ser-
vice rendered in such circumstances i.s 
at least questionable. 
Partly New Recruits 
The "Manchukuo'·' police are partly 
composed of members of the former 
Chinese police, partly of new recruits. 
In the larger towns there are actually 
Japanese officers in the police, and in 
many other places there are Japanese 
advisers. Some individual member of 
the police spoke to us expressed their 
dislike of the new regime, but said 
they must continue to serve to make 
a living. 
The "Manchukuo ATmy" also con·-
sists in the main of the former Man-
churian soldiers reorganized under 
Japanese supervision. Such troops were 
at first content to take service under 
the new regime provided they were 
merely required to maintain local 
order. But since they have on oc-
casions been called upon to engage in 
serious warfare against Chinese forces 
and to fight under Japanese orders 
side by side with Japanese troops, the 
"Manchukuo A.nfiy" has become . in-
creasingly unreliable. Japanese sources 
report the frequent defection of 
"Manchukuo" forces to the Chinese 
side, while the Chinese claim that one 
of their most reliable and fruitful 
sources of warlike supplies is the 
"Manchukuo Army." 
The Chinese business men and 
ba~kers who were interviewed by us 
were hostile to "Manchukuo." They 
disliked the Japanese; they feared fo-r 
their lives and property, and frequent-
ly remarked: "We do not want to be-
come like the Koreans." After Septem-
ber 18, there was a large exodus of 
businessmen to China, but some of the 
less rich ones are now returning. Gen-
erally speaking, the smaller shopkeep-
ers expect to suffer less from Japanese 
competition than do the larger mer-
chants and manufacturers, who ofter.. 
had profitable relations with the former 
officials. Many shops were still closed 
at the time of our visit. The increase 
in banditry adversely affected business 
in the countryside, and the machinery 
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of credit has largely broken down. The 
announced Japanese intention to ex-
ploit Manchuria economically, and the 
numerous visits of Japanese economic 
missions to Manchuria in the last fev. 
months have caused apprehension 
among Chinese businessmen, in spite 
of the fact that many of these mis-
sions are :reported to have returned to 
Japan disappointed. 
The professional claEses, teachers and 
doctors, are hostile to "Manchukuo." 
They allege that they are spied upon 
and intimidated. The interference with 
· education, the closing of Universiti~ 
and some schools and the alteratiom. 
in the Echool textbooks have added to 
their hostility, already great on patrio-
tic grounds. The censorship of tht 
press, post and opinion is resented, as 
is also the prohibition of the entry 
into "Manchukuo" of newEpapers pub• 
lished in China. There are, of course. 
Chinese who have been educated in 
Japan who are not included in this 
generalization. Many letters were re-
ceived from students and young peo-
ple directed against "Manchukuo." 
Farmers' Attitude Divergent 
Evidence regarding the attitude of 
farmers and town workers is divergent 
and naturally difficult to obtain. Opin-
ion among foreign~s and educated 
Chinese was to the effect that they were 
either hostile or indifferent to "Man-
chukuo." The farmer and worker is 
politically uneducated, usually illite-
rate, and normally takes little interest 
in · the Government. The following 
reasons were advanced by witnesses 
for the agricultur~l population being 
hbstile to "Manchukuo,', and were con-
firmed in some of the letters received 
from this class of person. The farmers 
have good grounds for believing that 
the new regime will lead to an in-
. creased immigration of Koreans, and 
possibly of Japanese. The Korean im-
migrants do not assimilate with the 
Chinese, and their methods of agricul-
ture are different. While the Chinese 
farmer mainly grows beans, kaoliang 
and wheat, the Korean farmer culti-
vates rice. 1'his means digging canals 
and dykes and 'flooding the fl.elds. If 
there are heavy rairts, the dykes built 
by the Koreans are liable to burst and 
flood neighboring Chinese land, ruin-
ing the crops. There have also . been 
constant quarrels in the past with 
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Koreans over land ownership and rents. 
Since the establishment of "Manchu-
kuo" the Chinese allege that the 
Koreans have often ceased to pay rent, 
that they have seized lands from the 
Chinese and that the Japanese have 
forced the Chinese to sell their lands 
at unfavorable prices. The farmers 
near the railways and towns have suf-
fered from orders forbidding the plant-
ing of kaoliang-a crop which grows 
to 10 foot in height and favors the 
operations of bandits-within 500 meters 
of railway lines and towns. The falling 
off of the seasonal migration of laborers 
from China Proper, due to the economic 
depression and accentuated to some ex-
tent by the political disturbances, con-
tinues. The public lands, usually avail-
able on terms to immigrants from 
China, have now been taken over by 
"Manchukuo." 
Since September 18, 1931, there has 
been an unparalleled growth of bandi-
try and lawlessness in the country-
side, partly due to disbanded soldiery 
and partly due to farmers who, having 
been ruined by bandits, have to take 
to banditry themselves for a living. 
Organized warfare, from which Man-
churia, compared to the rest of China, 
had been free for many y¥;!arS, is now 
being waged in many parts of the 
Three Provinces between Japanese and 
"Manchukuo" troops and the scattered 
forces still loyal to China. This war-
fare naturally inflicts great hatdshi~ 
on the farmers, especially as the Japa-
nese airplanes have been bombing vil-
lages suspected of harboring anti-. 
"Manchukuo" forces. One result has 
been that large areas have not been 
planted and next year the farmer will, 
find it harder than ever to pay his 
taxes. Since the outbreak of disorders, 
large numbers of the more recently 
established immiJrants from China have 
fled back inside the WaU. These mat-
erial reasons, when added to a certain 
ingrained dislike of the Japanese, 
caused many witnesses to tell us that 
the Chinese farmers, who constitut 
the ove.rwhelming mass .:,f the popula-
tion of Manchuria. suffer from and 
dislike the new regime, and that their 
attitude is one of passive hostility. 
Troop Behavior Good 
As regards the towmpeople, in cer-
tain places they have suffered fro:tl\ 
the attitude of Japanese soldiers, gen-
darmes and police. Generally speakin.F. 
the behavior of the Japanese troo~ 
has been good, there being no wide-
spread l-0otings or massacres, though 
we have received in our letters com-
plaints of individual brutality. On the 
other hand, the Japanese have been 
vigorous in suppressing elements that 
they believed to be hostile. The Chi-
nese allege that many executions have 
taken place, and also that prisoners 
have been threatened and tortured in 
Japanese gendarmerie stations. 
It was, we were told, impossible to 
stimulate in the towns a show of pop-
ular enthusiasm for the inauguration 
ceremonies of "Manchukuo." Generailv 
spe~kin~, the ~ttitude of the town pop-
ulation 1s a mxture of passive acquie-
scence and hostility. 
While we found the Chinese ma-
jority either hostile or indifferent to 
the "Manchukuo," the new "Govern-
ment" rec_eives ~om~ support from 
among various mmority racial groups 
in Manchuria, such as the Mongols, 
Koreans, White Russians and Mane-hue; 
They have in varying degrees suffered 
oppression from the former administra-
tion or economic disadvantage from 
the large immigration of Chinese in 
the last few decades, and while no 
section is entirely enthusiastic they 
hope for better treatment from the ne~ 
regime, whose policy in turn is to en-
courage these minority groups. 
The Mongols have remained a race 
apart from the Chinese, and, as already 
state~, have preserved a strongly race-
consc1ousness, as well as their tribal 
sy~m, aristocracy, language, dress, 
special modes of life, manners customs 
and religio,n. Though still ~ainly a 
pastoral people, they are increasingly 
engaged in agriculture and in the trans-
portation of products by carts and ani-
mals. The Mongols bordering Man-
churia have suffered increasingly from 
Chinese immigrants who obtain posses-
sion of and cultivate their lands from 
which they are being gradually extrud-
ed. This leads to chronic and unavoid-
able ill-feeling. Mo:ngol delegations we 
reoeivea, com~lained also of past suf,. 
ferings from the rapaciousness of Chi-
nese officials and tax-gatherers. The 
Mongols of Inner Mongolia have seen 
Outer Mongolia pass under the i.nflu-
ence of the U.S.S.R., whose extension 
to Inner Mongolia they dread. They 
wish to preserve their separate national 
existence against the encroachments of 
the Chinese on the one hand and the 
U.S.S.R. on the other. P:aced i.n this 
precarious position, they have greater 
hope of preserving their separate ex-
istence under the new regime. It must 
be observed, moreover, that the Prin-
ces are mainly dependent for their 
wealth on ~eel property and on their 
special privileges, and that they there-
fore tend to become amenable to de 
facto authorities. A deputation, how-
ever, of Mongol Princes was received 
by the commission i.n Peiping, and 
stated their opposition to the new re-
gime. At present the connection be-
tween the Mongols bordering on Man-
churia and the "Manchukuo Govern-
ment" is undefined and the "Manchu-
kuo Government'' has so far refrained 
from interfering in their administra-
tion. While the support of certain of 
these Mongol elements at present is 
genuine, if cautious, they are quite pre-
pared to withdraw it should the Japa-
nese prove a menace to their indepen-
dence or economic interests at some 
future date. 
Manchus Considered 
The Manchus have been almost com-
pletely assimilated with the Chinese, 
although in Kirin and Heilungkiang 
there still exlst small and politically 
unimportant colonies of Manchus who, 
though bilingual, r emain distinctly 
Manchu. Since the establishment of 
the Republic the remnants of the 
Mancfiu race lost their privileged posi-
tion: although the Republic promised 
to continue the payment of their sub-
sidies, they were paid in depreciated 
currency, and were therefore forced to 
take up farming and trade in which 
they had no experience. The few dis-
tinct Manchu groups that remain may 
cherish hopes that with the establish-
ment of "Manchukuo," whose backers 
spoke so often about the inhabitants 
of Manchuria being distinct in :race 
from those of the rest of China and 
in which the last of the Manchu Em-
perors is the Chief Executive, they 
may once more get priv-ileged treat-
ment. Persons of M,mchu race have 
entered the "Government" with such 
hopes, but Chinese witnesses in Man-
churia alleged that these office-holders 
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have been disillusioned by finding all 
the power in Japanese hand~ and their 
own proposals ignored. Although 
there may still exist some sentimental 
loyalty to the ex-Em;>eror among per-
sons of Manchu blood, there does not 
exist any xace-c.onscious ManchUJ 
movement of any significance. They 
have been so largely assimilated with 
the Chinese that although efforts have 
been made to recruit Manchus for the 
administration and to stimulate Man-
chu race-consciousness, this source of 
support for the new "Government" is 
not sufficient to give it any title t9 
represent the people. 
In the past there has been much 
friction between Korean farmers back-
ed by the Japanese authorities on the 
one hand, and Chinese officials, land-
owners and farmers, on the other. 
There is no doubt that in the paE.t 
Korean farmers suffered from violence 
and extortion. The Korean deputation 
which ·appeared before the commission 
generally welcomes the new regime, 
but we cannot say to what extent they 
were representative of their community. 
In any case, these Koreans who are 
political refugees, having emigrated to 
escape Japanese domination, might not 
be expected to welcome an extension of 
that domination. These refugees have 
proved a fertile ground for communist 
propaganda and maintain contact with 
the revolutionary groups inside Korea. 
White Russians 
Of all the minority communities in 
Manchuria, the small colony of White 
Russians-at least 100,000 in number-in 
and around Harbin has suffered the 
most in recent years. Because they 
are a minority community with no 
national Government to protect them, 
they have been subjected to every kind 
of humiliation by the Chinese officials 
and police. They are in conflict with 
the Government of their own country 
and are, even in Manchuria, in con-
stant anxiety on that account. The 
richer and more educated members of 
-their community can earn a livelihoo4, 
but they have been liable to suffer 
whenever the Chinese authorities have 
·thought some advantage was to be 
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gained from the U.S.S.R. at their ex-
pense. The poorer members find it 
very hard to make a living and have 
suffered continually at the hands of 
the police and the Chinese courts. In 
a province where taxes are assessed b:, 
a process of bargaining, they have bee.a 
made to pay a higher portion of their 
assessed truces than their Chinese neigh-
bors. They have experienced many 
restrictions on their trade and move-
ments, and have had to pay bribes to 
the officials to have their passports ex-
amined, their contracts approved or 
their land transferred. It is not to 
be wondered at that many members 
of this community, whose condition 
could not well be made worse, should 
have welcomed the Japanese and now 
entertain hopes that their lot may be 
improved under the new ad.ministra-
tion. 
We received a deputation of White 
Russians when we were in Harbin, as 
well as many letters, and we gathered 
from them that they would support 
any regime which would guarantee .to 
them: 
(1) The right of asylum; 
(2) . An honest and efficient police 
administration. 
(3) Justice in the law courts; 
(4) An equitable system of taxation; 
(5) Rights of trade and settlement. 
not dependent on the payment .. of 
bribes; 
(6) Facilities for educating their chil-
dren. 
Their requirements in this respect 
were chiefly efficient teaching of for~ 
eign languages to enable them to emi-
grate and good technical education to 
enable them to obtain business employ-
ment in China; 
(7) Some assistance regarding land 
settlement and emigration. 
Such are the opinions of the local 
population conveyed to us during our 
tour in Manchuria. After careful study 
of the evidence presented to us in 
public and private interviews, in let-
ters and written statements, we have 
come to the conclusion that there is ne 
general Chinese support for the "Man-
chukuo Government," which is regard-
ed by the local Chinese as an instrµ-
ment of the Japanese. 
CHAPTER, VII 
Japan's Economic Interests and the Chinese Boycott (*) · 
The three preceding chapters have 
.been chiefly confined to a description 
of military and policica1 events since 
September 18, 1931. No survey of the 
Sino-Japanese conflict wou:d be accu-
rate or complete without some account 
of another important factor in the 
struggle, namely the Chinese boycott 
of Japanese goods. To understand the 
methods employed in this boycott 
movement and their effect on Japanese 
trade, some indication must be given 
of the general economic position of 
Japan, of her economic and financial 
interests in China and of the foreign 
trade of China. This is also necessary 
to understand the extent and character 
ef the economic interests of both China 
and Japan in Manchuria, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
During the Meiji Restoration period 
in the sixties of the last. century, Japan 
.t,merged from her isolation of over two 
-centuries, and within less than 50 years 
developed into a world P~wer of ".he 
first rank. A population formerly almost 
stationary started to grow rapidly from 
33,000,000 in 1872 until it reached a ftg-
m-e of 65,000,000 in 1930; and this tre-
mendous growth still continues at the 
rate of about 900,000 per year. 
The population of Japan compared 
with its total surface is approximately 
437 persons per square mile, as against 
about 41 in the United States, 330 in 
Germany, 349 in Italy, 468 in Great 
Britain, 670 in Belgium and 254 in 
.China. 
Comparing the population of Japan 
per square mile of arable land with 
that of other countries, the r:rdo for 
Japan is exceptionally high, due to the 
·particular geographical formation of the 
Island Empire: 
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,774 
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,170 
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,709 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 
·Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 
France .. .. . . ... . .. . . .. . . ... .. . 467 
United States . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 229 
Due to a highly concentrated popula-
ion on agricultural land, the indivi-
dual holdings are exceedingly small, 35 
per cent of the farmers tilling less 
than one acre and 34 per cent less 
than two and one half acres. Tlie ex-
pansion limit of tillable land has been 
reached, as has also the limit of cul-
.tivation intensity-in short, the soil of 
Japan cannot be expecte'd to produce 
much more than it does today, nor can 
it provide much additional employ-
ment. 
Agrarian Dlfflculties 
Moreover, as result of intensive cul-
tivation and the widespread use of fer-
tilizers the cost of production is high. 
The price of land is far higher than 
in any other part of Asia and even in 
the most overcrowded parts of Europe. 
Much discontent seems to exist among 
the heavily indebted population, and 
conflicts between tenants and landown-
ers are on the increase. Emigration has 
been considered a possible remedy. but 
for reasons dealt with in the next 
chapter it has not, up to the present 
time, proved to be a solution. 
Japan at first turned to industrialism 
to foster the growth of an urban 
population which would both provide 
(• ) BOYCOTT : The word was first used 
in Ireland and was derived from the name 
of Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott 
(1832-97) , agent for the estates of the 
Earl of Erne in County Mayo. For re-
fusing in 1880 to receive rents at figures 
fixed by the tenants, Captain Boycott's 
life was threatened, his servants were 
compelled to leave him, his fences tom 
down, his letters intercepted and his food 
supplies interfered with. The teffl). soon 
came into common English use, and was 
speedily adopted into many foreign lang-
uages. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th. edition; 
1929, 
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a home market for agricultural pro-
ducts and turn labor to the production 
of goods for domestic and foreign use. 
Several changes have occurred since 
that time. Where, formerly, Japan 
was more than self-sufficing from the 
point of view of food supply, of recent 
years from 8 per cent to 15 per cent of 
her total imports have been foodstuffs, 
the fluctuation being due to the vary-
ing conditions of the home crops, prin-
cipally rice. The importation of food-
stuffs, and the probable increasing need 
of these imports necessitate an at-
tempt to offset the country's already 
unfavorable trade balance by an in-
crease in exports of industrial products. 
If Japan is to find employment for 
hei· increasing population through the 
process of further industrialization, the 
development of her export trade and 
of foreign markets capable of absorb-
ing an increasing amount of her man-
ufactured and semi-manufactured goods 
becomes more and more essential. Such 
markets would, at the same time, serve 
as a source of supply of raw materials 
and of foodstuffs. 
Japanese export trade, as hitherto 
developed, has two main directions: 
her luxury product, raw silk goes to 
the United States; and her staple man-
ufactures, chiefly cotton textiles, go to 
the countries of Asia, the United States 
taking 42.5 per cent of her exports and 
the Asia market as a whole taking 
42.6 per cent of this latter trade China, 
the Kwantung Leased Territory, and 
Hongkong take 24.7 per cent, and a 
large share of the remainder is handled 
by Chinese merchants in other. parts of 
Asia. 
During 1930, the last year for which 
complete figures are available, the total 
exports of Japan amounted to ¥1,469,-
852,000 and her imports to ¥1,546,071,000. 
Of the exports, ¥260,826,000, or 17.7 per 
cent, went t.'o China (excluding the 
Kwantung Leased Territory and Hong-
kong), while of the imports ¥161,667, -
000, or 10.4 per cent, came from China 
(excluding the Kwantung Leased Ter-
ritory and Hongkong). 
Analysing the principal commodities 
exported by Japan to China, it will be 
found that China takes 32.8 per cent 
of all aquatic products exported by 
Japan; 84.6 per cent of refined sugar; 
75.1 per cent of coal, and 31.9 per cent 
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of cotton tissues, or an average of 51.6 
per cent. 
Imports From China 
The same analysis applied to the 
commodities imported from China 
shows that 24.5 per cent of the total 
amount of beans and peas imported by 
Japan comes from China; 53 per cent 
of the oil cake; and 25 per cent of 
vegetable fibers; or an average of 34.5 
per cent. 
As these figures are for China only, 
excluding Hongkong and the Kwantung 
Leased Territory, they do not indicate 
the extent of Japanese trade with Man-
churia, which passes mainly through 
the port: of Dairen. 
The facts and figures just given clear-
ly show the importance to Japan of 
her trade with China. Nor is Japan's 
interest in China limited to trade alone; 
she has a considerable amount of capi-
tal invested in industrial enterprises, 
as well as in railways, shipping and 
banking, and in all of these branches 
of financial a.nd economic activity the 
general trend of development has been 
increasing considerably during the last 
three decades. 
In 1898 the only Japanese investment 
of any consequence was a small cot-
ton gin in Shanghai owned jointly with 
Chinese, representing a value of about 
100,000 taels. By 1913 the estimated 
total of Japanese investments in China 
nd Manchuria amounted to ¥435,000,000, 
out of a total of ¥535,000,000 estimated 
investments abroad. By the end of the 
World War, Japan had more than 
-doubled her investments in China and 
Manchuria over those of 1913, a con-
siderable part of this increase being 
due to the famous "Nishihara Loans," 
which had been partially granted for 
political considerations. Notwith-,tand-
ing this setback, Japan's investments 
in China and Manchuria in 1929 were 
estimated at almost ¥2,000.000,000, (*) out 
of her total investments abroad of ¥2,-
100,000,000, showing that Japan's in-
vestments abroad have been almost en-
tirely confined to China and Man-
churia, the latter having absorbed by 
far the greater part of this investment 
(particularly in railways). 
( •) According to another estimate, 
Japan's investments in China, including 
Manchuria, total approximately ¥1,800,000,-
000. 
Apart from these investments, · China 
has been indebted to Japan for vari-
oUs state, provincial and municipal 
loans which in 1925 were estimated at 
a total of ¥304,458,000 (the greater part 
unsecured) plus ¥18,037 ,000 interest. 
Although the bulk of Japan's invest-
ments are in Manchuria, a considerable 
amount is invested in industries, ship. 
ping and banking in China proper. 
Nearly 50 per cent of the total number 
of spindles operated in the spinning 
and weaving industry in China in 1929 
were owned by Japanese. Japan was 
second in the carrying trade of China. 
e.nd the number of Japanese banks in 
China in 1932 is put at 30, a few of 
which are joint Sino-Japanese enter-
pri es. 
Interest of Chinese 
Althoue;h the foregoin~ figures are 
stated from the standooint of Japan, it 
is easy to see their relative importance 
from the standpoint of China. For-
eign trade with Japan has held first 
place in the total foreign trade of 
China up to 1932. In 1930, 24.1 per cent 
of her exports went to Japan, while 
in the same year 24.9 per cent of her 
imports came from Japan. This, in 
comparison with the figures from 
Japan's standpoint, shows that the 
trade of China with Japan is a greater 
percentage of her total foreign trade 
than is the trade of Japan with China 
of the total foreign trade of Japan. 
But China has no investments, bank-
i!n~ or shipping interests in Japan. 
China requires, above all else, to be 
able to export her products in in-
creasi-ng quantities to enable her to 
pay for the many finished products she 
needs and in order to establish a sound 
basis of credit on which to borrow the 
caoital required for further develop-
ment. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that 
Sino-Japanese economic and financial 
relations are both extensive and varied, 
and, consequently, easily affected and 
disorganized by any disturbing factor. 
It also appears that, in its entirety, 
Japanese dependence on China is 
greater than China's dependence on 
Japan. Hence Japan is the more vul-
nerable and has more to lose in cas 
of disturbed relations. 
It is therefore clear that the man:r 
political disputes which have arisen 
between the two countries since the 
Sino-Japanese war of 1895 have in t'Um 
affected their mutual economic rela-
tions, and the fact that in spite of 
these disturbances the trade between 
them has continued to increase proves 
that there is an underlying economic 
tie that no political antagonism has 
been able to sever. 
For centuries the Chinese have been 
familiar with boycott methods in the 
organization of their merchants, bank-
ers and craft guilds. These guilds al-
though they are being modified to meet 
modern conditions, still exist in large 
numbers and exercise great power over 
their members in the defense of their 
common professional interest. The 
training and attitude acquired in the 
course of this century old guild life 
has been combined, in the present-day 
boycott movement, with the recent fer-
vent nationalism, of which the Kuo-
mintang is the organized expression. 
The era of modern anti-foreign lx>y-
cotts employed on a national basis as 
a political weapo.n against a foreign 
Power (as distinct from a professional 
instrument used by Chinese traders 
against each other) can be said to have 
started in 1905 with a boycott direc-
ted against the United States because 
of a stipu:ation in the Sino-American 
Commercial Treaty, as renewed and 
revised in that year, restricting more 
sevetely than before the entry of Chi-
nese into America. From that moment 
onward until today there have been 
10 distinct boycotts which can be con-
sidered as national in scope (besides 
anti-foreign movements . of a local 
character), nine of which were direct-
ed against Japan (•) and one only 
against Great Britain. 
(•) The date and immediate cause of 
each of these boycotts are: 
1908 The Tatsu Maru incident. 
1909 The Antung-Mukden Railway ques-
tion. 
1915 The "21 Demands." 
1919 The Shantung question. 
1923 Port Arthur and Dalren recovery 
question. 
1925 May 30th. incident. 
1927 Despatch of troops to Shantung. 
1928 Tsinan incident. 
1931 The Manchurian affair (Wanpao-•· 
~han and Mukden events). 
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Causes of Boycotts 
U these boycotts are studied in de-
tail, it will be found that each of them 
can be traced back to a definite fact, 
event or incident, generally of a politi• 
cal nature and interpreted by China 
as directed against her material inter• 
ests or detrimental to her national 
prestige. Thus, the boycott of 1931 
was started as a direct sequel to the 
massacre of Koreans in July, following 
the Wanpaoshan incident in June of 
that year, and has been accentuated by 
the events at Mukden in September 
and at Shanghai in January, 1932. Each 
boycott has its own immediately trace• 
able cause, but none of the causes in 
themselves would have initiated eco• 
nomic retaliation on so extensive a 
·scale had it not been for the mass psy• 
chology described in Chapter 1. The 
factors contributing to the creation of 
this psychology are: a conviction of 
in.justice (rightly or wrongly con-
sidered ·as such), an inherited faith in 
Chinese cultural superiority over for• 
eigners and a fervent nationalism of a 
Western type, mainly defensive in aims 
but in which certain aggressive ten• 
dencies are not lacking. 
Although a Society for the Regen• 
eration of China (Hsing Chung Hui), 
which may be considered the progenitor 
of the Kuomintang, was founded as far 
back as 1893, and although there can be 
no doubt that all the boycotts from 
1905 to 1925 were launched with the 
war•cry of Nationalism, there is no 
concrete evidence that the original na• 
tionalist associations, and later the 
Kuomintang, had a direct hand in their 
organization. Inspired by Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen's new creed, Chambers of 
Commerce and Student Unions were 
fully capable of such a task, guided as 
they were by century.old secret socie-
-ties, guild experience and guild ment• 
ality. The merchants · furnished the 
technical knowledge, means of organiza. 
tion and rules of procedure, while the 
students inspired the movements with 
the enthusiasm of their newly acquired 
conviction and their spirit of deter• 
mination in the national cause and 
helped to put them into operation. 
While the students were ·generally mov• 
ed by nationalistic feelings alone, the 
Chambers of Commerce, though shar-
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ing these feelings, thought it wise to 
participate from a desire to control 
the operation of the boycott. Th~ 
actual rules of the ear lier boycotts were 
designed to prevent the purchase of 
the goods of the country against 1whicb 
the boycott was directed. Gradually, 
however, the field of action was ex-
tended to a refusal to export Chinese 
goods to the country concerned, or to 
sell or render services to its nationals 
in China. Finally, the avowed purpose 
of the more recent boycotts has beJ 
come to sever completely all economic 
relations with the "enemy country." 
It should be pointed out that the rules 
thus established were never carried out 
to the fullest extent, for reasons which 
have been fully dealt with in the spe· 
cial study annexed to this report. Gen-
erally speaking, the boycotts have al-
ways had more impetus in the south, 
where nationalistic feelings found their 
first and most fervent adherents, than 
in the north, Shantung especially hav-
ing withhold support. 
Movement Since 1925 
From 1925 onward a definite ·change 
took place in the boycott organiza-
tion. The Kuomintang, having from 
its creation supported the movement 
increased its control with each suc.,-
cessive boycott until today it is the 
real organizing, driving, co-ordinating 
and supervising factor in these de-
monstrations. 
In dofng this, the Kuomintang, as 
indicated by evidence in the possession 
of the commission, did not d~ the 
associations which had hitherto been 
re.sponsible for the direction of boy-
cott movements. It rather co-ordinated 
their efforts, systematized and made 
uniform their methods and put un-
reservedly behind the movement the 
moral and material weight of its 
powerful. party organization. Having 
branches all over the country, possess-
ing vast propaganda and information 
services, and inspired by a strong na-
tiona]istic sentiment, it rapidly succeed-
ed in organizing and stimulating a 
movement which had, up to that time, 
been somewhat sporadic. As a con-
sequence, the coercive authority vf the 
organizers of the boycotts over the mer-
chants and the general public became 
stronger than ever before, although at 
the same time a fair margin . of · auto-
nomy and initiative was left to the 
individual boycott associations. 
The boycott rules continued to vary 
according to local conditions but paral-
lel with the strengthening of the or-
ganization, the methods employed by 
the Boycott Societies became more uni-
form, more strict and effective. At the 
same time the Kuomintang Party issu-
ed instructions prohibiting the destruc-
tion of commercial houses belonging to 
Japanese or the infliction of physical 
harm. This does not mean that the 
lives of Japanese in China have never 
been threatened in the course of a 
boycott, but as a whole it may be 
stated that during the more recent 
boycotts, acts of violence against J a-
panese subjects have been less numer-
ous and serious than in earlier days. 
An examination of the technique of 
the methods employed shows that the 
atmosphere of popular sentiment with-
out which no boycott could succeed is 
created by a formidable propaganda 
uniformly carried out all over the 
country, using slogans well chosen to 
incite the popular mind against the 
"enemy" country. 
In the present boycott directed 
against Japan which the commission 
has seen in operation, every availabl,.! 
means was employed to impress upon 
the people the partriotic duty of not 
buying Ja;,anese goods. The columns of 
the Chinese prers were filled with pro-
paganda of this kind, the walls of 
buildings in the towns were covered 
with posters, often of an extremely vio-
lent character;(*) anti-Japanese slogans 
were printed on currency notes, on let-
ters and telegn m forms; chain letters 
went from hand to hand, etc. These ex-
amples were by no means exhaustive, 
but serve to show the nature of the 
methods employed. The fact that this 
propaganda does not differ essentially 
from that ured in certain countries of 
Europe and America during the World 
War 1914-1918 only proves the degree 
of hostility toward Japan which the 
Chinese have come to feel as a result 
(*) In most cities visited by the com-
mission these posters had been removed 
beforehand but declarations from reliable 
local witnesses who often possessed 
samples of thf'se posters bore out the fact 
mentioned above. Moreover, . samples are 
to be found in the archives of the com-
mission. . 
of the political tension between the 
two ~ountries. · 
Boycott Rules Adopted 
Essential ·as the political atmosphere 
of a boycott may be to its ultimate 
success, nevertheless no such move-
ment could be effective if the boycott 
associations had not secured a certain 
uniformity in their rules of procedure. 
The four general principles adopted at 
the first meeting of the Shanghai Anti-
Japanese Association held on July 17, 
1931, may serve as an illustration of the 
main objects aimed at by these rules. 
They were: 
a. To withdraw the orders for Japa-
nese goods already ordered. 
b. To stop shipment of Japanese 
goods already ordered but not yet con-
signed; 
c. To refuse to accept Japanese 
goods already in the godowns but not 
Y,et paid for; . 
. d. To register with the Anti-Japa-
nese Association Japanese goods al-
ready purchased and to ~uspend tem-
porarily the selling of these goods . . Th.e 
procedure of registration will be sep-
arately decided upon. 
Subsequent resolutions adopted by 
the same association and reproduced in 
the annex are much more detailed and 
contain provisions for all possible cases 
and eventualities. 
A powerful means of enforcing the 
QOycotts is the compulsory registra-
tion of Japanese goods held in stpck 
by Chinese merchants. Inspectors of 
the Anti-Japanese societies watch the 
movement of Japanese goods, ex~mine 
those of doubtful origin in order to 
ascertain whether or not , they are 
Japanese, undertake raids on stores 
and godowns where they suspect the 
presence of non-registered Japanese 
goods and bring to the attention of 
their principals any case of the viola-
tion of the rules they may discover. 
Merchants who are found to be guilty 
of such a breach of the rules are fined 
by the Boycott Associations themselves 
and publicly exposed to popular dis-
app!!oval, while the goods in their 
possession are confiscated and sold at 
public auction, the proceeds going into 
the funds of the Anti-Japanese organi-
zation. 
The boycott is not limited to trade · 
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alone. Chines~ z re '!'a1ned not to 
travel on Japanese ships,. to use Japa-
nese in any capacity, either in busi-
ness or in - domestic- serviee. Those 
who disregard these instructions are 
subjected to various forms of disap-
proval and intimidation. 
Another featme of this boycott, as 
of previous ones, is the wish not only 
to injure Japanese industries, but to 
further Chinese industries by stimula-
ting the production of certain articles 
which have hitherto been imported 
from Japan. The pri:nci_:;i.sl result has 
been an extension of the Chinese tex-
tile industry at the expense of the 
Japanese-owned mills in the Shanghai 
area. 
That boycott of 1931, organized on the 
lines just described, continued until 
abou.t December of that year, 1932, when 
a certain relaxation became apparent. 
In January, 1932, in the course of the 
negotiations then proceeding between:· 
the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and 
the Japanese Consul-Gene.,,al in that 
city, the Chinese even undertook to 
dissolve voluntarily the local anti-
Japanese association. 
Marked Revival 
During the hostilities in Shanghai. 
and the months immediately follow-
ing the evacuatidn of the Japanese 
troops, the boycott, although never 
completely abandoned, was moderated, 
and during late spring and early sum-
me~ it even looked as if Japanese trade 
in different parts of the country might 
resume. Then, quite suddenly, at the 
end of Julr and beginning August. 
coinciding with the reported military 
activity on the borders of J ehol, there 
was a marked revival of the boycott 
movement. Articles urging the people 
not to buy Japanese goods appeared 
anew in the Chinese press, Hie Shang-
hai Chamber of Commerce published 
a letter suggesting the resumption of 
the boycott and the Coal Merchants' 
Guild in the same city decided to 
restrict to the minimum the importa-
tion of Japanese coal. At the same 
tim~ more violent methods were em-
ployed, such as the throwing of a 
bQmb into the compound of a coal dea-
ler suspected of · having handled Japa-
nese coal and the sending of lettf;rs 
to storekeepers threatening to destroy 
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their property unless they stopped 
selling Japanese commodities. Some 
of the letters reproduced in the news-
papers were signed the "Blood and Iron 
Group or the "Blood and Soul Group 
for the punishment of traitors." 
Such is the situation at the timf! of 
writing this Report. This recrudes-
cence of the boycott activity caused 
the Jap.anese Consul-General in Shang-
hai to lodge a formal protest with the 
local authorities. 
The various boycott movement~, and 
the present one in particular, have 
seriously affected Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, both in .a material and in a 
psychological sense. 
As far as the material effects are 
concerned, that is, the loss of trade, 
the Chinese have a tendency to under-
state them in their desire to present 
the boycott as rather a moral -pEotest 
than as an act of econ.omfc injuTy, 
while the Japane$8' attach too abso-
lute a value ta certain trade statistics. 
The araunients used in this connec-
tion. by the two p arties are examined. 
in the annexed study already refer:red 
to. In that study will also be found 
full particulars of the extent of the 
damage done to Japanese trade, which 
has certainly been considerable. 
Another .aspect of the subjecf should 
also be mentioned. The Chinese them-
selves suffer losses from goods already 
paid for, not registered with the Boy-
cott Associations, and seized for pub-
lic a-uction; from :fines paid to the as-
sociations for violation of the boycott 
rules from revenue not ireceived by 
the Chinese Maritime Customs; and 
generally speaking, from loss of trade. 
These losses are considerable. 
The psychological effect of the boy-
cott on Sino-Japanese .relations, al-
though even more difficult to estimate 
than the material effect, is certainly 
not less serious in that it h -: s had a 
disastrous re_;,ercussion on the feelings 
of large sections of Japanese public 
opinion toward China. During the 
visit of the commission to Japan, both 
the Tokyo and the Osaka Chambers of 
Commerce stressed this subject. 
Public Onlnion Exasoerated 
The knowledge that Japan is suffer-
ing injwies against which she canpot 
protect herself has exasperated Japa-
nese public opinion. The merchants 
whom we interviewed at OSaka were 
inclined to exaggerate certain abuses 
of boycott methods, such as racketeer-
ing and blackmailing, and to under-
estimate or even to deny completely 
the close relationship between Japan's 
recent policy toward China and the 
use of the boycott as a defensive wea-
pon ag inst that policy. On the con-
trary instead of regarding the boycott 
as China's weapon of defense these 
Japanese merchants insisted that it was 
an act of aggression against which the 
Japanese military measures were a re-
taliation. Anyway there is no doubt 
that the boycott has been among the 
causes which have profoundly embit-
tered the relations between China and 
Japa,n in recent years. . 
There are three controversial issues ' 
invo~ved in the policy and . methods 
of the boycott. 
The first is the question whether th<' 
movement is purely spontaneous, as the 
Chinese themselves claim, or whether, 
as the Japanese allege, it is an or-
ganized movement impo:,ed upon the 
people by the Kuomintang, by method& 
whi!;h at times amount to terrorism. On 
this :,ubject much may be said on both 
sides. On the one hand it would ap-
pear to be impossible for a nation to 
exhibit the degree of co-operation and 
sacrifice involved in the · maintenance 
of a boycott over a wide area and for 
a long period if there did not exist a 
foundation of strong popular feeling. 
On the other hand, it has been clearly 
shown to what extent the Kuomintang, 
using the mentality and the methods 
which the Chinese people have inherit-
ed from their old guilds and secret so-
cieties, has taken control of the re-
cent boycotts, and particularly of th 
present one. The rules, the discipline . 
and the sanctions used against the 
"traitors," which form such an essen-
tial part of the present boycott, show 
that however spontaneous, the move-
ment is certainly strongly organizt1d. 
All popular movements require some 
measure of organization to be effec-
tive. The loyalty of all adherents to 
a common cause is never uniform1y 
strong, and discipline is required to 
enforce unity of purpose and action. 
Our conclusion is that the Chinese boy-
cotts are both popular and organized; 
that though they originate in and are 
supported by strong national sentiment, 
they ar,e, controlled and directed by 
organizations which can start or call 
them off, and that they are enforced 
by methods which certainly amount to 
intimidation. While many separate 
bodies are involved in the organization, 
the main controlling authority is he 
Kuomintang. 
The S€'COJld issue is whether · or not 
in the conduct of the boycott move-
ment the methods employed have al-
ways been: legal. From the evidence 
collectEd by the commission it is dif-
ficult to draw any other conclusion 
than that illegal acts have been con-
stantly committed and that they have 
not been sufficiently su9pressed by the 
authorities and the courts. The fact 
that thE'Se methods are mainly the same 
as those used in China in olden days 
may be an explanation but not a justi-
fication. When in former days a guild 
elected to declare a boycott, searched 
the houses of suspected members 
brought them before the Guild Court, 
punished them for a breach of rules. · 
imposed Jines and sold the goods seiz-
~d, · it ·acted in conformity with the 
customs of. that time. Moreover, it 
was an internal affair of a Chinese 
community. and no foreigner was in-
v.olved. The present situation · is dif-
ferent. China has adopted a code of , 
modern laws, and these are incompat-
ible with the traditional methods of 
trade boycotts in China. The memo-
randum in which the Chinese assessor· 
has defended his country's point of 
view with regard to the boycott does 
not contest this statement but argues 
that "the boycott . . .. is pursued, gen-
erally speaking, in a legitimate man-
ner." The evidence at the disposal 
of the commission does not bear out 
this contention. 
Distinction Required 
In this connection a distinction 
should be made between the illegai° 
acts committed directly against for-
eign · residents, ih casu Japanese, tmd 
those committed against Chinese wi 
the avowed intention, how iVer, of 
causing damage to Japanese inte.rests. 
As far as the former are conce~d, 
they are clearly not only illegal undel' 
the laws of China but also incompati-
ble with treaty obligations to prot.ect 
life and property and to main~in 
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liberty of trade, residence, movement 
and action. This is not contested by 
the Ch,inese, . and the boycott ·associa-
tions, as well as the Kuomintang au-
thorities, have tried, although they 
may not always have been successful, 
to prevent offences of this · kind. As 
already stated they have occurred less 
frequently during the present boycott 
than on previous occasions. (•) 
With regard to illegal acts committed · 
against - the Chinese, the Chinese as-
sessor observed on page 17 of his me-
morandum on the boycott: 
"We would like to observe in the 
first place that a foreign nation is not 
autliorized to raise a question of in-
ternal law. In fact, we find ourselves . 
confronted with acts denounced as un-
lawful but committed by Chinese na-
tiona:is in prejudice to other Chinese 
nationals. Their suppression is a mat-
ter for the Chinese authorities, . and it 
seems to us that no one has the right 
of calling into account the manner in 
which the Chinese penal law is applied 
in matters where both offenders and 
sufferers belong to our own nationality. 
No ·state has the right of intervention 
in the administration of exc:iusively 
domestic affairs of another State. This 
is what the principle of mutual res-
pect for ea,~h others' sovereignty and 
independence means." . 
So stated, the a:rgument is incon-
testable, but it overlooks the fact that 
the ground of the Japanese complaint 
is not that one Chinese national has 
been illegaay injured by another, but 
that the injury has been done to Japa-
nese interests by the employment of 
methods which are -illegal under Chi-
nese law, and that failure to enforce 
the law in such circumstances implies 
the responsibility of the Chinese Gov-
ernment for the injury done to Japan. 
This leads to ·a consideration of t:he 
last controversial _point involved in 
(*) According to recent Japanese in-
formation, there were 35 instances in 
which goods belonging to Japanese mer-
chants were seized and kept in detention 
by members of the Anti-Japanese As-
sociations in Shanghai during the period 
from July, 1931 to the end of December, 
1931. . The value of the goods involved 
was estimated approximately at 287,000 
d,oliars. Of these instances, in August, 
1932, five were reported as stilf remaining 
unsolved. 
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the policy of the boycott, namely the 
extent of the responsibility of the. Chi-
nese Government. The Chinese official 
attitude is that "the liberty of choice 
in making purchases is a personal. 
right which no government can inter- . 
fere with; while the governments are 
responsible for the protection of lives. 
and property, they are not required 
by any commonly-recognized regula-
tions and principles to prohibit and 
punish the exercise of an elemental 
right of every citizen." 
More Direct Than Indicated 
The commission has been suppaed 
with documentary evidence ·which is 
reproduced in the Study No. 8 annexed ' 
to this report and which indicates that 
the part taken by the Chinese Gov- • 
ernment in the present boycott has been 
somewhat more direct than the quota- · 
tion above would 1:end to indicate. 
We do not suggest that there is .any-
thing improper in the fact that Gov- . 
ernment Departments should support , 
the boycott movement: we only wish. 
to • point out that official encourage- '. 
ment' involves a measure of Govern-
ment . responsibility. In this connec-
tion the question of relations between 
the Government and the Kuomintang 
must be considered. Of the respon- . 
sibility of the latter there can be no , 
question. It is the controlling and co- , 
ordinating .organ behind the whole boy-
cott movement. The Kuomintang may. 
be the maker and the master of the 
Government, but to determine at what 
point the responsibility of the Party . 
ends and that of the Government be-
gins is a complicated problem of con-
stitutional law on which the commis-
s_ion does not feel it proper to oro-
nounce. 
The · claim of the Government that 
the boycott is a legitimate wea~on of 
defence against military aggression by 
a stronger country, especially in cases 
where methods of arbitration have not 
previously been utilized, raises a · ques-
tion of a much wider character. No 
one can deny the right of the individu- . 
al Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese 
goods, use Japanese banks, or ships, 
or to work for Japanese employers, 
to sell commodities to Japanese, or to 
maintain ·social relations with Japa-
nese. Nor is it possible to deny that 
the , C4inese, · acting individually · or 
even in organized bodies, are entitled 
to make propaganda on behalf of these 
ideas, always subject to the condi-
tion. of course, that the methods do 
not infringe the laws of the land. 
Whether, however, the organized ap-
plication of the boycott to the- trade 
of one particular country is consistent 
with friendly relations or in conformity 
with treaty obligations is rather a pro-
blem of international law than a sub-
ject for our inquiry. We would ex-
prESS the hope, however, that in the 
interest of all States this problem 
should be considered at an early date 
and regulated by international agree-
ment. 
In the course of the present chapter 
it has been shown first that Japan, in 
connection with her population prob-
lem, is seeking to increase her indus-
trial output and to secure for this pur-
pose reliable oversea markets; secondly, 
that, apart from the export of raw silk 
to the United States, China constitutes 
the · principal market for Japanese ex-
ports and at the same time supplies 
the Island Empire with an important 
amount of raw materials and foodstuffs. 
Further, China has attracted nearly the 
whole of Japan's foreign investments, 
and even in her present disturbed and 
undeveloped condition, offers a profit-
able field to Japanese economic and 
financial activities of various types. 
Finally, an analysis of the injury caused 
to Japanese interests in China by the 
various boycotts which have succeeded 
one another from 1908 until today ha.~ 
drawn attention to the vulnerable char-
acter of these interests. 
The dependenc~ of Japan on the Chi-
nese market is fully recognized by the 
Japanese themselves. On the · othe~ 
hand, China is a country which stands 
in the most urgent need of develop-
ment in all fields of economic life, and 
J-a.pan, which in 1931, notwithstanding 
the boycott, occupied the first place iri 
her total foreign trade, seems more thari 
any other foreigri Power Indicated as 
an ally in eeonomic matters. · 
The interdependence of the trade of 
these two neighboring countries and 
the interests of both call for an eco-
nomic rapprochement, but there can 
be no such. rapprochement so long · as· 
the political relations between them are 
so, unsatisfactory as to call forlli the 
use of military force by one and the 




Economic Interests in Manchuria 
It has been shown in the preceding 
chapter . that the economic require-
ments of Japan and China, unless dis-
turbed by political considerations, 
would lead to mutual understanding 
and co-operation, and not to conflict. 
':qle study of the inter-relation between 
J.apanese and Chinese economic inter-
ests itJ. _!\fanchuria, taken in themselves 
and apart from the political events of 
recent years leads to the same conclu-
sion. The economic interests of both 
countries in Manchuria are not irre-
concilable; indeed, their reconciliation 
is necessary if the existing resources 
and .futur.e economic pos.5ibilities of 
Manchuria are to be developed to the 
fullest extent. 
In Chapter III the claim of Japanese 
public opinion that the resources, both 
actual and potential, of Manchuria are 
essential to the economic life of their 
country has been fully examined. The 
object of this chapter is to consider 
how far this claim is in conformity 
with economic facts. 
It is a fact that in South Manchuria, 
Japan is the largest foreign investor, 
whereas in North Manchuria the same 
is true of the U,S.S.R. Taking the 
three provinces as a whole, the Japa-
nese investments are more important 
than those of the U.S.S.R., although it 
is difficult to say to what extent be-
cause of the impos.5ibility of obtain -
ing reliable comparative figures. As 
the subject of investments is examin-
ed in detail in an annex to this re-
port, a few essential figures will be 
sufficient to illustrate the relative im-
portance of Japan, the U.S.S.R. and 
other countries as participating factors 
in the economic development of Man-
churia. 
According to a Japanese source of 
information, Jap&nese investments were 
estimated in 1928 at about ¥1,500,000,000, 
a figure which, if correct, must have 
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grown today to approximately ¥1,-
700,000,000. (*) A Russi.an source puts 
Japanese investments at the present 
time at about ¥1,500,000,000 for the 
whole of Manchuria inclusive of the 
Kwantung Leased Territory and at 
about ¥1,300,000,000 for the Three 
Provinces, the bulk of J aplanese 
capital being invested in Liaoning 
Province. 
Mostly in Railways 
With regard to the nature of these 
investments it will be found that the 
majority of the capital has been de-
voted to transportation enterprises 
(mainly railw8ys), agriculture, mining 
ar.d forestry coming next. As a mat-
ter of fact, the Japanese investments 
in South Manchuria center mainly 
round· the Scuth Manchuria Railway 
while the investments of the U.S.S.R. 
in the North are to a great extent, 
directly or indirectly, linked up with 
the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
Foreign investments other than Japa-
nese are more difficult to estimate, and 
in spite -of the helpful aEsistance of 
those immediately interested, the in-
formation obtained by the commis.5ion 
has been meagre. Most of the figures 
given by the Japanese are prior to 1917, 
and consequently out of date. For the 
U.S.S.R., as has been stated, no definite 
estimate is pos.5ible. With regard to 
other countries, a recent Russian esti-
mate for North Manchuria only, which 
it has not been possible to verify, in-
dicates Great Britain as the next largest 
investor with G. $11,185,000, followed 
by Japan with G. $9,229,400, the United 
States with G. $8,220,000. Poland with 
G. $5,025,000, France with G. $1,760,000, 
Germany with G. $1,235,000 and miscel-
laneous investments G. $1,129,600, mak-
(*) Another Japanese authority puts 
the total of Japanese investments in 
China, including Manchuria, in 1929 at a 
figure of approximately ¥1,500,000,000. 
ing a total of G. $37,784,400. For South 
Manchuria similar figures are not avail-
able. 
It is now necessary to analyze the 
part Manchuria plays in the economic 
life of Japan. A detailed study on this 
subject will be found in an annex to 
this report from which it will be seen 
that although this part is an important 
one, it is at the same time limited by 
circumstances which must not be over-
looked. 
It does not seem from past experi-
ence that Manchuria is a region suit-
able for Japanese emigration o,n a large 
scale. As already stated in Chapter 
II, the farmers and coolies from Shan-
tung and Chihli have in the last few 
decades taken possession of the soil. 
Japanese settlers are, and for many 
years will mostly be, businessmen, of-
ficials, salaried employees who have 
come to · manage the investments of 
capital, the development of various 
enterprises and the utilization of na-
tural resources. 
As regards her supplies of agricultu-
ral produce, Japan today depends on 
Manchuria mainly for the soya bean 
and its derivatives, the use of which 
as foodstuff as forage may even increase 
in the future. As a fertilizer, which 
is today one of its chief uses, its im-
portan~e is likely to decrease with the 
growth of chemical industries in Japan. 
But the question of food supply is not 
at the moment acute for Japan, the 
acquisition of Korea and Formosa hav-
ing helped to solve, at least for the 
time, her rice problem. If at some 
future date the need of this commodity 
becomes urgent for the Japanese Em-
pire, Manchuria may be able to pro-
vide an additional source of supply. 
But in that case a large amount of 
capital would have to be spent in the 
development of a sufficient irtigation 
system. 
Heavy Industries 
Larger still, it seems, will be the 
~ount of capital necessary for the 
creation of Japanese heavy industries, 
if these are destined to become in-
dependent of foreign countries, as a 
result of the utilization of the re-
sources of Manchuria. Japan seeks 
above all to develop in the Three 
Eastern Provinces the production of 
those raw materials which are indis-
pensable to her national defence. 
Manchuria can supply her with coal. 
oil and iron. The economic advant-
c' ges however, of such supplies are 
uncertain. For coal, only a compara-
tively small part of the production is 
utilized in Japan; oil is extracted from 
shale only in very limited quantities ; 
while it would appear that iron is de-
finitely produced at a loss. But eco-
nomic considerations are not the only 
ones which influence the Japanese 
Government. The resot.U"ces of Man-
churia are intended to assist the de-
velopment of an independent metai-
lurgic system. In any case Japan must 
seek abroad a great part of her coke 
and certain nonsiliceous ores. The 
Three Eastern Provinces may ensure 
greater security in the supplies of cer-
tain pr-oducts which are indispensable 
for her national defence, but heavy 
financial sacrifices may be involved in 
obtaining them. The strategic interests 
of Japan in Manchuria involved "in 
this question have been mentioned · 
elsewhere. Further, Manchuria is not 
likely to supply Japan with those raw 
materials which she needs most for 
her textile industries. 
The Three Northeastern Provinces 
provide a t·egular market for Japa-
nese manufactured· goods; and the im-
,t:.ortance of this market may even in-
crease with their growth in prosperity. 
But Osaka in the past has always de-
pended more on Shanghai than on 
Dairen. The Manchurian market may 
perbaps offer more security, but it is 
more restrictea than the . Chinese 
market. 
The idea of "Economic Blocs" has 
penetrated to Japan from the West . 
The possibility of such a bloc com-
prising the Japanese Empire and Man- · 
churia is ·often found in the 'writings 
of Japanese statesmen, professors and 
journalists. In an article written 
shortly before he took office, the pres-
ent Minister of Commerce and Indus-
try pointed to the formation in , the 
world of such economic blocs, Amer-
ican, Soviet, European and British, and 
stated that Japan should also create 
with Manchuria such a bloc. 
There is nothing at present to show 
that such a system is practicable. 
Some voices have recently been raised 
in Japan to warn their compatriots 
against dangerous illusions. Japan de-
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pends for the bulk of her commerce 
far less on Manchuria than she does 
on the United States, China proper and 
British India. 
Manchuria may become in the future 
of great assistance to an overpopulated 
Japan , but it is as dangerous not to 
discern the limitations of its possibili-
ties. as it is to underestimate their 
value. 
China's Economic Relations 
When studying the economic relations 
of the rest of China with her Three 
Eastern Provinces, it will be apparent 
that, contrary to what we have seen in 
the case of Japan, her chief earlier 
contribution to their development con-
sisted in the sending of seasonal work-
ers and permanent settlers to whom the 
great agricultural development of the 
country is due. More recently, how-
ever, particularly in the last decade, 
her participation in railway construc-
tino and in the development. of mineral 
and forestry resowces and in industry, 
trade and banking, has also shown a 
marked progress, the extent of which 
cannot be adequately shown due to 
lack of data. On the whole it may be 
said that the principal ties between 
Manchuria and the rest of China are 
racial and social rather than economic. 
It has been recalled in Chapter II that 
the present population of Manchuria is, 
in the main, drawn from recent im-
migrations. The spontaneous character 
of these immigrations show clearly how 
they have fulfilled a real need. They 
have been a consequence of famine, 
although they were encouraged to some 
extent by both the Japanese and Chi-
nese-. 
The Japanese hav~ for a number of 
years recruited. Chinese labor for the 
Fushun mines, for the Daire,n harbor 
works and for the construction of rail-
way lines. But the number of Chi-
nese thus recruited has always been' 
very limited and this recruitment ceas-
ed in 1927, when it appeared that the 
local supp:ies of labor were sufficient. 
The Provincial authorities in Man-
churia have also on several occasions 
assisted the settlement of Chinese im-
migrants, although in practice these 
activities of the authorities of the 
Three- Eastern Provinces have only 
had a limited influence on immigration. 
The authorities in North China, and 
the charitable societies, have also in 
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certain periods endeavorEtl to encour-
age the settlement of families in Man-
churia. 
The principal assistance received by 
the immigrants has been the reduced 
ra~s offered by the South Manchuria 
Railway, the Chinese lines and the 
Chinese Eastern Railway. These en-
couragements given to newcomers 
showed that at least until the end of 
1931, the South Manchuria Railway. the 
Manchurian provincial authorities and 
the Chinese Government regarded this 
exodus with favor; all of them profit-
ed by the peopling of the Three East.-
em Provinces, although their interests 
in the movement were not always iden-
tical. 
Old Relations Kept 
Emigrants, once settled in. Manchuri~ 
maintain their relations with their prer 
vince of origin in China proper. This 
is best shown by a study -0£ the re-
mittances that the emigrants sent back 
to their families in the villages of their 
birth. It is impossible to estimate the 
total of these remittances, which are ef-
fected through banks, through the post 
and through money taken back by re-
turning emigrants. It is believed that 
twenty million dollars are so take• 
annually into Shantung end Hopei 
while the postoffice statistics showed ia 
1928 that the Provinces of Liaoning and 
Kirin remitted to the Province of 
Shantung by money orders a sum equal 
to the amount remitted to that pro-
vince by all the other provinces in 
China. There is no doubt that these 
remittances. foi-m an important economic 
link bettween Manchuria and China 
P.toper. They are the index of the 
contact maintained between the emi-
grants and their families in the pro-
vinces of their origin. This contact is 
all the eader because conditions on 
either side of the Great Wall do not 
greatly differ. The produce of the soil 
is in the main the same and the agri-
cultural methods identical. The m:>st. 
pronounced variations between agricul-
tural conditions in Manchuria and in 
Shantung are caused by differences of 
climate, varying density of population 
and different states of economic de~ 
velopment. These factors do not pre-
vent the agriculture of the Three East-
ern Provinces from tending to resemble 
more and more- the agricultural condi~ 
ti.ans in Shantung. In Liaoning, a long 
settled territory, rural conditions re-
semble more closely those in Shantung 
than do those in Heilungkiang, a terri-
tory more recently opened up. 
The organization of direct trade with 
the agriculturalists in Manchuria re-
sembles also the conditions in China 
proper. In the Three Provinces such 
commerce is pi the hands of Chinese. 
who alone buy directly from the 
farmers. 'Similarly in the Three Pro-
vinces as in China Proper, credit per-
forms an important function in such 
local trade. One can even say that 
the resemblance in commercial organ-
ization in Manchuria and China Pro-
,per is found not only in local coun-
tryside trade but also in trade in the 
towns. 
In -fact, the social and economic Chi-
nese organization in Manchuria is a 
transplanted society which has kept 
the customs, dialect and activities of 
tts home. The only changes necessary 
,are those required to meet the condi-
tions of a land more vast, less in-
habited and more open to outside in-
fluences. 
The question arises whether this 
mass migration has been merely an 
episode or whether it will continue in 
the future. When account is taken of 
the areas in South Manchuria and 
certain valleys in the south and• east, 
such as the Sungari, Liao and Mu-
tanchiang valieys, it is clear that from 
the purely agricultural p-oin_t 'Of view, 
Manchuria can still absorb inwnerous 
colonists. According to one ,of lthe 
best experts on the staff of 'file Chi-
nese Eastern Railway, the population 
of Manchuria could reach in ~ years 
a figure of 75,000,000. 
Conditions May Limit 
But economic conditions may in the 
future limit the rapid growth of the 
population of Manchuria. Economic 
conditions in fact alone render the 
future of soya bean farming uncertain. 
On the other hand, crops recently in-
troduced into Manchuria, especially rice 
farming, may develop there. The 
hopes which some Japanese have placed 
in the development of cotton growing 
Seem to be subject to certain limita-
tions. Consequently economic and 
technical factors may to some extent 
limit the entry of newcomers into the 
Three Provinces. 
The recent political events are not 
the only cause of the decline of Chi-
nese migration into Manchuria. The 
economic crisis had already in the first 
six months of the year 1931 diminished 
the importance of the seasonal migra-
tion The world depression added·_ to 
the effect of an unavoidable local 
cnSls. Once this economic crisis is 
over and order }-_as been re-established, 
Manchuria may once more serve as an 
outlet for the population of China 
proper. The Chinese are the people 
best adapted for the colonisation of 
Manchuria. An artificial restriction of 
this migration by arbitrary politica.l 
measures would be prejudicial to the 
interests of Manchuria as it would be 
to the interests of ,Shantung and 
Hopei. 
The ties between Manchuria and the 
rest of ·China remain chiefly racial and 
social. At the same time economic ties 
are continuously becoming stronger, 
which is shown by the growing com-
mercial relations between Manchuria 
and the rest ot China. Nevertheless, 
according to customs' returns, Japan 
remains the best customer and chief 
supplier of Manchuria, China Proper 
occupying the second place. 
The chief imports from Manchuria 
into the rest of China are the soya 
bean -and its derivatives, coal and 
small amounts o'f groundnut.s, raw .silk, 
miscrellaneous ceueals and a very limit-
ed amount of .iron, maize, wool and 
timber. 'The chief exports to Manchu-
ria from China Proper are cotton piece 
goods, tobacco preparations, sllken and 
other texiles, tea, cereals and seeds, 
raw cotton, paper and wheat flour. 
Consequently China Proper relies on 
Manchuria for certain foodstuffs, most 
important of which is the soya bean 
and its derivaties, but her imports of 
minerals with the exception of coal 
and her imports of timber, animal pro-
ducts and raw materials for manufac-
turing purposes have in the past been 
slight. Furthermore, China proper is 
able to use only a portion of Manchu-
ria's favorable balance to offset its own 
unfavorable balance. It is able to do 
this not by virtue of its poltical affi-
liation as such, as is generally thought, 
but chiefly because the Manchurian 
postoffices and customs have been high-
ly profitable institutions and because 
of the substantial remittances of Chi-
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nese settlers ·to their families in Shang-
hai and Hopei. 
Comments Offered 
The resources of Manchuria are great, 
and as yet not fully ascertained. For 
their development they require popula-
tion, capital, technical skill, organiza-
tion and internal security. The popu-
lation is almost entirely supplied by 
China. Large numbers of the existing 
population - were born in provinces of 
North China where their family . ties are 
still very close. Capital, technical skill 
and organization have hitherto chiefly 
been provided by Japan in South Man-
churia and by Russia north of Chang-
chun. Other foreign countries to a 
much smaller degree have inter~ 
throughout the Three Provinces but 
, principally in the large cities; Their 
· representatives have exercised a con-
. ciliatory influence in the recent years 
of political tension, and will continue 
to do so, provided that Japan, as the 
dominating rconomic Power, does not 
attempt to monopolize the field. The 
all-important problem at the present 
time is the establishment of an ad-
ministration, acceptable to the popula-
tion and capable of supplying the last 
. need-namely the maintenance of law 
and order. 
No foreign Power could develop 
Manchuria' or reap any benefit from 
an attempt to control it without the 
· good will and wholehearted co-opera-
tion of the Chinese masses which form 
the bulk of the population, tilling its 
soil, and supplying the labor for prac-
tically. every enterprise in the coun-
try. Neither will China ever be free 
from anxiety and danger unless these 
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northern Provinces cease to afford a 
battleground for the conflicting ambi-
tions of neighboring Powers. It is as 
necessary therefore for China to satis-
fy the economic interests of Japan in 
this territory as for Japan to recognize 
the unalterably Chinese charact~r of 
its population. 
Parallel to an understanding of this 
kind and in order to allow all inter-
ested Powers to co-operate in the de-
. velopment of Manchuria it seems es-
sential that the principle of the Open 
Door should be maintained, not only 
from the legal point of view but also 
in the actual practice of trade, in-
dustry and banking. Among foreign 
businessmen in Manchuria other than 
Japanese there is a fear that .Japanese 
, business concerns will try to· reap 
benefit from the present political posi-
tion by other means than those of free 
competition. If this fear came to b~ 
justified, foreign interests would be 
· discouraged and the population of 
·Manchuria might be the first to suffer. 
The maintenance of a real Open Door 
manifested by free competition in the 
field of trade, investment, and finance, 
would be in the interest of both Japan 
China.(•) 
( * ) In this connection it is necessary 
to mention the extraordinary extent to 
which goods are being smuggled into 
Manchuria, especially over the Korean 
border and through Dairen. Not only ls 
this practice • detrimental to the Customs 
revenue but it disorganizes trade, and 
rightly or wrongly gives rise to the belief 
that the Power which has virtual cantroi 
over the Customs Administration might 




Principles and Conditions of Settlement 
In the previous chapters of this re-
port it has been shown that, though 
the issues between China and Japan 
were not in themselves incapable of 
solution by arbitral procedure, yet the 
handling of them by their respective 
Governments, especially those relating 
t,0 Manchuria, had so embittered their 
relations as sooner or later to make 
· a conflict inevitable. A sketch has been 
given of China as a nation in evolu-
tion with all the political upheavals, 
social disorders, and disruptive ten-
dencies inseparable from such a period 
of transition. It has been shown how 
seriously the rights and interests claim-
ed· by Japan have been affected by the 
weakness of the authority of the Cen-
tral Government in China, and how 
· anxious Japan has shown herself to 
keep Manchuria apart from · the Gov-
errunent of the rest of China. A brief 
• survey of the respective policies of the 
Chinese, Russian and Japanese Gov-
ernments in Manchuria has revealed 
the . fact that the administration . of 
these Provinces has more than once 
been declared by their rulers to be in-
dependent from the Central Govern-
ment of China, yet no wish to be sepa-
rated from the rest of China has ever 
been expressed by their population, 
which is overwhelmingly Chinese. Fin-
. ally, . we have examined carefully and 
thoroughly the actual events which 
took place on and subsequent to 
September 18, 193.l, and have express-
ed our opinion. 
A point has now been reached when 
attention can be concentrated ou the 
future, and we would dismiss the past 
with this final reflection. It must be 
apparent ta every reader of the preced-
ing chapter that the issues involved in 
this conflict are not as simple as they 
are often represented to be. They are, 
on the contrary, exceedingly complicat-
ed, -and only an intimate knowledge of 
all the facts, as well as of their his-
torical background should entitle any 
one to express a definite op.inion upon 
them. This is not a case in which one 
country has declared war on another 
country without previously exhausting 
the opportunities for conciliation pro-
vided in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. Neither is it a simple case 
of the violation of tl'e frontier ·of. one 
country by the armea forces of a neigh-
boring country, because in Manchuria 
there are many features without an ex-
act parallel in other parts of the wurld. 
Rights Not Clearly Defined 
The dispute has arise~ between two 
States, both members of 'the League. 
concerning a territory the 'size of 
France and Germany comp~ed, in 
which both claim to have rights and 
interests only some of which are clear-
ly defined by international law; o. ter-
ritory which, although legally an in-
tegral part of China, had a local ad-
ministration of sufficiently autonomous 
character to carry on direct neg.>tia-
tions with Japan on tlie matters which 
lay at the root of this conflict. ~. 
Japan controls a railway and a strip 
of territory running from the sea right 
up into the heart of Manchuria, and 
she maintains for the protection of tbat 
property a force of about 10,000 ~oUiers, 
which she claims the right by treaty 
to increase, if necessary, up to 15,000. 
She also exercises the rights of juris-
diction over all her subjects in Man-
churia, and maintains consular police 
throughout the country. . 
These facts must be considered by 
those who debate the issues. It is a 
fact that without a declaration of war 
a large area of what was indisputably 
the Chinese territory has been forcibly 
seized and occupied by the armed 
forces of Japan, and has in consequ-
ence of this operation ~en separated 
from and declared indepetidfnt of the 
rest of. China. The steps by which this 
1lJ 
was .accomplished are claimed by Japan 
to have been consistent with the obli-
gations of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the 
Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all 
of which were designed to prevent ac-
tion of this kind. Moreover, the opera-
tion which had only just .begun when 
the matter was first brought to the 
notice of the League was completed 
during the following months and is held 
by the Japanese Government to be con-
!;iistent with the assurances given by 
their representative at Geneva on 
September 30 and December 10. The 
justification .in this case has been that 
all the military .operations have been 
~egitimate acts of self-defence, the .right 
of whicb is implicit in all the multila-
teral treaties mentioned above, and was 
not taken away by any of the resolu-
tions of the Council of 'the League. 
Further, the administration which has 
been substituted for tbat of China in 
the Three Pro'9inces is justified on the 
grounds that its .establishment was the 
act of the local population who, by 
· a spontaneous assertion of tbeir inde-
pendence, have severed all connection 
with China and established their own 
Government. Such a genuine indepen-
dence movement, it is claimed, is not 
prohibited by any international ,treaty 
or by any of tbe resolutions of the 
Council of the League 'of Nations; -and 
the fact of its having taken place has 
profoundly modified the application of 
the Nine-Power Tre-aty and entirely al-
tered the whole character of t1le prob-
Jezn bein_g investigated by the LeaguE'. 
Both Complicated, Serious 
It is this plea of justification which 
makes this particular conflict at once 
.EO complicated and so _serious. 'It is not 
the fuhction of our Commission to argue 
the issue, but iW'e have tried to p.rovide 
sufficient .material to enable the League 
of Nations to settle the dispute con-
sistently with the honor, dignity and 
• national .interest of both the contending 
parties. ·Criticism alone will not ac-
complish this: there must also be prac-
tical efforts at conciliation. We have 
been at pains to find out the truth re-
garaing past events in Manchuria, and 
to state it frankly we recognise that 
this is only part, .and by no mea~ the 
most important part, of ou:r work. We 
have throughout our mission offered to 
118 
the Governments of both countries the 
help of the League of Nations in com-
posing their differences and we con-
clude it by offering to the League our 
suggestions for securing, consistently 
with justice and with peace, the per-
manent interests of China and Japan in 
Manchuria. 
It must be clear from everything 
that we have already said that a mere 
restoration of the status quo ante would 
be no solution. Since the present con-
flict arose .out of the conditions prevail-
ing before last September, to restore 
these conditions would merely be to in-
vite a repetition of the trouble. It 
would be to treat the whole question 
theoretically and to leave out of ac-
eount the realities of the situation. 
From what we have said in the· two 
preceding chapters. the maintenance 
and recc:ignition of the present regime 
in Manchuria would be equally un-
satisfacfory. Such a solution does not 
appear to us compatible with the 
fundamental principles of existing in-
ternational obli,:?ations, nor with the 
good understanding between ,the twn 
countries upon which peace in the Fa'l" 
East depends. It is opposed to the 
interests of China. It disregards the 
wishes of the people of Manchuria, and 
it is at least questionable whether it 
would ultimateJ,y serve the perman~ 
interests of Japan. 
Chinese Feelings Certain 
About the feelings of the people of 
Manchuria toward the present regime 
there can really be no doubt; and China 
would not voluntarily accept as a last-
ing solutio,n the complete separation 
of her Three Eastern Provinces. The 
analogy o1 the distant province of Out... 
er Mongolia is not an entirely per-
tinent one, as Outer Mongolia is bound 
to China by no strong economic or 
social ties, and is sparsely inhabited 
by a population which is mainly non-
Chinese. The situation in Manchuria 
is radically different from That in Out-
el" Mongolia. The millions of Chinese 
farmers now setfled permanently on the 
land have made Manchuria in many 
respects a simple extension of China 
south of the Wall. The Three ·Eastern 
Provinces ha-o-e become almost as Chi-
nese in race, culture and national senU-
ment as the neighboring Provinces of 
Hopei and 'Shantung, from whidh most 
of the immigrants <?ame. 
· Apart from 1:his, past experience 
-has shown that those who control 
Manchuria have exercised a consider-
·able influence on the affairs of the 
rest of China-at least of North China 
-:.and possess unquestionable stTategic 
and political advantages. To cut off 
fuese Provinces from the rest of Chin!l, 
either legally or actually, would be to 
ereate for the future a serious irri-
dentist problem which would endanger 
peace by keeping alive the hostiliw 
of China and rendering probab1.e the 
continued boycott of Japanese goods. 
The Commission received ,from the 
Japanese Government a clear and 
valuable statement of the vital inter-
ests of the'ir country in Manchuria. 
Without •exaggerating the economic de-
pendence o'f Japan on Manchuria 'be-
!Y'Ond the limits ascribed to it in a 
~revious chapter. and certainly with-
out suggesting that economic relation-
ship entitles Japan to contro-1 the eco-
nomic, still less the political devel-
opment of those Provinces, we rec. 
ognize the great importance of Man-
churia in the economic development 
Qf Japan. Nor do we consider · un-
easonable her demand for the estab-
iishment of a stable government whi~ 
ould be -capable of maintaining the 
order necessary for the economic de-
elopment o'f the country. But ·such 
conditions can only be securely and 
effectively guaranteed by an admin-
i.slration which is in conformity with 
the wishes of 'the population and 
which takes full account of their feel-
ings and aspirations. And equally is 
H only in an atmosphere of external 
confidence and internal peace verv 
different from that now existing' in the 
Far :East, that the capital which is 
necessary for the rapid economic clP-
velopment of Manchuria will be forth. 
coming. 
Japanese Need Chinese Market 
In spite of the pressure of increas-
ing over-population, the Japanese have 
not as yet fully utilized their existin~ 
facilities for emigration, and the Japa-
nese Governmetit has no't hitherto con-
templated a large emigration of their 
t>OOPle to Manchuria. But the Japa-
nese do look to further industrializa-
tidn as a . means to cope with 'the a2-
rarian C'risis and with 'the poptda'tiion 
problem: Such !industrialization would 
require further economic outlets, and 
the only large and relatively sUJ.1e 
markets that Japan can find are in 
Asia 'and particularly in China. Japan 
requires not only the Manchurian but 
the whole Chinese market, and the ris<.' 
in the standard of living which will 
certainly follow the consolidation and 
modernization nf China should stimu-
late trade and raise the purchasinli! 
power of the Chinese market. 
This economic rapprochement be-
tween .Japan ·and China, which is of 
vital interest to .Japan, is of equal in-
terest to China, for China would find 
that a closer economic .and technical 
collaboration with Japan would as~t 
her in her primary task .of national re-
construction. China could assist this 
rapprochem_ent by restraining the more 
intolerant tendencies of her nationalism 
· and by giving effective guarantees that 
as soon as ordial relations were re-
established ithe practice of. organized 
!boycotts would not be revived. Japan, 
on her side, -could facilitate this rap-
iprochement by renouncing any attempt 
to :solve the Manchurian problem by 
isolating it from the p:r:oblem of her 
relations with China as a whole, in 
uch a way as to make impossible the 
fu-iendship and collaboration of China. 
It may, however, be less economic 
consid anons than -aruciety -for b-er own 
security which has determined the ac-
tions and policy of Japan :in Manchuria. 
it is especially in this connection that 
her statesmen and military authorities 
are ,accustomed to -speak of MaDchuria 
as "the We-line of Japan." One can 
sympathize with · such anxieties and 
try 'to appreciate the actions and 
motives -0£ those who hav-e to bear the 
1heavy responsibility of securing the 
defen.ce of their country against :all 
eventualities. While acknowledging 
the interest of Japan in preventing 
Manchuria from serving as a base of 
operations directed against ·her own 
territory, and .even her wish to be able 
to take all appropriate military meas-
ures if in certain circumstances the 
frontiers of Manchuria should be cross-
ed by the forces of a foreign Pewer, 
it may still be questioned whether the 
military occupation· of Manchuria Jf.oy 
an indefinite perit>d, involving, as it 
must, a ht-avy financial burden, is re:al ... 
ly the most effective way of in1 r: , 
against this exter~l danger; and whe-
. ther, in'.·the event of aggression having 
to be resisted in tp.is way, the Japa-
nese troops in Manchuria would not 
·be seriously embarrassed if they were 
, surrounded by a restive or rebellious 
population backed by a hostile China. 
It , is surely in the interest of .Jap&n 
· to consider also other possible solu-
tions of the problem of security, which 
would be more in keeping with the 
principles on which rests the present 
peace organization of the world, and 
analogous to arrangements concludec 
by other Great Powers in various par!s 
of the world. She might even find it 
possible, with the sympathy and gooci-
\Vi.11 of the rest of the world, an'd :.:it 
no cost to herself, to obtain better se-
curity than she will obtain by the cost .. 
ly method she is at present adopfrng 
Other Powers Interested 
Apart from China and Japan, other 
Powers of ·the world have also im-
. portant interests to defend in this Sino-
. Japanese conflict. • We have already re-
. £erred to existing multilateral treaties, 
and any real and lasting solution by 
· agreement ·must be compatible with the 
· stipulations· of these fundamental agree-
ments on which is based the peace or-
ganisation of the world. The considera-
tions which actuated the representatives 
of the Powers at the Washington Con-
. ference are still valid. It is quite as. 
much in the interests of the Powers 
now as it was in 1922 to assist the re-
construction of China and to maintain 
· her sovereignty and her territorial and 
· administrative integrity as indispens-
able to the maintenance of peace. Any 
disintegration of China might lead, per-
. haps rapidly to serious international 
rivalries, which would become all thP 
more bitter if they should happen to 
. coincide ,with rivalries between diver-
. gent social gystems. Finally thf" inter~ 
ests of peace are the same the world 
over. · Any loss of confidence in . the 
application of the principles of the 
Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in 
any part of the· world diminishes the 
value and efficacy of those principles 
. everywhere. , 
The Commission has not been able 
to obtain direct information as to the 
· extent of the interests of the U .S.S.R. 
in Manchuria, nor to ascertain the 
views of the Government of the U.S.S.R. 
on the Manchurian question. But even 
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without sources of direct information 
it cannot overlook the part played by 
Russia in Manchuria nor the important 
interests which the U.S.S.R. have iu 
that region as owners of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway, and of the territory 
beyond it,; north and northeast fron-
tiers. It is clear that any solution of 
. the problem of Manchuria which ignor-
ed the important interests of the U. 
S.S.R. would risk a future breach of 
.the peace and would not be permanent. 
"These considerations are sufficient 
to indicate the lines on which a solu-
tion .might be reached if the Govern-
ments of China and Japan could re-
cognize the identity of their chief in-
terests and were willin2 to make them 
· include the maintenance of peace and 
the establishment of cordial relations 
with each other. As already stated. 
there is no question of returning to 
.the conditions before September. 1931. 
A satisfactory regime for the future 
might be evolved out of the present one 
without any violent change. In the 
next chapter we offer certain ~ugges-
tions for doing this, but we -would first 
define the general principles to which 
any satisfactory solution should con-
form. They are the following: 
1. Compatibility with the interests 
of both China and Japan. . 
"Both countries are members of the 
League and each is entitled to claim 
. the same consideration from the 
League. A solution from which both 
did not rferive benefit would · not be a 
gain to the cause of peace. 
2. Consideration for the interests of 
U.S.S.R . 
To make peace between two of the 
neighboring countries without regard 
for• the interests of the third would be 
neither just nor wise, nor in the in-
terests of peace. 
3. Conformity with existing multi-
lateral treaties. 
Any solution should confo.nn to :·he 
provisions of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the Pact of Paric;, 
and the Nine-Power Treaty of Wash-
. ington. 
4. Recognition of Japan's interests 
in Manchuria. 
The rights and interests of Japan 
in Manchuria are facts which canaot 
be ignored,. ar.d any solution which 
failed to recognize them and to takP. 
int.o account also the historical as-
sociations of Japan with that country 
would not be satisfactory. 
5. The establishment of new, treaty 
relations between China and Japan. 
A · re-statement of the Tespective 
rights, interests and responsibilities ~ 
both countries in Manchuria in new 
treaties, which shall be part of the 
settlement by agreement, is desirable 
, if future friction is to be avoided, and 
mutual confidence and co-ol)eration is 
to be restored. 
6. Effective provision for the settle-
ment of future disputes. 
As a corollary to the above, it is 
necessary that provision should be 
made for facilitating the prompt settle-
ment of minor d~putes as they arise. 
7. Manchurian autonomy. 
The government in Manchuria should 
be modified in such a way as to secure, 
consistently with the sovereignty and 
administrative integrity of China, a 
large measure of autonomy designed to 
meet the local conditions and special 
characteristics of the Three Provinces. 
The new civil re2ime must be so con-
stituted and conducted as to satisfy the 
essential requirements of good govern-
ment. 
8. Internal order and security 
against external aggression. 
The internal order of the country 
should be secured by an effective local 
gendarmerie force, and security against 
external aggression should be provided 
by the withdrawal of all armed forces 
other than gendarmerie and by the con-
clusion of a treaty of non-aggression 
between the countries interested. 
9. Encouragement of an economic 
rapprochement between China and Ja-
pan. 
For this purpose a new commercial 
treaty between the two countries is de-
sirable. Such a treaty should aim at 
placing on an equitable basis the com-
mercial relations between the two coun-
tries and bringing them into conformity 
with their improved political relations. 
10. International Co-operation in 
Chinese reconstruction. 
Since the present political instability 
in China is an obstacle to friendship 
with Japan and an anxiety to the rest 
of the world, as the maintenance of 
peace in· the Far ' East· is ·a ·matter of 
international concern; and since "the 
conditions enumerated &hove cannot be 
· fulfilled without a: strong Central Gov-
, ernment in China, the fin&l requisite 
for a satisfactory solution is temporary 
international co-operation in the ·inter-
nal reconstruction of 'China. as suggest-
ed by the late Dr. S~n Yat-sen. 
· If the present S\iuation could be 
modifted · in such a way as to satisfy 
these conditions, and embody these 
ideas; China and Japan would have 
achieved a solution o their difficultle$ 
which might be made the starting point 
of a new era of close understandmg 
and political 'co-operation between them. 
If such a rapprochement is not secur-
ed, no solution, whatever its terms, 
can really be fruitful. Is it really im-
possible to contemplate such a new re-
lationship even in this hour of crisis? 
Young Japan is clamorous for stroni 
measures in China and a policy of 
thoroughness in Manchuria. Those who 
make these demands are tired of the 
delays and pin-pricks of t1'e pre-Sep-
tember period; they are impetuous, and 
impatient to gain their end. But even 
in Japan appropriate means must be 
found for the attainment of every end 
After making the acquaintance of ~ome 
of the more ardent exponents of this 
'positive' policy, and those especially 
who, with undoubted idealism and 
great personal devotion have constitut-
ed themselves the pioneers of a deli-
cate undertaking in the 'Manchukuo• 
regime, it is impossible not to realize 
that at the heart of the problem for 
Japan lies her anxiety concerning the 
political development of modern China, 
and the future to which it is tendinJ;?. 
This anxiety has led to action with the 
object of controlling that development 
and steering its course in directions 
which will secure the economic inter-
ests of Japan and satisfy strategic re-
quirements for the defence of her 
Empire. 
Japanese oprmon is nevertheless 
vaguely conscious that it is no lonJ!er 
practicable to have two separate poli-
cies. one for Manchuria and one for 
the rest of China. Even with her Man-
churian interests as a goal, therefore. 
Japan might recognize and welcome · 
sympathetically the renaissance of Chi-
nese national sentiment; might make 
friends with it, guide it in her direc-
-Uon· · and -offer it support, if only to 
ensure that it does not seek suoI>ort 
elsewhere. 
In China, too, as thoughful men 
have c-ome to recognize that the vital 
problem, the real national problem, fa!: 
their country is the reconstruction .and 
mod'ernization of the State, they .can-
not fail to realize that this policy of 
reconstruction and modernization, al-
ready initiated with so much promise-
of ,success, ·necessitates for its ful:fill-
ment the ·cultivation ·of frierully re1a-
. tfobs' with all countries, and ·~hove all 
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with that great nation which is theiJ? 
nearest neighbor. China needs, in poli-
tical and economic matters, the co-
operation of all the leading Powers, 
but especially valuable to her would 
be the 'friendly attitude of the Japa-
nese Government and the economic co-
operation of Japan in Manchuria. All 
the other claims of her newly awaken-
ed nationalism-'legitimate and urgent 
though they may be-should be sub-
ordinated 'to this one dominating need 
for the effective internal reconstruc.-
tion of the State. 
CHAPTER X 
Consideration and Suggestions to the Council 
It is not the function of the Com-
mission to submit directly to the Gov-
ernments of China and Japan recom-
mendations for the solution of the 
present dispute. But, in order 'to faci-
litate the final solution of existinJ? 
causes of dispute between the two 
countries,' to quote the words used 
by Mr. Briand when explaining to the 
Council the text of the resolution which 
originated the Commission, we now 
offer to the League of Nations, as the 
result of our studies, suggestions de-
signed to help the appropriate organ 
of the League to dTaw up definite pro-
posals fcl:' submission to the parties to 
the dispute. It is should be understood 
that these suggestions are intended ·1s 
an illustration t,£ one way in which the 
conditions we hav'° laid down in tht=> 
preceding chapter might be met. They 
are mainly concerned with broad prin-
ciples; they leave many details to be 
filled in and are susceptible of consider-
able modification by the parties to the 
dispute if they are willing to accept 
some solution on thes 13 lines. 
Even if the formal' recognition of 
'Manchukuo' by Japan should take 
place before our report is considered 
in Geneva-an eventuality which we 
cannot ignore-we d'o not think that 
our work will' have been rendered 
valueless. We believe that in any casP. 
the Council would find that our re-
port contains suggestions which wou1'i 
be helpful for its decisions or for i . · 
recommendations to the two great 
Powers concerned, with the object of 
satisfying their vital interests in Man~ 
churia. 
It is with this obj•ect that, whilst 
bearing in mind the principles of the 
League of Nations, the spirit and letter 
of the treaties concerning China and 
the general interests of peace, we havf"! 
not overlooked existing realities, and 
have taken account of the administra-
tive machinery existing and in proc~ 
of evolution in the Three Eastehl 
Provinces. It would be the function 
of the Council, in the paramount in-
terest of world peace, whatever may 
be the eventuality, to decid how t 
suggestions made in our report may b 
extended and applied to events which 
are still developing from day to day; 
always with the object of securing a 
durable understanding between China 
and Japan by utilizimg all the sound 
forces, whether in ideals or persons. 
whether in thought or action, which 
are at present fe11nenting in Man-
churia. 
Should Invite Discussion 
We suggest in the first place t 
the Council of the League should i,n,. 
vite the Governments of China and 
Japan to discuss a solution of their 
dispute on the lines intlieated in the 
last. chapter. 
If the invitation is accepted, the 
next step would be the summoning u 
soon as possible of an advisory confer-
ence, to discuss and to recommend de-
tailed' proposals for the constitution of 
a special regime for the administration 
of the Three Eastern Provinces. 
Such a conference; it is suggested. 
might be composed of representativeit 
of the Chinese and Japanese Govern-
ments and of two delegations repre-
senting the local population., on 
selected in a manner to be prescribed 
by the Chinese Government and one 
selected in a manner to be prescribed 
by the Japanese Government. H 
agreed by the Parties, t);ie assistance of 
neutral observers might be secured. 
If the conference were unable to 
reach agreement on any particulal' 
point, it would submit to the Council 
the point of difference, and the Coun-
cil would then attempt to secure an 
agreed settlement on these points. 
Simultaneously with the sitting of 
the advisory conference, the matters at 
issue- between Japan and China re]at-
ing to respective rights and interests 
should be discussed separately, in this 
case also, if so agreed, with the help 
of neutral observers. 
Finally, we suggest that the results 
of these discussions and negotiations 
should be embodied in four separate 
instruments: 
1. A declaration by the Govern- . 
ment of China constituting a sp~ial 
administration for the Three Eastern 
Provinces, in the terms recommended 
by the advisory conference; 
2. A Sino-Japanese treaty dealing 
with Japanese interests; 
3. A Sino-Japanese treaty of con- -
ciliation and arbitration, non-aggres-
sion and mutual assistance. 
4. A Sino-Japanese commercial 
treaty. 
It is suggested that, before the meet-
ing of the advisory conference, the 
broad outlines of the form of admin-
istration to be considered by that body 
should be agreed upon between the 
parties, · with the · assfstance of the 
Council. Among the matters to be 
considered at that stage are the follow-
ing: 
The place of meeting of the ad-
visory conference, the nature of the 
representation, and whether or not 
neutral observers are · desired; 
. The principle of the maintenance of 
the territorial and administrative .in-
tegrity of China and the grant of &i 
large measure of ,autonomy to Man· 
churia; 
The policy of. creating a special 
gendarmerie as the sole method of 
maintaining internal order; 
· The principle of setting the various 
matters in dispute by means of thP 
separate treaties suggested; 
· The grant of an amnesty to all 
those who have taken part in the re-
cent · political developments in Man- · 
churia. 
Rest Left to Conference 
When once these broad principles 
have been agreed upon beforehand, 
the fullest possible discretion as re-
gards the details would be left to the 
representatives of the partie.c: at thP 
advisory conference or when negotiat- · 
ing the treaties. Further reference to 
the _Council of the League of Natjo,n s: . 
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would only take place in the event of 
faiiure to agree. 
Among the advantages of this pro-
cedure, it is claimed that, while it ic: 
consistent with the sovereignty of 
China, it will enable effective and prac-
tical measures to be taken to meet 
the situation in Manchuria as it exisu: 
today, and at the same time allow for 
such modifications hereaftler as the 
changes in the internal stuation in 
China may warrant. Notice, for in-
stance, has been taken in this report 
of certain administrative and fiscal 
changes which have either been pro-
posed or actually carried out in Man-
churia recently, such as the reorgani-
zation of provincial governments, the 
creation of a central bank, the em-
ployment of foreign advisers. These 
features might be with advantage re-
tained by the advisory conference. The 
presence at the conference of repre-
sentatives of the inhabitants of Man-
churia, selected in some such way as 
we have suggested, should also facili-
tate the passage from the present to the 
new regime. 
The autonomous regime contemplat-
ed for Manchuria is intended to apply 
to the three provinces of Liaoning 
(Fengtien), Kirin and Heilungkiang 
only. The rights at present enjoyed 
by Japan in the province of Jehol 
(Eastern Inner Mongolia) would be 
dealt with in the treaty on t~ sub-
ject of Japanese interests. 
The four Instruments can now be 
considered ·seriatim: 
1. The Declaration. 
The final proposals of the advisory 
conference would be submitted to the 
Chinese Government, and the Chinese 
Government would embody them in D 
Declaration which would be trans· 
mitted to the League of Nations :md 
to the signatory Powers of the Nine-
Power Treaty. The members of the 
League and the signatory Powers of thP. 
Nine-Power Treaty would take note of 
this declaration, which would be stated 
to have for the Chinese Government 
the binding character of an interna-
tional engagement. 
The conditions under which sub-
sequent revision of the declaration, if 
required, might take place would bP 
laid . down in the declaration itself as 
agreed to in accordance with the Droce-
dure suggested here above. 
-. The. declaration would distin~ 
between the powers of the Central 
Government of China in the ThreP 
Eastern Provinces and those of tht;! 
Autonomous Local Government. 
It is suggested that the powers to 
be reserved to the Central Govern-
ment should be the followin2: 
· 1. The control of general treaty and 
foreign relations not otherwise provid-
ed for; it being understood that the 
central government would not enter 
into any international engagements in-
consistent with the terms of the declara-
tion. 
2. The control of the Customs, the 
Post Office, and the Salt Gabelle and 
possibly of the administration of the 
stamp duty and the tobacco and wine 
taxes. The equitable division between 
the Central Government and the Three 
Eastern Provinces, of the net income 
from these revenues, would be deter-
mined by the advisory conference. 
3. The power of appointment, at 
least in the first instance, of the Chief 
Executive of the Government of the 
Three Eastern Provinces in accordance 
with the procedure to be laid down in 
the declaration. Vacancies would be 
filled in the same way or by some 
system of selection in the Three Eastern 
Provinces, to be agreed upon by the 
advisory conference and inserted in the 
declaration. 
4. The power of issuing to the Chief 
Executive of the Three Eastern Pro-
vinces such instructions as might be 
necessary to ensure the carrying out of 
the international engagements entered 
into by the Central Government of 
China in matters under the administra-
tion of the autonomous Government of 
the Three Eastern Provinces. 
5. Any additional powers agreed 
upon by the conference. 
Rest to Manchuria 
All other powers would be vested 
in the autonomous Government of the 
Three Eastern Provinces. 
Some practical syst~m might be de-
vised to secure an expression of thP 
opinion of the people on the policv 
of the Government, possibly through 
the traditional agency of the Chambers 
of Commerce, Guilds, and other civil 
organizations. 
· Some provision should also be made 
to safeguard the interes~ of W1i\te. 
Russians and other minorities. · 
It is · suggested that a special geri-
1 
darmerie should be organized, with. ·the 
collaboration of foreign instructors, 
which would be the only armed force 
within the Three Eastern Provinces. 
The organization of the gendarmeriP-
should either be completed within a 
period to be specified in advance, or 
the time of its completion should be 
determined in accordance with a pro-
cedure to be laid down in the declara- , 
tion. As this special corps would hP 
the only armed force in the territory 
of the Three Eastern Provinces, its or-
ganization. when completed, should be 
followed by the retirement from this 
territory of all other armed forces. in-
cluding any special bodies of police or 
1·ailway guards, whether Chinese or 
Japanese. 
An adequate number of foreign ad-
visers would be appointed by the Chief 
Executive of the autonomous Govern-
ment, of whom a substantial propor-
tion should be Japanese. The details 
would be worked out by the pr~edure· 
described above, and would be stated 
in the declaration. Nationals of small 
States, as well &s of the Great Powersr 
wo11ld be eligiblt::. 
The appointment of two foreigners 
of different nationalities to . have suo-
ervision of (1) the constabulary, and (2) 
the fiscal administration, would be made 
by the Chief Executive from a pane( 
submitted by the Council of the 
League. These two officials would have 
extensive powers during the period of 
organization and trial of the new re•• 
~ime. The powers of the - advisers 
would be defined in the declaration. 
Basel to Suggest Financier 
The appointment of one foreigner 
as a general adviser to the Central 
Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces 
would be made by the Chief Execu-
tive from a panel submitted by the 
Board of Directors of the Bank for 
International Settlements. 
The employment of foreign advisers 
and officials is in conformity with thP 
policy of the founder of the Chinese 
Nationalist Party, and with that of. 
the present -National Government. Jf. 
will not, we hope, be difficult for Chi-
nese opinion to recognize that the actual • 
situation a~!f the complexity of the 
l25 
forei'.gn interests, rights arid irtfluenc 
in these provinces require special 
measures in the interests of peace anu 
good, government. But it cannot be 
too strongly emphasized that the pre:,-
ence · of the foreign, advisers and of .. 
ficials here suggested, including those 
who,. during the period of the organi-
zation of the new regime, must ex-
er~is,e exceptionally wide powers, mere-
ly represents a form of international 
co-'oi>eration. They must be selected 
ih .a ,~anner acceptable to the Chinese 
dovernment and one which is consis• 
ten't . with th~ sovereignty of China. 
W'fi-en appointed they must ·r~rd 
therilselves as- the- servants of thi; Gov-
ernment employing them, as has al-
wah· been the case in the past with 
the foreigners employed in the Customs 
and Postal administration or with the 
technical organizations of the League 
that. hav~ collaborated with China. Jn 
this- connection the following passage 
fn the sp.eech of Count Uchida in the 
,tapane1ie Diet on August 25. 1932. is of 
~~erest: 
!J "Our own Government since the 
M~i. -~toration, have employed many 
foreigners as advisers or as regular of-
ficials; their number for instancf!, in 
the- year 1875 ,or thereabout, exceeded 
5Q0.". 
,The point must .a lso be stressed that 
the appointment of a relatively large 
number of Japanese advisers in an ~t-
mosphere of Sino-Japanese co-opera-
tion, would enable such officials to con-
ttibute the training and knowledge 
specially suited to local conditions. The 
goal to be kept in view throughout the 
period of transition is the creation of a 
civil service composed entirely of Chi-
nese who will ultimately make-the em-
ployment of foreigners unnecessary. 
2. The Sino-Japanese Tte.aty, d.ealing 
with-Japanese Interests. 
Full discretion would of cows,e be 
left to those who will negotiate the 
three suggested treaties between China 
and Ja:pan, but it may be useful to 
indicate the matters with which it is 
suggested that they should d~al 
The· treaty d'ealing· with Japanese in-
terests in the Three Eastel'n Provinces 
and. with some Japanese interests in the 
Province of J ehol would' have to deal 
principally with certain economic rights 
of Japanese- nationals and wrt:h, l'ail-
1,26· 
way questions. The aims 0, this tr~ 
s-hould .be:- ' 
Ji. The free participation of JapQJl ill 
the economic development of Maa--
churia, which would not carry with. 
it a right to control the country either 
economically_ or politicalbr; ., 
Z. The continuance in the Province-
of Je~10l of such rights as Japan now-
enjoys there; 
· 3. An extension to the wli.ole of 
Manchuria of the right to settle and 
!'ease land, coupled with some modifica-
tion of the principle of extraterritorial-
ity; 
4. An agreement regarding .me, 
operation · o_f the railways. 
Extrality Might Be Modified 
Hitherto, the rights of settlement 
of Japanese nationals have b een coo- • 
fined to South Manchuria, thougn n 
definite boundary line between North. 
and South Manchuria has ever been 
fixed. a1td to J ehol. These rights have 
been exeircised under conditions which 
China . found unacceptable, and this. 
caused, continued friction and conflicts. 
Extraterritorial status as regards taxa-. 
t;ion an~ justice was claimed both for 
the Japanese and the Koreans, and ill, 
the case -of the latter there were spe-
cial stipulations which were ill-defi»-
ecl an9, the subject of disputes. From 
evidence given before the commission 
we have reason to believe that China 
would be willing to extend to the whole 
of Manchuria the present limited right 
of settlement~ provided it was not ac-
companied by extraterritorial status, 
the effect of which, it was claimed.. 
would be to create a Japanese State pi 
the heart of a Chinese territory. 
· Two methods of compromise have. 
suggested themselves. One ts that. the . 
existing rights of settlement, accorn-
panied by extraterritorial status, 
should be maintained and that such 
rights shoulrl be extended both ~o 
Japanese· and Koreans in North- M~n-
churia and Jehol without extraterri-
torial status. The othei: is that the · 
Japanese Should be granted the. ri~ht 
to settle anywhere in Mancburln and 
Jehol with extraterritorial status• and 
that the Kore::ins should have the same 
rights without extraterritorial status;. 
Both proposals have some advantages 
to recommend them, and both have 
rather seri<>us objections, Jt i<;. obviou, 
thaf the · most · satisfactory solution of 
the problem is to make the adminis-
tration of these Provinces so efficient 
that extraterritorial status will no 
longer· be desired. It is with th!$ ob-
ject that we · recommend that at lea:;t 
two foreign advis~rs, one · of whom 
should be of Japanese nationality, 
should be attached to the Supreme 
Court, and other advisers might with 
advantage be attached to other Courts. 
The opinions of these advisers mig~t 
be made public in all cases in which 
the Courts were called upon to an-
judicate on matters in which foreign 
nationals were involved. We also think 
that in the period of reorganization 
some foreign sup~rvision of the ad-
ministration of finance is desirable, 
and, in dealing with the declaration. 
we have presented some suggestions 
i.o that effect. 
Arbitration Tribunal Advised 
A further safeguard would be pro-
vided by the establishment, under the 
treaty of conciliation, of an arbitra-
tion tribunal to deal with any com-
plaints which the Chinese or Japanese 
Governments might bring in their own 
names or in those of their nationals. 
The decision of this complicated and 
difficult question must rest with the 
parties negotiating the Treaty, but the 
present system of foreJgn protection, 
when applied to a minority group as 
numerous as the Koreans, who are, 
moreover, increasing in number, and 
who live in such close touch with the 
Chinese population, is bound to pro-
duce m~ny occasions of irritation, lead-
ing to local incidents and foreign in-
teryention. · In the interests of peace 
it is desirable that this fruitful source 
of friction should be removed. 
Any extension of the rights of set-
tlement in the case of Japanese would 
apply on the same conditions to the 
nationals of all other Powers which en-
joy the benefits of a 'Most Favored 
Nation' clause, provided that those 
Powers whose nationals enjoy extra-
territorial rights. enter into a similar 
treaty with China. . 
As regards railways, it has been 
pointed out in Chapter Ill that there 
has been little or no co-operation in 
the past between the Chinese and Ja-
panese railway builders and authoritie; 
directed to achieving a -compreh~nsive' 
and mutually beneficial railway plan. · 
It is obvious that · if future friction ·1s 
to be avoided, provisions must be made 
in the treaty at present under discus-
sion · for bringing ·to an end the · com-
petitive system of the past; and · sub-· 
tituting ·a common understanding as re-
gards freights and tariffs on the' variow. 
systems. The subject is disc~ed • in 
the special Study No. 1, annexed to 
this report. In the opinion of the com-
mission there are two possible- solutions, 
which could be considered either as 
alternatives or as stages to one final 
solution. . The first, which is the more 
limited in scope, is a working agreement 
between the Chinese and Japanese J;ail-
way administrations which would facili-
tate their co-operation. China and 
Japan might agree to manage their res-
pective railway systems in Manchuria 
on the principle of co-operation and 
a joint Sino-Japanese Railway Commis-
sion, with at least one foreign adviser 
might exercise functions analogo~ 
to those of boards which exist 
in some other countries. A more 
t~orough remedy would be pro-
vided by an amalgamation . of the 
Chinese and Japanese railway inter-
ests. Such ~n amalgamation, if it 
could be agreed upon, would be the 
true mark of that Sino-Japanese eco-
nomic collaboration, to secure which 
is one of the objects of this report. 
While safeguarding the il\terests of 
China, it would place at the di,sposal 
of all the railways in Manchuria the 
benefit of the great technical experi-
ence of the South Manchuria Railway 
and could be evolved without difficulty 
from the system which has been ap-
plied to the railways of Manchuria 
in the last few months. It might even 
pave the way in the future to some 
wider international agreement which 
might include the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. Though a fairly detailed des-
cription of such all amalgamation is 
to be found in the appendix as an ex-
ample of the ~ort of thing that might 
be done, only direct ne.totjatioru; be-
tween the parties could evolve a de-
tailed scheme. Such a solution of the 
railway quesiion would make the South 
Manchuria Railway a purely commer-
cial enterprise, and the security pro-
vided by the special corps of gendar-
merie, when once this body was fully 
organized, would enable the railway 
guard~ to be . withdrawn, thus saving 
i:t - .considerable item of expense. If 
this. is donei it would be well that spe-
cial land regulations and a special 
municipal administratiO'n should prP-
viously be, institute(i in the railway 
area in order to safeguard the vested 
interests of the South Manchuria Rail-
way and of Japanese nationals. 
. If a treaty on these lines could be 
agreed upon, a ·legal ·basis for Japa-
nese rights in the Three Eastern :Pro-
vinces and in J eh61 would have been 
found which would be at least as hene-
ftcia-1: fu ,Jat:>an as the present treatiei; 
and agreements, and one which would 
be more acceptable to China. China 
might then find no difficulty in re-
cogl}izing alt the definite gra,nts made 
th Japan by such treaties and J;lgree-
ments as those of 1915, unless abrogated 
or modified by the new treaty. All 
~inor ri_ghts claimed by Japan. the 
va1idity of which may be opeµ to dis-
pvte, should }>e the subject of agree-
ment1 · In c~se of disagr~ement resort 
should be made to the procedure out-
lined ' in- the Treaty of Conciliation. 
., Treaty of Conciliation 
3.- The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Ag-
gression and Mutual Assistance. 
,It is not necessary to describe in 
any detail the subject matter of this 
treaty, of which there are many prece-
dents and existing examples. 
Such a treaty would provide for a 
Board of Concfliation whose function:, 
would l;>e to assist ih the solution flf 
any difficulties as they arise · betweer. 
the Governments of China and Japan. 
It would glso · P.stablish an arbitration 
tribunal composed of persons with 
judida1 experience and the necessary 
knowledge of the Far East. This trihu-
rial would deijl with any disputes be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese Gov-
ernm~nis regarding the interpretation 
of the 'declaration or of the new trea-
ties; and with such other categories of 
disputes as might be specifiecl in the 
treity . of conciliation . 
Finally, in conformity with the pro-
vJ~ions for Non-}\ggression and Mu-
tual -Assistan<;_e inse~ted \n the Treaty, 
the contra~ting parties should a~ree 
that Manchuria should gradually he ··· 
c~lll~ ~- d-~mili.jarize.d ~re3 . . With this , 
1~ 
object it would be provided that after 
the organisation of the gendarmerie 
had been effected any violation of the 
demilitarized territory by either of the 
parties or by a third party would con-
stitute an act of aggression entitli~ 
the other party, or both parties in the . 
case of a third party attack, to take 
whatever measures might be deemed 
advisable to defend the demilitarized-
territory, without prejudice to the 
right of the Council of the League to 
take action under the Covenant. 
if the Government of the U.S.S.R. 
desired to participate in the Non-
Aggression and Mutual Assistance sec-
tion of suclJ. a treaty, the appropriate . 
clauses co\lld be embodied in a sepa-
rate tripartite agreement. 
4, The Sino-Japanese Commercial 
Treaty. 
The Commercial Treaty would na-
turally have as its object the establish-
mer.t <>f conditions which would en-
courage as much as possible the ex-
change ot goods between China and 
Japan, while safeguarding the existing 
treaty rights of other countries. This 
treaty shc)Uld also contain an under-
taking by the Chinese Government ro· 
take all measures within its power to 
forbid and repress organized boycott 
movements against Japanese trade, 
without prejudice to the individual 
rights of Chinese consumers. 
The above suggestions and consider-
atio,ns regarding the objects of the pro-
posed declaration and treaties are sub-
mitted . for the consideration of the 
Council_ of the League. Whatever may 
be the details of future agreements, 
the essential point is that negotiations 
should qe · begun as soon as possible 
and should be conducted in a spirit 
of mutual confidence. 
Our work is finished. 
Manchuria for a year past has been 
giv~ over to strife and turmoil. 
The population of a large, fertile 
and rich country has been subjected 
to conditions of distress such as it has 
probably never experienced before. 
The relations between China and 
Japan are those of war in disguise, 
and the future is full ·of anxiety. 
We have reported the circumstances 
which have created these conditions. 
~verY.9ne _is ._fully aware_ of J!l~ gr~-
vity of the problem which confronts the 
League of Nations, and of the difficul-
ties of the solution. 
At the moment of concluding our 
report we read in the press two state-
ments by the Foreign Ministers of 
China and Japan, from each of which 
we would extract one point of the ut-
most importance. 
On August 28 Mr. Lo Wen-kan 
declared at Nanking: 
"China is confident that any reason-
able proposal for the settlement of the 
present situation will necessarily be 
compatible with the letter and spirit of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and the anti-war Pact, and the Nine 
Power Treaty, as well as with China's 
sovereign power, and wm also effec-
tively secure a durable peace in the 
Far East." 
On August 30th Count Uchida is 
reported to have declared at Tokyo: 
"The Government considers the 
question of Sino-Japanese relations as 
more important than the question of 
Manchuria and Mongolia." 
We cannot close our report more 
appropriately than by reproducing here 
the thought underlying these two 
statements, so exactly does it corres-
pond with the evidence we have col-
lected, with our own study of the 
problem, and consequently with ottr 
own convictions, so confident are we 
that the policy indicated by these de-
clarations, if promptly and effectively 
applied, could not fail to lead to a 
satisfactory solution of the Manchuian 
question in the best interests of the 
two great countries of the Far East 
and of humanity in general. 
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